



The Federation of
Islamic Associations
of New Zealand (Inc.)

اتحاد الجمعيات الإسلامية النيوزيلندية

SINCE 1979

COLLECTION OF READINGS: ISSUES IMPACTING THE SOCIAL TAPESTRY OF AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND

COUNTER-TERRORISM, RIGHT WING EXTREMISM,
ROLE OF MEDIA, SOCIAL COHESION,
THE HEALING PROCESS AND OTHER TOPICAL ISSUES

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

In the name of Allāh, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

KARAKIA

Kia hora te marino
Kia whakapapa pounamu te moana
Hei huarahi mā tatou I te rangi nei
Aroha atu, aroha mai
Tātou i a tātou katoa.

May peace be widespread
May the sea be like greenstone
A pathway for us all this day
Let us show respect for each other
For one another
Bind us all together !



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FOREWORD

Asalaamu alaikum and Kia Ora Koutou

The foundation of our nation is borne out of the respect of the tanagata whenua and the recognition of Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

The purpose of this Collection of Readings is to offer a NZ Muslim perspective on a number of current issues which are important to discuss as part of our nation building. The social tapestry of country is continually changing and Muslims recognize that we also have an on-going responsibility to make a positive contribution to the national narrative of nation building. Muslims have contributed in many spheres of education, science, medicine, economic, public sector, business, sporting and cultural life of NZ .

The historical footprint of Muslims in Aotearoa New Zealand dates back to two Muslims , Mahmud Qasim and Nasrin , who came as sailors in 1769 on the French ship , Saint Jean Baptiste¹. The current demographic footprint is about 1% of the population at about 62,000 Muslims² from some 80 different ethnicities .

FIANZ as an umbrella organization, offers this collection to highlight our views post-15 March terror tragedy. The niyat or intention is to share our thoughts, expressions and research, which hitherto has been absent in the national socio-political discourse. We recognize this is an embryonic contribution, our identity and values in the NZ context.

Wasalaam and Ngā mihi,

Ibrar Sheikh
President
June 2021

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¹We acknowledge the research by Dr Todd Nachowitz, University of Waikato.
²NZ Census 2018



1.00 - SOCIAL COHESION: AN INITIAL PERSPECTIVE

In the name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful O humankind! We created you from a single pair of a male and a female and made you into nations and tribes that you may know one another.

Quran 49:13

Foundation

Diversity as a demographic reality and a foundational principle is grounded in the history of Aotearoa NZ. If we take Te Tiriti o Waitangi as the basis of our modern nation state, despite what has often been our failure over the decades to uphold its precepts or honour its spirit, then the acceptance of difference is at the very core of our national being.

How we manage such cultural, linguistic, tradition and religious difference is often a reflection of the value we place on diversity. Diversity has the potential to be a faultline running through the strata of land or a vein of gold waiting to be mined. It can break us or enrich us, it is a point of weakness or a mark of strength - and how we approach, manage and lead in this field will set the tone for our generations to come.

The concept of social cohesion is an attempt to reflect this core foundation, to affirm its value and to draw it into a reality we can live by. In the face of rapidly evolving national identities and social values, where unity is no longer based on outmoded ideas of homogeneity, reaffirming our core principles is a means of holding us all together in all of our diversity and coalescing a set of common goals – the recommendations of the Royal Commission Report are a starting point.

Immediately after the tragic events of 15 March 2019, there was an unprecedented response from the general NZ public – with a few notable exceptions this response occurred across all those points of difference that might otherwise have been considered divisive – race, colour, creed, political affiliation, age, ethnicity, urban/rural, education level, income strata, etc

In the face of atrocity we suddenly knew who we were as a nation, who we were not and perhaps more importantly, who we wanted to be.



As a result in the post 15th March context the wider NZ society has become more sensitized to the ways in which social cohesion can be threatened and have indicated a lower social tolerance for such behavior by both individuals and institutions. This serves to provide a well supported, popular and grass roots grounded social impetus to see positive change enacted. The widespread and intricate network of nation-wide community based organisations, also serve as functioning agencies for social cohesion.

For many in the Muslim community, the Government's support for the Royal Commission of Inquiry and its commitment to implementing the recommendations outlined in the Commission's final report, indicate a strong political will to effect change. The governing context now means that such political will may more easily find its expression in concrete action.

Muslim Community as Case Study

Just as Te Tiriti may serve as a blueprint for an inclusive and pluralistic NZ society, likewise in the history of Islam there is the presence of the Madinah Constitution serving fundamentally the same purpose. Madinah was the first Islamic City State, established by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) in 623CE it comprised a community made up of various peoples and tribes espousing different religious creeds (Muslim, Jewish, Christian, Pagan, etc). The Constitution referred to this fledgling society as – one ummah or one community. This has over the centuries formed a foundational principle that informed the development of Islamic civilisations that were both demographically complex as well as geographically expansive.

Today Islam is the second largest religion in the world numbering approximately 1.8 billion adherents and is currently the largest growing faith group among the major world religions. In many ways the Muslim community of Aotearoa NZ is a microcosm of this global snapshot. With a population of 61,455 (approx 1.3% of the total population), the Muslim community has members from over 60 different ethnic groups including Maori, Pasifika and Pakeha.

The social cohesion required to hold together such a variegated and multi-layered community has had to be solid enough to provide a firm footing on which we can all stand, whilst at the same time allowing sufficient flexibility to incorporate a widely diverse and evolving society.

The preceding 2 years have been a tumultuous time for the Muslim community of Aotearoa NZ and at times the faultlines of difference threatened to break apart the very foundations beneath our feet leaving us bereft of solid ground with no place to stand securely and call home. But just as our world turned upside down, the rest of Aotearoa NZ stood firm.



And so together we are looking forward.

Always in the back of our mind, in the silence of our consciousness, in our deep heart we seek to honour the legacy of our 51 martyrs and we say that out of one act of darkness there is the potential for so much light. We have already seen this with the long-awaited changes to the arms legislation being pushed through, the establishment of the Royal Commission, the upgrading of the Office of Ethnic Communities, the appointment of a Minister to oversee the recommendations of the Royal Commission Report, the opening of the discussion around hate crimes, the review of Police procedures around gun licensing and above all the commitment of stakeholders throughout the public and civic sectors to meaningful and authentic engagement.

We are driven and compelled to undertake this work – to make sure that this never happens to our country again. On the 15th of March it was the Muslim community that was so brutally attacked but we know that it could just as easily have been someone else, some other minority community, some other marginalised group, some other vulnerable segment of our society.

And so together we are looking forward. We recognise that the changes that need to happen and the transformation that needs to take place to create a safe and inclusive country for everyone will require an all of Government approach alongside an all of Society approach. We are looking to Government to be our partners in this work and to take up the mantle of leadership for this vital mahi.

May peace be with us all.



2.00 - BELONGING, PARTICIPATION, INCLUSION, RECOGNITION, AND LEGITIMACY: AOTEAROA'S ACCEPTANCE OF ITS CITIZENS WHO ARE ALSO MUSLIMS

Introduction

This very brief opinion piece addresses three important questions that relate to citizens and other residents of Aotearoa who are also Muslims from a wide range of diverse socio-economic and cultural backgrounds and often with a different understanding of Islam stemming from this diversity. This of course is not unique to people who consider themselves Muslims and other religions also are somewhat similar although in the New Zealand context perhaps Islam is conceptualized by non-Muslims as a monolithic and an ahistorical entity, where there are “tolerable” aspects of the religion to be encouraged and “intolerable” aspects to be suppressed. As an introductory comment: how can the complexities and the dynamism of Islam in New Zealand and those who claim to be Muslims be understood as a monolithic religion devoid of its historical development. It is in this context that issues relating to extremism, terrorism, and Islamophobia have influence, albeit somewhat subtly a somewhat “dominant” discourse in how Muslims are perceived in New Zealand.

Here there are three fundamental questions that are being asked and tentative answers suggested/provided as areas for discussion. These questions are as follows:

- 1) What should the discourses in the media generated by the Government of New Zealand explain to the public its position on and understanding of extremism, terrorism, and Islamophobia?**
- 2) What should the Government's policy be on confronting extremism and identifying what types of extremism exist?**
- 3) What should the Government's policy be on confronting acts of terrorism including of course preventing from taking place in the first instance?**

It needs to be noted that these questions are answered in a somewhat truncated and summarized manner but they open the way for much deeper analysis than is possible in this opinion piece.



The Big Picture

New Zealand/Aotearoa is a nation of immigrants from the first Maori people who set sail for Aotearoa from the Polynesian settlers of Central Polynesia to Aotearoa more than 1,000 years ago to the European settlers of the 1830s and 1840s and then to more recent immigration of peoples from many different countries including those countries that have substantial Muslim populations. Although the first Muslim settlers arrived in Aotearoa in the late 19th century. Most of the Muslims who have arrived in New Zealand circa the 1980s qualified to migrate to New Zealand based on their being able to fulfil immigration criteria unless refugees from war torn countries such as Somalia and Afghanistan or under South Pacific immigration programs such as Fijian Indians or as students in institutions of higher learning.

By the late 1970s and especially the early 1980s it was recognized that the New Zealand economy would atrophy without an influx of skilled and enthusiastic migrants and generally irrespective of ethnic, racial or religious affiliation these migrants were welcomed often with “open arms”. Because many were highly skilled and even though they were and still are to some extent discriminated against in the workforce they rapidly made the transition from relying on the Government for income and other forms of social support to income generating and tax paying members of the workforce whether as wage and salary earners of small and medium sized business owners and operators or fee-based professionals. Quantitative data while not disaggregated by religious affiliations clearly demonstrates the economic contribution, they have made to the relatively robust New Zealand economy.

However, this is not the whole picture because these immigrants, Muslims and non-Muslims alike contributed in no small way to transforming the socio-cultural landscape of New Zealand society. This could be seen through Muslims from different societies in the art and music they brought with them to New Zealand, which was not always appreciated by Anglo New Zealanders to foods that few New Zealanders had ever tasted before and to different clothing customs (for instance the *Hajib* that some Muslim women wear) to rituals such as Friday prayers at the mosque or Eid (once more not always appreciated except by Anglo New Zealanders who valued cultural diversity although it must be recognized that outside of urban contexts in cities like Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Hamilton the contribution socially and culturally of Muslims to society was and is still not greatly recognized). For refugees from countries such as Somalia they also provided New Zealand with a cultural diversity that it hitherto lacked.

Thus, clearly Muslims from different societies did not migrate to New Zealand as political extremists or religious fanatics waiting to be “radicalized” by the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Taliban or other putative Islamist groups. That perhaps a mere handful of such Muslim migrants or their offspring either directly or indirectly support one or more groups – and this has not been adequately documented in most instances – does not negate the argument that the overwhelming majority of Muslims from over 50 countries migrated to New Zealand because they wanted to live in a place like New Zealand.



What it appears most Muslims migrating to New Zealand have sought to maintain is both their original culture and ethnic identity while also feeling a sense of belonging to Whenua that is Aotearoa. In this respect these Muslims from different societies are no different to other immigrant groups to New Zealand beginning with the British in the early 19th century or for instance the more recent immigrants from China. New Zealand after all claims to be a multicultural society.

By briefly do a very short sketch of the arrival of Muslims from quite diverse societies into New Zealand from the early 1980s onwards we contextualize Muslim immigrants as immigrants wanting to establish a new home in New Zealand not Muslims looking for opportunities to take advantage of the relative peace and security most people in New Zealand have come to expect and create acts of terror. Indeed, as the Christchurch Mosque massacres reveal it was not Muslims of any background who launched terrorist attacks in New Zealand but an extremely right wing, anti-Muslim racist who wanted to inflict as much harm on Muslims in New Zealand as he could. Below it will be briefly explored how irrespective of this fanatical extremist acting as he did supposedly as a “lone wolf” there are structural and cultural characteristics of New Zealand society that indirectly and of course not deliberately facilitated the enabling environment for this horrendous series of actions to occur. It is now possible to look more closely at the first question.

What should the discourses in the media generated by the Government of New Zealand explain to the public its position on and understanding of extremism, terrorism, and Islamophobia?

Islamophobia per se does not directly lead to terrorism but it really has to be a contributory factor. On the one hand you have “cultural nationalists” who proclaim they are neither ethnocentric or racist but simply do not wish to mix with people identified as Muslims because they feel uncomfortable with how Muslims are supposed to view the world. Such “cultural nationalists” might even embrace some form of multiculturalism but it resonates with what is referred to as “securitization” or “othering” where as a group Muslim individuals and communities are primarily seen as a potential threat to New Zealand’s “national security”. This bias it should be noted has until post the Christchurch Mosque Shootings also impacted some of the agencies that constitute part of the New Zealand Intelligence Community. Underpinning this “conceptual approach” – and here the emphasis is on quasi-intellectual understandings of “cultural nationalism” politics becomes the “politics of fear” rather than “hope and vision”. It also results in marginalizing the democratic role of citizens in national security affairs.

The Government needs to demonstrate to the public that it rejects Islamophobia but to do so is not to express opposition to Islamophobic views held by some of its own citizens but actually demonstrate it rejects Islamophobia. A step in the right direction would be to revisit its own policies on multiculturalism and eschew treating Muslims in New Zealand as though just because they are Muslims does not mean they all have identical belief systems. There maybe some Muslims that are less positive about New Zealand society than other Muslims just as there are non-Muslims who are less than positive about



New Zealand society the way it is and not all of them are Disempowered Anglo New Zealand males. There are more than “50 shades of grey” in this debate and the Government needs to stress the five pillars of social cohesion – belonging, social inclusion, participation, recognition, and legitimacy - which goes beyond just social inclusion (process of improving how individuals and groups participate in and contribute to society on their own terms or social license that enables the Government to undertake its own activities because it has the ongoing approval or acceptance of society to do so. All Muslims in New Zealand if they permit the Government just to categorize them as Muslims and not citizens that of equal status to all other New Zealanders are being put in a position of being subject to Islamophobic bias and prejudice even if the Government (and it does not really matter which political party or parties are the government of the day) is trying to avoid such an outcome.

Extremism by way of contrast and this is well stated in the Royal Commission established in the wake of the Christchurch Mosque shootings could be a precursor to what occurred in Christchurch. Of course, there can be Muslim extremists such as those who may at present or in the past support ISIL or Al-Qaeda but an a more nuanced understanding of for instance the Taliban in Afghanistan that claims it is fighting a war of national liberation is necessary. If the Government sees all Muslim political parties as potentially terrorist (in the New Zealand context it was initially accepted that the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria was a “terrorist party” because it was outlawed by the military in that country in 1992 and the security risk certification by New Zealand’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) of one of its activists Ahmed Zaoui who sought refuge in New Zealand) but ignore historically how the Lehi, pejoratively known as the Stern Gang and that openly admitted it was an extremist terrorist organization played a key role in the formation of the State of Israel at the expense of Arabs and Palestinians post WW2. This is not a history lesson but the Government needs to come to terms with terrorism and its historical roots largely in the foundation of the “modern state”.

Terrorism is also nuanced but what occurred in Christchurch in March 2019 is one of the worst examples of terrorism in a liberal democracy. Most New Zealanders could understand that terrorist attacks have occurred in liberal democracies such as the US, France, Germany, UK, Ireland, and Norway but were shocked when news of the Christchurch Mosque shootings emerged. This was not a terrorist attack by Muslim terrorists but by a seriously racially bigoted and violent Anglo Male: that he came from Australia is really in the scheme of things neither here nor there although his upbringing was in a conservative rural town in Northern New South Wales not too dissimilar to many rural towns throughout New Zealand but especially in the South Island. This “lone wolf” could have equally been a Pakeha New Zealand extremist from anywhere in New Zealand but more likely a rural township or the surrounding hinterland where there is little cultural diversity and the promotion of alternative views are not actively canvassed. Not all extremists are determined to become terrorists but they are more likely to tacitly support such methods to “cleanse” society of those groups who they think hold values diametrically opposed to their own. It is incumbent on the government of the day to loudly proclaim it does not think that Muslims per se in New Zealand are more likely to be terrorists than non-Muslims.



The evidence and a commitment to social cohesion demands of the government it reaches out to all communities and dispel such wrong-headed assertions.

What should the Government's policy be on confronting extremism and identifying what types of extremism exist?

Governments in New Zealand since 2001, specifically the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) have developed a conceptual model of National Security. It is defined as the condition which permits the citizens of the state to go about their daily business confidently free from fear and able to make the most of opportunities to advance their way of life. It encompasses the preparedness, protection and preservation of people and of property, both tangible and intangible. An "All Hazards" approach has been adopted that not only is designed to confront terrorism (only one of eight hazards) but also ranging from preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity to sustaining the economic prosperity and protecting the natural environment. It is a much broader definition of national security than when the SIS was first established in 1956.

However, specific to terrorism the New Zealand Police are accorded legislative power via the Crimes Act of 1961, International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act of 1987, and the Terrorism Suppression Act of 2002 to confront extremism if it likely to lead to terrorist activities. But espionage is the responsibility of the SIS via the New Zealand Security Intelligence Act of 1968 and Government Policy (which of course can change from time-to-time) whereas cyber security is the responsibility of the Government Communications Security Bureau as per the 2003 Act establishing its creation and also Government Policy. The Intelligence Community has six major actors that also include the National Assessments Bureau, the Combined Threat Assessment Group (housed in the SIS), the New Zealand SIGINT Operations Centers (part of the Five Eyes Arrangements with the US, UK, Canada, and Australia, and other agencies (New Zealand Defense Force, Police, Immigration New Zealand, Customs and Ministry of Primary Industry).

As the Christchurch Mosque Shooting reveal none of stakeholders in this community were able to develop any notion that a person or persons like the individual involved was a potential terrorist, Indeed the SIS admitted that up until 2018 it had focused most of its attention on the threat of violent Islamist terrorism. That most of its investigative resources were devoted to counter-terrorism it thought originated with "credible" threats from New Zealand supporters of ISIL to either participate in hostilities abroad (notably Syria) as members of a designated terrorist organization or, if unable or unwilling to travel, to mount, encourage, support or mount terrorist attacks or undertake actions in support of terrorism in New Zealand. Prior to "9/11" the SIS focused most of its attentions on politically progressive individuals and groups in New Zealand ranging from Dr. Bill Sutch the Canterbury University Professor who the SIS goaded on by the Muldoon Government claimed was spying for the Soviet Union, to surveillance of activists such as Trevor Richards and HART opposed to sporting ties with the apartheid regime in



South Africa, and to activists such as Aziz Choudry who opposed some important aspects of new global trading arrangements. In all three instances SIS failed abysmally although the governments of the day, especially the Muldoon led National Party Government tried its best to use the SIS to harass progressive individuals and groups. None of these examples illustrate terrorism should be a major preoccupation for the Intelligence Community. Moreover, the SIS failed to pre-empt the 1985 bombing of the Rainbow Warrior by agents of the French Intelligence Agency (DGSE) or the 2004 purchase of New Zealand passports by Mossad the Israeli Intelligence Agency that were used to assassinate high-ranking PLO officials in the United Arab Emirates.

During the Royal Commission the Director-General of SIS conceded that her organization had hitherto focused too much attention on what it imagined would be terrorist threats from Islamic Groups or their supporters in New Zealand. She conceded that post the Christchurch Mosque Shootings more attention needed to be devoted to right-wing extremism in New Zealand but not to the exclusion of “faith-based” ideologically driven organizations. The insulation here of course that “Islamists” still posed a possible threat to national security in New Zealand. When questioned on issues such as whether any Muslims were recruited by SIS, she said she did not know because applicants were not asked to state their religious affiliation which of course is consistent with human rights instruments both domestically and internationally that New Zealand is a signatory to but hardly conducive to an organization that has failed Muslims in New Zealand in the past and needs to have a more nuanced understanding of all Muslims in New Zealand.

It should not be left to the Intelligence Community to identify who is a potential terrorist or not although intuitively it is not Muslims in New Zealand who are the terrorists but the pockets of right-wing extremists that exist in New Zealand (e.g., activities of the Whanganui Branch of the Right-Wing Resistance Group that accuse Muslim refugees of attempting to transform the culture of New Zealand to suit themselves to “kill everyone” who did not believe in God). Such groups are somewhat similar to those who marched on Capitol Hill in Washington on the 6th of January 2021 goaded on by the defeated anti-Muslim President Trump. Were there American Muslims in this group? The answer is no.

What should the Government’s policy be on confronting acts of terrorism including of course preventing from taking place in the first instance?

The extant question is New Zealand safe from terrorism? The answer to this question is no society in the world is any longer completely safe from terrorism. But it is necessary to identify what type of terrorist and in the New Zealand context it has not been Islamists. The Government must confront acts of terrorism but ideally it should prevent them from taking place in the first instance.



However, the real national security considerations the Government needs to seriously consider are those concerned with transnational organized crime, cyber security incidents, natural hazards, and biosecurity events and pandemics. This is not to say that there will never be a similar terrorist event to the Christchurch Mosque Shootings but it is insufficient to rely on defense, law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

The Government needs to recognize there are different appreciation of risks held by the public at large compared to national security practitioners but as Muslims in New Zealand have been the target of bias and prejudice among government agencies and entities and the victims of the worst terrorist attack in the South Pacific the Government needs to listen to the voices of Muslims in New Zealand. Listening is not a two-hour focus group, key informant interviews or several training modules over two to five days but an iterative process over a longer period of time. But it is also to have an adequate representation of Muslims in positions where they cannot only sensitize those New Zealanders who understand little or nothing about Islam or the ethnic backgrounds of Muslims in New Zealand but are able to provide more effective inputs into policies designed to enhance social cohesion in New Zealand. A time-honored adage is a society is evaluated not on how it treats its major ethnic and religious groups but how it treats its minority ethnic and religious groups.



3.00 - REFLECTIONS AND RESILIENCE

The massacre of Muslims in Christchurch being the 10th deadliest mass shooting in recent history³ and the “darkest day”⁴ in NZ history, has resulted in a complete paradigm shift of the narrative of the peaceful Kiwi way of life. With the sixteen minutes of calculated mayhem caused by brass-encased bullets from AR-15 semi-automatics,⁵ New Zealand joined the endless list of countries who have become casualties of terrorism.

The images of the bloodied corpses of 50 ordinary Kiwis with a similar number of casualties, are now an unfortunate part of the fabric which shapes our historical landscape. The victims aged 3 to 71 years and from many different countries of origin, are all ordinary Kiwis. They were singled out for death because they also happened to be Muslims. The execution-style massacre of Muslims at Masjid Al-Noor and Linwood Masjid will haunt generations of New Zealanders.

Unless steps are taken by all concerned stakeholders to address the healing process, the consequences of this massacre will linger and fester into a generational tragedy. The healing process needs to be well planned. The healing process shall have to be implemented with utmost care and sensitivity. The healing process proffered is guided by the mandates from the Quran and examples from the life of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

SABR (PATIENCE)

“O you who believe! Seek help in patience and As-Salah (the prayer). Truly, Allah is with As-Sabirin (the patient).”

Source: Al-Quran : Surah 2. Al-Baqara, Ayaat 153⁶

Having patience after suffering a tragedy is mandated in the Quran.

At an individual level, Muslims affected by the 15 March Massacre have translated this into seeking solace through prayer and reflection. At an organisational level, FIANZ is also advocating all its constituent organisations and other Muslim organisational stakeholders to remain patient. It is this patience which provides the calm environs to reflect and plan for the future.

³<https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-deadliest-mass-shootings-in-history.html>

⁴<https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/jacinda-ardern-shines-on-new-zealand-s-darkest-day-20190316-p514qh.html>

⁵<https://www.thisinsider.com/christchurch-mass-shooting-photos-inside-linwood-mosque-2019-3>

⁶<http://www.alim.org/library/quran/AlQuran-tafsir/TIK/2/153>



We have highlighted that patience and forbearance should not be considered as inertia, but rather a prerequisite to reflect on what happened and then bring about the inner-strength to address the aftermath of the tragedy which has consumed the whole nation.

The baseline of our priorities is to ensure the welfare of the victims and their families, the need for calm and patience by Muslims and a planned and systematic healing process which ensures that the outpouring of love, care and the unity of New Zealanders is sustained and translated into tangible social constructs for the future.

SHUKUR (GRATITUDE)

*Prophet Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him, said,
"He who does not thank people, does not thank Allah"
(Ahmad, Tirmidhi).*

At the outset, our gratitude is to all New Zealanders. People from all corners of NZ, from all walks of life, all races, creeds, and ages have consoled us, stood by us and held out their helping hands at this time of grief.

The outpouring has been sincere, concerted and insightful. This is the true New Zealand and what makes Aotearoa unique amongst the nations of the world. We recognise all New Zealanders are united in their stand against such atrocities and the commitment we have all made to work together to mitigate such man-made calamities in the future.

ADL (JUSTICE)

You who believe! Show integrity for the sake of Allah, bearing witness with justice. Do not let hatred for a people incite you into not being just. Be just. (Quran Surat al-Maida, 8)

That justice is delivered is a key part of the healing process. The alleged perpetrator, who shall remain nameless, was caught within a very short time period, due to the diligence of our police. This same diligence has been evident in the method in which justice has been delivered. The Muslims of NZ, have full faith in our justice system.



HIKMAH (WISDOM)

"I have given you the capacity for hearing, sight, and the intellect, and you are responsible for using them effectively.... All impropriety is condemned by your Lord. This is of the wisdom inspired to you by your Lord." [Quran 17:36-39]

Islam advocates rationality against rhetoric, stresses the use of intellect instead of emotion, and reasoned argument above mindless reaction. Hikmah dictates that in the process of healing we have to take stock of the hate-antecedents, mitigate the hate-catalysts and proffer a path to acknowledge and appreciate differences.

“Islamophobia” is as detestable as “apartheid” was in the past and “anti-Semitism” is in the present. When mixed with unchallenged racist behavior and hate speech the potential for violence is most evident, as noted by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance.⁷ Our approach is to address the underlying issues and at the same time have appropriate social-cohesion education programmes. Our preference is to encourage debate and clarify misunderstandings. Such an approach, would lay a strong foundation.

Islam teaches us not to look at humanity through our differences, but rather our similarities. God has given us diversity so we can celebrate the differences and not to condemn those who don't share our views. This is our baseline hikmah.

⁷<https://www.coe.int/en/web/european-commission-against-racism-and-intolerance/hate-speech-and-violence>



4.00 - MEDIA GENERATED ISLAMOPHOBIA

Whilst there is a plethora of information on the media's role in promoting Islamophobia in New Zealand, the research by Rahman and Emadi (2018)⁸ is the most thorough and provides a baseline of data based on empirical research. The research clearly demonstrates that both the NZ media and the international media accessed in NZ (newswires) were more prone to describe Islam in negative terms, such as "Islamic terrorism" and "Islamic jihad"

Table 1: Representations of Islam in NZ media, 2014-2017

Topic	2014		2015		2016		2017	
	NZ	Int'l	NZ	Int'l	NZ	Int'l	NZ	Int'l
"Islam"	1,233	1,561	1,510	1,934	1,015	1,957	1,376	2,515
"Islamic terrorism"	7,178	8,258	10,301	11,683	8,024	10,745	7,774	11,472
"Islamic jihad"	5,630	6,364	8,407	9,291	6,148	7,780	5,199	6,997

Note: Results of searches using the terms "Islam", "Islamic terrorism" and "Islamic jihad" on Newztext database on 17 July 2018

Within this pervading media-generated atmosphere of sustained Islamophobia, an article by the Christchurch Press on 4 June 2014 is particularly damaging. With no reference to any specific or tangible evidence, the article boldly proclaimed that terrorists were radicalised in Christchurch with the image of Masjid Al-Nur in the forefront.

What is even more disturbing was the label of "RADICAL BASE" with a question mark (?). After much debate and Letters to the Editor some 3 days later there was an editorial which stated:

⁸<https://ojs.aut.ac.nz/pacific-journalism-review/article/view/419/622>




There is no real evidence that anyone in Christchurch is engaged in anything other than peaceful and religious activities at the mosque and the rest of the population should keep that firmly in mind. --- Editor ⁹

Unfortunately the damage had already been done. As the Secretary of the Muslim Association at that time wrote to the editor in response to the article :

“Headlines can be killers. The old truth endures – headlines do their work and few people will read a retraction or a correction days later.”¹⁰

It is so sad to note the warning given by the Muslim Association Secretary some 5 years ago, was unfortunately proved to be a harrowing reality on 15 March.



The terrorist who committed the massacre at Masjid Al Nur had read the initial article and the eye-catching headline that the mosque was a radical base. As a justification for the massacre at this Masjid Al Nur, he wrote “it had a history of extremism

The Christchurch Press and other NZ media outlets need to be reminded of their shameful role in engendering Islamophobia through baseless headlines . This is not a case of ‘freedom of expression’ but bordering on ‘calumny through hate mongering’. Such hate mongering has dire and tragic consequences.

This tragic episode has brought to the fore another related issue, namely the sensationalising of stories calculated to demonise some or other marginal group. These stories almost always originate overseas but the New Zealand media always has options on how these stories are relayed across our own country. Regrettably, broader public interest has not always prevailed in editorial considerations, and when this is the case, it nourishes and emboldens certain dormant attitudes and perceptions. Eventually and alas invariably we all harvest a bitter yield. Hopefully, the tragic events of 15 March will lead to some introspection across the media platforms.

⁹<http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/opinion/editorials/10129571/Editorial-Passing-connections-do-not-radicalise-a-mosqu>

¹⁰<https://www.news.com.au/world/pacific/neighbours-associates-of-brenton-tarrant-say-there-was-something-off-about-him/news-story/e76a6f40a2f21f121546bc469bf7e7b7>



5.00 - THE SECURITISATION OF ISLAM AND MUSLIMS

The relevant NZ State sector agencies were unable to anticipate or plan for the attack due to an inappropriate concentration of, or priority setting for, counter-terrorism resources on other perceived threats. This may be partly because of the securitisation of Islam and Muslims. Islam and Muslims have been discursively constructed over decades as a security threat, and counter-terrorism has come to mean the governance of the “threat” of Islam and Muslims in the way society and Government talk, think, and act. The securitisation of Islam and Muslims is not necessarily intentional, and cannot be fully explained by the intentional actions of individual agents. It is a structural issue that involves both official and unofficial security actors, including politicians, academics, and the media. Further, Islamist extremist terrorists have themselves contributed to the securitisation of Islam and Muslims through their nihilistic actions and narrative, while RWE narratives have been mainstreamed by social media, tabloids, provocateurs, and personalities. Our concern is not with apportioning blame, but with solving complex problems.

The political theory of securitisation

According to the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, an issue is securitised when the public legitimate official speech acts that construct the issue as a security threat and call for exceptional security measures to counter it. Past paradigms in security studies, international relations, and international political theory talk about threats as objectively existing, and try to measure their seriousness and develop strategies for governing threats. Securitisation theory is a second-order theory observing the behaviour of the main actors – academic, official, political, and social - in the field. It studies how problems are constructed by security actors as threats to the existence of something which justifies the use of extraordinary measures and elevates the problem to the level of high politics. Security takes a specific rhetorical form:

Some referent object is posited as having a demand on survival and as being existentially threatened; the threat has a swiftness and drama high enough to make a point of no return credible — if not dealt with in time, it will be too late — and therefore this issue can not be left to ordinary practices. The actor that tries to define the situation like this—the securitizing actor—thereby claims a right to use extraordinary measures, and the success of the securitizing move is ultimately decided by the relevant audience in its decision to accept or not accept this operation. Thus, security is neither objective (threats in themselves) nor subjective (a matter of perceptions), but intersubjective and political: Who can securitize what and with what effects?



It is not that securitisations refer to a real threat that exists prior to and independently of the utterance, that can be objectively perceived and measured. Rather, the utterance is itself the speech act that constructs, successfully or not, something as a threat to something that justifies exceptional counter-measures. Speech acts have or lack illocutionary and perlocutionary force.

The original elements of Copenhagen School's securitisation theory are thus:

- who securitises (securitising actor);
- through what language (securitising speech acts);
- on what issues (threats);
- for whom (referent object);
- who is being persuaded or whose legitimisation is being sought (audience);
- why;
- with what results;
- under what conditions.

A securitisation may be successful or not, in terms of achieving practical effects, depending on whether it satisfies the intersubjective and political conditions of the securitising speech act, and produces the effect of the audience legitimating the exceptional measures proposed as necessary to counter the threat.

The construction of a threat always already involves societal dimensions of identity, values, norms, socialisation, narratives, and relationships. New Zealand's securitisation of the threat of nuclear weapons is based on our strong internalisation and entrepreneurship of anti-nuclear norms. It is integral to our national identity and values, and the story that we tell ourselves about who we are as a people and our place in the world. Aotearoa's construction of the threat of climate change is based, in part, on our socialisation into the rules-based international order and belief in multilateral approaches to global problem solving. Our relationships with Pacific peoples also shape how we talk and think about the threat of climate change and our responses to it.

As an official securitising actor, the NZIC plays a critical role in the construction of Islam and Muslims as security threats through its official security narrative. There has been a laudable intentional effort made by the NZIC to prevent the direct securitisation of Islam and Muslims, but the securitisation of Islam and Muslims occurs despite explicit disavowals that terrorism is a Muslim problem. Through its actions and official narrative over decades, the NZIC has contributed to the direct and indirect securitisation of Islam and Muslims.



We make the assumption that the NZIC acts as a rational budget-maximising and power-maximising bureaucracy. The direct and indirect securitisation of Islam and Muslims provides pretext for the NZIC to make increasing budget bids. The 2016 budget gave the intelligence community a \$178.7m dollar boost over four years. Spending on the NZIC has more than doubled from \$67m in 2013 to \$138.6m in 2017. This year the agencies have \$153m. NZSIS staff increased from 240 in 2014/2015 to 335 in 2017/2018. In 2015, former Prime Minister John Key explicitly linked the expansion of national security resources and powers to the Islamic State, while making no mention of the resurgent threat of RWE during the same time period to the “changing security environment”. For comparison, in the Review of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Machinery 2015, the Australian security and intelligence bureaucracy explicitly make the case for removing the budget constraints of the Efficiency Dividend from all ASIO, ASIS, and Federal Police operations by directly and indirectly securitising Islam and Muslims.

After the Christchurch terrorist attack, Western security and intelligence agencies will predictably make increased budget bids, and appeals will be made to legitimate greater powers to govern the threat of RWE. We predict that it will be more challenging to securitise RWE compared to Islamist extremist terrorism, however. The securitisation of Islam and Muslims has manufactured the public opinion that Muslims are a legitimate target of HUMINT and SIGNIT operations, while citizens and residents who are accustomed to being the population whose lives and “way of life” are secured, and the primary audience of securitisations who legitimate exceptional security measures, are not.

“Islam is the problem”

To prevent any confusion and misunderstanding, securitisation theory does not imply that threats are not in a critical sense, “real”. Christchurch shows that the threat of RWE to New Zealanders was all-too-real. While New Zealand has fortunately not been the target of Islamist extremist terrorism, internationally there have been Muslims who commit terrorist acts. There are real extremist ideologies, individuals, organisations, movements, and networks who really threaten the security of different countries, institutions, communities, and people. The real threat of RWE was not constructed as a national security threat to New Zealand.

There are six parts to the claim that Islam and Muslims have been securitised:

- Counter-terrorism has been focused exclusively on Islamist extremist terrorism while ignoring or downplaying other real terrorist threats in security discourse, with the effect of indirectly making terrorism a “Muslim problem”.
- RWE is registered at the level of low politics, as a law and order or community safety issue, not as a security issue proper, or as a lower magnitude threat. This indirectly securitises Islam as a problem or threat of a different order.



- Securitisations have been vague and unstable. Dominant security discourse shifts from neutrally framing Islamist extremist terrorism as a threat to people, property, territory, and institutions in Western countries and in Muslim-majority countries and regions, to framing Islam or Muslims as “the problem”, and as a demographic, normative, or ontological threat to Western “identity”, “values”, and “our way of life”.
- Islam and Muslims are directly and indirectly securitised through the discourse of social cohesion.
- In the Muslim experience, the direct and indirect securitisation of Islam and Muslims is a process and a structure. It is produced and reproduced through the uncoordinated activity of different securitising actors, not only officials. Directly and indirectly, politicians, officials, academics, media, and extremists, both Islamist and right wing, have all contributed to the securitisation of Islam.
- Security discourse is global. Even if New Zealand is neutral and professional, the social forces constructing Islam and Muslims as a threat will influence perceptions and behaviours here.

Exclusive focus

Officials made laudable attempts to not directly securitise Islam and Muslims. The Director-General has stated publicly: “I’ve been careful not to be trying to target a particular community or to say there’s a particular community that’s a problem. If you start saying that, then you’re creating a problem. I’ve been really, really careful not to do that, which is why I talk about behaviours, extremist behaviours.” Tellingly, the same Listener article states that the focus is on “Islamic terrorism”. The failure to analyse and assess other forms of terrorism and speak about these publicly, particularly the resurgent threat of RWE during the past decade, indirectly contributes to the securitisation of Islam and Muslims through an exclusive focus on Islamist terrorism, in effect making terrorism a Muslim issue.

The 2016 Report of the First Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand, “Intelligence and Security in a Free Society” by Hon. Sir Michael Cullen, KNZM, and Dame Patsy Reddy, DNZM, which lead to the Intelligence and Security Act 2017, assessed the “modern threat landscape”. Their assessment frames the terrorist threat exclusively as a Muslim problem, referring to “turmoil in the Middle East”, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and the risk that New Zealanders radicalised by ISIL here or returning from Syria or Iraq will be inspired to carry out attacks on home soil, as has occurred in other Western countries”. No mention is made of RWE attacks that had occurred in other Western countries since Oslo, prior to the review. This created a justification narrative for the expansion of the powers of the security and intelligence agencies that was based exclusively on the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism.

In Australia, our closest security partner, the dominant security narrative exclusively constructs Islamist extremism as a threat to national security, and securitises Islam, migration, and Muslim-majority countries and regions. The 2006 Counter-Terrorism White Paper claims that “Jihadist terrorism is the predominant focus of Australia’s current counter-terrorism efforts due to its spread, impact and explicit targeting of Australians”, and does not refer to RWE or other forms of terrorism.



The recent 2015 Review of Australia's Counter-Terrorism Machinery, assessed the "threat environment" exclusively in terms of Islamist extremist terrorism and explicitly links violent extremism to Muslims. The exclusive focus on Islamist extremist terrorism contributes indirectly to the securitisation of Islam, while the direct securitisation of Islam occurs through repeated references to the Australian Muslim community, "potential terrorists", and "at-risk" "individuals" and "communities". A timeline of seven "Lone actor and self-initiated attacks in the West" between 2012 and 2015 includes only Islamist terrorism and excludes the RWE terrorist lone wolf attacks perpetrated in the West during the same period. It is unclear whether Australian, Phillip Galea, 31, who was charged in August 2016 with plotting RWE terrorist attacks and was allegedly preparing RWE terrorist training manual, was known to security and intelligence services at the time the 2015 Review was being written. The 2016 Australian Defence White Paper exclusively links terrorism to acts "perpetrated or motivated by terrorist groups such as Daesh, al-Qa'ida and others that claim to act in the name of Islam".

Magnitude of the threat

Despite the statistics on terrorism and hate crimes in the West, the problem of Islamist extremist terrorism was discursively constructed as a threat of a fundamentally different order or magnitude to the problem of RWE terrorism, producing the effects of elevating the threat to the level of high politics, expanding the resources and powers of Western security agencies, and mobilising the machinery of Western states and billions of dollars in resources. When RWE is not excluded from focus, it is registered at the level of low politics as a law and order or a community safety issue. In recent years, RWE was increasingly securitised as a threat by the United Kingdom and the United States. However, RWE was not constructed as a global security issue or counter-terrorism priority of the same magnitude as Islamist extremism, which was elevated to the level of high politics through the "Global War on Terror" macrosecuritisation.

Australia's 2015 Counter-Terrorism White Paper claims to "oppose terrorism and violent extremism in all its manifestations, regardless of its ideological or political inspiration". However, it explicitly states that "Terrorism based on other ideological, religious, or political beliefs – such as right wing or left wing extremism – is also of concern, though it does not represent the same magnitude of threat as that posed by violent extremists claiming to act in the name of Islam".

The White Paper mentions the case of Breivik, claiming that it "underscores" the "possibility" of individuals who are not part of a proscribed group committing acts of terrorism in Australia. Under the heading "Other potential threats", the White Paper states that "violent expressions of Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and other racially- and culturally-motivated ideologies" may possibly undermine "social cohesion". The 2015 White Paper goes on to mention that "nationalist and white supremacist movements and individuals" have been "triggered" by the increased threat from Islamist terrorist groups. This trend is framed as reactive, and a problem in terms of "exacerbating local intercommunal tensions" and risking



“reinforcing terrorist recruitment propaganda by fueling perceptions of Muslim persecution”, rather than to Muslim lives or to national security per se. This framing of the “other” potential threat registers RWE at the level of low politics, or in terms of the primary threat of Islamist extremism. The White Paper claims:

Over time, the terrorism threat picture for Australia will change. Groups on the political far right, for instance, have posed a terrorist threat in the past and may resurface. However, there is no significant threat to Australia in the short to medium term.

No evidence is provided for this statement. Yet, by this time, the Australian-born terrorist had become radicalised in Australia and travelled internationally from Australia for RWE purposes.

Vague and unstable securitisations

Interstate conflict and power politics have now returned to the global agenda. However, the dominant macro-interpretation of post-Cold War global order, security, and politics was framed in culturalist or civilisational terms, including the trend toward post-secularism and the popular remobilisation of religion.

118. The Global War on Terror is theorised by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies as a macrosecuritisation at the system level of analysis. Under this macrosecuritisation, vaguely defined security referents oscillate variously between “global security”, “liberal international order”, “the international community”, “the West”, “modernity”, “national security”, “liberal democracy”, “freedom”, “Western values”, “the border”, and “our way of life”. Security threats to these referent objects shift between “terrorism”, “extremism”, “radicalism”, “fundamentalism”, “the Middle East”, “Jihad”, “Muslims”, and “Islam”.

Muslim-majority countries and regions are constructed as “governance failures”, “weak states”, “backward”, “unstable”, or “conflict zones”. Exceptional measures justified by this securitisation of Islam include intelligence operations, invasion, drone warfare, and liberal intervention at home (“muscular liberalism”, “integration”, “social cohesion”) and abroad (“development”, “modernisation”, “nation-building”, “regime change”, “sanctions”).

The securitisation of Islam occurs in part through the construction of our places of worship and spaces as potential generative contexts of terrorism, or as sites of radicalisation, and thus as legitimate targets of SIGINT and HUMINT operations.



Primary “audiences” of securitising speech acts are white and Western. Dominant political, official, academic, and media security narratives construct Islam, Muslims, and Sharia, and non-white (particularly Muslim) migration, refugees, and asylum seekers as societal security threats to Western “identity”, “values”, and “our way of life”: to “Judeo-Christian Western civilisation” by conservatives, and to “Enlightenment modernity” or “liberalism” by progressives. For example, former Prime Minister John Key defined national security as “protecting our way of life and the values that shape our society” in a rare public speech on security. John Key, in that speech, was careful to “stress that none of these people [terrorists] are representative of the New Zealand Muslim community as a whole”. However, he indirectly securitised Islam through his exclusive focus on the global threat of ISIS, and by securitising Muslim-majority regions of the world, including our “close friends and neighbours in Indonesia, Malaysia and others in the region, which have Muslim populations”.

Terrorism perpetrated by Muslims is labelled inconsistently, with the practical effect of securitising Islam and Muslims. Terms such as “Sunni extremism”, “Salafi-Wahhabi terrorism”, “Jihadi”, “radical Islam”, “Muslim terrorist”, “Islamic extremism”, “Islamic terrorism”, “political Islam”, and so on, directly securitise Islam and Muslims. These imprecise terms securitise Islam as a religion, and Islamic religiosity and spirituality, not Islamism as a political and social movement with a violent extremist fringe. “Islamist extremist terrorism” is a more accurate securitisation as it refers to an extreme version of a modern political ideology.

A central claim of securitisation theory is that the ontology of the referent object and the threat makes a crucial difference to our understanding and practices of national security. Securitisations have different practical effects depending on the constitution of the referent object and the hypostatized threat. Securitisations that take the state as referent object are different from securitisations that take the nation or our “identity”, “values”, and “way of life” as the referent object. This is because, ontologically, the conditions of survival are different for different objects: the intertemporal identity conditions for a “state” are not identical with the identity conditions of the “nation”, for a state can be (come) multi-national or multi-cultural, or the nation might revolt against the state and constitute a new one, for example.

Securitising our “values”, “identity”, and “way of life” as a referent object, or Islam and Muslims as a security threat, has different practical consequences to securitising terrorism as one threat among many threats and risks to New Zealand and its territory, people, property, infrastructure, institutions, and information. If the security referent is “modernity”, “the West”, “Judeo-Christian heritage”, or our “identity”, “values”, and “way of life”, and if “the problem is Islam”, then there will be an inevitable and irreconcilable “clash of civilisations” and permanent social conflict in pluralistic Western societies. Getting security discourse right is therefore as vital to national and global security, and to the contemporary tasks of governance, as the security response itself. It is not mere “political correctness”.



The securitisation of social cohesion

The securitisation of Islam and Muslims occurs in part in relation to the question about “social cohesion”, Muslims’ “loyalty” to the nation-state, and the “compatibility” of (essentialist conceptions of) Islam and the West. It occurs in relation to the “need” for Muslims and Islam to “modernise”, “liberalise”, “reform”, “integrate”, “assimilate”, or become nationalised as distinctively, e.g., “British”.

For Muslims, particularly after 9/11, security concerns feature prominently in contemporary discourses of social cohesion, which hyperbolise the threat of a “parallel society”. Muslim migrants, particularly second generation youth, are problematised and framed as threats to social cohesion and national security in government policy. Social cohesion encodes the dominant security narrative that Muslim communities are “segregated”, “suspect”, “alienated”, and thus pose a “potential” terrorist threat, and that our (predominantly male) youth are “at risk” of radicalisation.

The 2007 “Connecting Diverse Communities” project, led by the Office of Ethnic Communities and the Ministry of Social Development, was commissioned by Ministers “following a series of international events, including riots in Sydney’s Cronulla area and the debate around the publication of cartoons portraying the Prophet Mohammed”. The subtext of the Strategic Direction and Intent for the Office of Ethnic Communities 2016-2020 is that superdiversity is a potential threat to the maintenance of social stability and cohesion, despite the OEC’s vision statement: “flourishing ethnic diversity – thriving New Zealand”. The text refers to “many examples from overseas of what can happen when communities do not successfully connect and integrate”. The redacted briefing to the Incoming Minister provided by the heads of the NZSIS and the GCSB in 2015, obtained by the New Zealand Herald through the Official Information Act after the intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman, directly securitises Islam and Muslims. Troublingly, terrorism was linked not only to Islam and Muslims, but to the analysis that “significant migration... is creating communities with distinct identities and links to overseas”. This was assessed by the NZIC as the top national security threat to New Zealand in 2015.

Securitisation is processual and structural

The discursive construction of security threats is not as formal and official as the original Copenhagen School describes. Securitisation is an ongoing process, not a single event or a single speech act. It involves a variety of actors and acts, and justifies a range of responses from the exceptional to the everyday, and from the domestic to the global. It involves officials, media, academia, and politicians.

Framing theory explains how media employ particular interpretational lenses by emphasising certain aspects of an issue and deemphasising or omitting others in their reporting. Securitisation is the dominant media frame through which Muslim stories or stories involving Muslims or Muslim countries and regions are told to the public. Violent acts perpetrated by Muslim and non-Muslim actors are framed differently: Muslim violence is framed as “terrorism”, covered extensively, and linked to the War on Terror macrosecuritisation,



while non-Muslim violence is reported using the “mental illness”, “mass shooting”, or “loner” frames. Across the country, we heard “the media” named as one of the main contributors to the enabling environment of the Christchurch terrorist attack. While the media is outside the scope of the Royal Commission’s terms of reference, it is integral to understanding the securitisation of Islam and Muslims, and the ways in which dominant security discourse can be seen by RWEs to legitimate and support their narrative that Muslims and Islam are a demographic, normative, and ontological threat to Western civilisation.

Figure 2 Image of Masjid An-Nur and caption from a 2014 Press article titled “Drone victims 'radicalised' at mosque”.

Academic terrorism research and university teaching is concentrated on Islamist extremism and terrorism and on Muslim-majority countries and regions. This contributes to the securitisation of Islam through socialising and educating undergraduate students, the sociology and political economy of “expertise” in international relations, terrorism studies, and security studies (altering who is hired and promoted, invited to give keynote talks, published in leading journals, cited, interviewed by mainstream media, consulted by government and industry, funded by government and private grants, and recognised for research excellence), and by defining the subject matter of international relations, terrorism studies, and security studies. A 2019 article published in *Critical Studies in Terrorism* uses keyword analysis on 3,442 articles published between 2007 and 2016 in nine of the field’s leading academic journals. The results were that research on terrorism is concentrated on al-Qa’ida, Islamist extremist terrorism generally, and Muslim-majority countries and regions, and consistently underemphasises or ignores other ideal-typical forms of terrorism, notably state terrorism and RWE terrorism.

The direct securitisation of Islam occurs in part through the actions and speech of political leaders. Statements such as “These are radical Islamic terrorists” and that “To solve a problem, you have to be able to state what the problem is, or at least say the name” are explicit, direct securitisations of Islam. Statements like these masquerade as commonsense objections to “political correctness”, but amount to a dangerous mobilisation of the security apparatus and population for the political agendas of increasingly populist and nationalist governments.

Globally, the Obama administration understood that the direct securitisation of Islam and Muslims was wrong in principle, and counterproductively threatened US national security and world peace. The Trump administration has resecured Islam and Muslims directly to an extent without precedent in the Obama, Bush, or Clinton years, and provided a powerful platform to far-right, conspiratorial pundits and alternative media, whose security narratives now have influence over US foreign policy and national security strategy.



Some New Zealand politicians can also contribute to the direct securitisation of Islam. Hansard, the official record of Parliament, has in its searchable record, dating back to 2003, 139 mentions of “Muslim”, 317 mentions of “Islam”, and 238 mentions of the word “Islamic”. These are almost all in the context of security and counter-terrorism. The Rt. Hon. Winston Peters’ 2005 speech titled “The End of Tolerance”, made after the 7/7 London bombings, stated:

They say - ah-yes - but New Zealand has always been a nation of immigrants. They miss a crucial point. New Zealand has never been a nation of Islamic immigrants... This two-faced approach is how radical Islam works – present the acceptable face to one audience and the militant face to another... In New Zealand the Muslim community have been quick to show us their more moderate face, but as some media reports have shown, there is a militant underbelly here as well. Underneath it all the agenda is to promote fundamentalist Islam... Indeed these groups are like the mythical Hydra – a serpent underbelly with multiple heads capable of striking at any time and in any direction.

The “jihadi bride” saga was a critical event in the discursive construction of the “Muslim threat” in New Zealand. As IWCNZ’s Anjum Rahman said at the time, “We all get tarred with this and people begin to view all of us with suspicion. And in an environment that is already reasonably hostile this doesn’t help matters much at all”. The jihadi bride meme is still being circulated in global and local media after the Christchurch terrorist attack, with a recent article (15 July 2019) in stuff.co.nz, “Operation Jihadi Bride: The truth about sex and Islamic State”, casually slipping between terrible stories of Yazidi slaves and ISIS brutality and factually inaccurate statements about Sharia, reinforcing the negative stereotype of perverse Muslim masculinity and generalised Islamic barbarity.

The indirect securitisation of Islam occurs despite commendable official statements that distinguish between mainstream Muslims and violent extremists and terrorist organisations. Paradigm examples include: “[ISIS’s] behaviour is barbaric and they’re neither Islamic or a state and actually they do a disservice to the billions of law-abiding, good, honest Muslims around the world”.

From a Muslim perspective, the original securitisation theory also fails to account for the diverse ways in which national security is not only “narrated” but “performed” to construct threats and referent objects of security. For example, the practice of illuminating monuments in solidarity, constructs affective and symbolic hierarchies of publicly mournable deaths and creates public memories and meanings of events. Western countries and white bodies are constructed in this way as security referents. As the organiser of the campaign to have the Sky Tower illuminated to remember the victims of a suicide attack in Bagdad that killed 175 people and injured over 200 said, “I wish that it’s not that Iraqis’ lives are cheaper, and it kind of does seem like it. Everyone is so immune to Iraqis dying lately, but this was a massive incident and it affected a lot of families in New Zealand”.



Individual acts of solidarity after a terrorist attack, such as adding a symbolic filter or badge to Facebook profile pictures, and dramatised performances of the news of a terrorist attack perpetrated by a Muslim, or events in the War on Terror or in Muslim-majority countries and regions, securitise Islam and Muslims.

Security is performed at the border through the “security theatre” of metal detectors, bag checks, random stops, searches, and interrogations of visibly Muslim travellers, people with Muslim names, and Muslims who have travelled to or from Muslim-majority countries.

The speed and tone of official statements or tweets by political leaders and the kinds of response they propose to attacks – from “thoughts and prayers” to hyper-securitisation – and their readiness to identify violent acts as terrorism are also securitising performances, rather than simply speech acts.

Figure 3 Tweet from United States President Donald Trump’s personal Twitter page after an attack on London Bridge.

Security is “imaginary”, “affective”, and “perceptual”, not only intersubjective. Our imagination of “terrorism” is a knife-wielding and masked young brown man, the Kalashnikov, the kufiyah, the burqa, the beard, Arabic script and phrases, and the names Muhammad and Aisha. Terrorism is stereotypically associated with Arabs and Muslims, as criminality is associated with African-Americans in the United States, and with Māori in Aotearoa. As the authors of a 2011 social psychology study of Ethnic Group Stereotypes in Aotearoa New Zealand state:

There is a wide body of literature in social cognition that emphasises the self-maintaining nature of stereotypes. According to this general socio-cognitive perspective, existing stereotypes (or schemata about group characteristics) often drive us to automatically see what we expect to see. Thus we are more likely to attend to and encode or remember stereotype-consistent information rather than stereotype-inconsistent information. We are more likely to form stable internal attributions about observed behaviours that are consistent with our pre-existing stereotypes and discount observations that are not.

Group-based misrecognitions and feelings of insecurity and hostility are reinforced by official security narratives. Australia’s National Security Campaign, for example, encourages members of the public to report “suspicious activity”. From its launch in 2003, Arab and Muslim Australians have raised serious human rights questions about the campaign, arguing that it has made them suspect communities under surveillance by neighbours and colleagues. The current campaign video features ISIS-like imagery, while the radio version mentions ISIS and Syria. A video on chemical security features a white man cast as a small business owner and a stereotypical brown-skinned terrorist. RWE is not named or depicted in the campaign. This directly securitised Islam and Muslims.



Official, academic, and political narratives blur into mainstream media and entertainment misrepresentations manufactured by and for a Western, and non-Muslim gaze. This complex is referred to in the vernacular and in parts of the academic literature as the “Islamophobia industry”.

Conclusion:

The securitisation of Islam and Muslims is both direct and indirect, and both official/formal and unofficial/informal. From a Muslim perspective, securitisation is a process, not an event. It is structural, and involves a variety of actors and acts. The discourse of social cohesion encodes the securitisation of Islam and Muslims. Officials and politicians have used rhetorical strategies such as hedging and disclaimers to avoid the direct securitisation of Islam. Meanwhile, officials and politicians have indirectly securitised Islam through an exclusive focus on Islamist extremist terrorism, downplaying the magnitude of the threat of RWE, and by using vague and unstable language to securitise referent objects and security threats. The construction of Islam and Muslims as a threat is not only the intersubjective validation of securitising official speech acts in public discourse, but something performative, imaginative, affective, and perceptual.

Critically analysing and countering the securitisation of Islam and Muslims is not to pretend that Islamist extremist terrorism is not a threat. FIANZ condemns terrorism in every form. Thanks be to God, New Zealand has not been targeted by the transnational threat of Islamist extremist terrorism. Nor is it to imply that there is necessarily an organised Western conspiracy against Muslims. The securitisation of Islam and Muslims explains the path dependency of the historical evolution of the NZIC over the time horizon of the post-Cold War era, and interacts with public choice theory to explain the expansion of, inappropriate concentration of, or priority setting for, counter-terrorism resources. Understanding the limits of our thought and practice enables us here and now at this critical juncture to shift the paradigm and alter the evolutionary path of the NZIC going forward. Moreover, it is critical to understand how the securitisation of Islam and Muslims through official, political, and media narratives, images, and memes influences, reinforces, and legitimises the RWE narrative.

Rather than securitising RWE under the War on Terror macrosecuritisation, we must desecuritize Islam and Muslims; rationally resecuritize terrorism to clarify the range of threats and referent objects; and shift to a new all-of-government-and-society approach to Aotearoa New Zealand’s security and wellbeing, grounded in our identity and values, and critical of institutional racism and anti-Muslim bias. Because security is always already societal, insofar it involves issues of identity, values, norms, socialisation, narratives, and relationships, we need to have a critical and reflective conversation about our national identity and values, and the implications for Aotearoa New Zealand’s security and wellbeing.



6.00 - THE THREATSCAPE

Right wing extremism

There is not one universal – trans-historical, cross-cultural – political spectrum on which all ideologies can be graded. Ideologies are spectral. There are extremes on the spectra of liberalism, socialism, conservatism, Islamism, nationalism, and other political ideologies. Some political ideologies are inherently extreme, insofar as they are, often self-consciously, so far beyond the norms of the social contexts which they aim to change, that they have no popular or legitimate paths to power. They champion their cause through violence, or exit away from mainstream society. RWE ranges over forms of extremism on the spectra of ideologies on the political right, and rightist political ideologies that are inherently extreme – particularly white supremacy. However, during the age of Western imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide, white supremacist ideology was not considered inherently extreme in relation to the existing norms of Western societies. White supremacy was once “common sense” in almost all modern Western political philosophy – socialist, liberal, and conservative – and across Western academic disciplines.

RWE is complex and multiple. It cannot be given an essential definition. RWE is a constellation of causes, ideologies, narratives, movements, and networks that share common features or family resemblances. RWE is not identical with white supremacy. White supremacy is a commonality among different forms of RWE in the West. However, there are non-white and non-Western forms of RWE, and not all RWEs in the West are necessarily white. Hindu RWE demonstrates the difficulties around defining RWE and further complicates the relationship between terrorism and religion, political ideologies, and regimes in power, for example.

Supremacism is common to most types of RWE. Xenophobia is also a commonality. RWE ideologies and narratives tend to centre on real or imagined antagonisms between racial, religious, or ethnic in-groups and out-groups. Relatedly, RWE ideologies tend to essentialise in-group and out-group identities and values, and represent internal and external forces of change to demographics, identity, or values as inherently degenerative. RWE ideologies tend to be reactionary; they are nostalgic for an imaginary lost utopia of pure identity, social unity, and uncorrupted tradition.



RWE narratives tend to be paranoid and conspiratorial. This is a common feature of extremist narratives in general. White supremacist anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that circulate in RWE networks combine RWE elements into narratives of a Jewish globalist cabal masterminding the destruction of Western civilisation. The narratives are variations on the theme that there is a Jewish global conspiracy to socially engineer demographic and normative changes and economic collapse that threaten white, hetero-patriarchal, individualist, capitalist, Christian Western civilisation by controlling the media and banking industries, corrupting academia and culture, puppeteering governments, instigating wars, financing leftist social movements, and manipulating mass migration. Billionaire Jewish philanthropist, George Soros, has now become the face of this faceless enemy on the transnational extreme right. Leftist and non-Western, non-white manifestations of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are also problems. Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, which have again proliferated around the world, are a problem across religious, social, political, national, ethnic, and other differences.

Some forms of RWE are single-issue, such as anti-abortion violent extremism. RWEs might focus on single issues, such as gender roles, gun rights, or central government, on which they hold extreme views and for which they are willing to take violent action, while holding moderate views on other core RWE issues. RWE causes are generally nationalistic, and are rooted in national particularities, such as irredentist claims or historical narratives of national victimhood or lost glory. While some RWE movements are specific to particular national contexts, most contemporary RWE is instead focused on transnational categories of whiteness and masculinity, or the perceived threats of Judaism, Islam, non-white migration, liberal capitalism, or the left, to their conception of Western identity, values, and way of life, and to white male power. Contemporary RWE – like extremism on the Islamist spectrum – bears the marks of global hypermodernity: it is digital, mediated, networked, personalised, deterritorialised, and decontextualised.

RWE is not accurately framed as a new historical development with explanatory factors solely in recent history, such as the influx of refugees and migrants from Africa and the Middle East to Europe in 2015-2016, the global recession following the 2007/8 global financial crisis, or the historic election in 2008 of the first African-American President of the United States of America. RWE existed throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and was last resurgent during the 1990s. The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which killed 168 people and injured over 680 others, was the most horrific manifestation of RWE during this era in the United States.

Contemporary RWE has evolved with and adapted to technological, political, economic, aesthetic, social, and geopolitical transformations, but it is connected to older generations. Extreme ideologies, movements, and groups on the nationalist spectrum, irredentism, ethnic and religious conflict, and genocide, have been defining features of the post-colonial and post-Soviet worlds and the global security environment.



Before the attack, the Christchurch terrorist live streamed himself in his car listening to the song “God is a Serb”, written in 1993 in support of Radovan Karadzic, a Bosnian Serb leader convicted of genocide for his role in the massacre of 8,000 Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995. In his manifesto, the terrorist claimed to be working “part time as a kebab removalist”, an 8chan alt-right meme referencing the genocide of Bosnian Muslims, and wrote “kebab remover” on one of the weapons used in the attack. During his radicalisation process, the terrorist performed a nationalist “dark tour” of Turkey, then Serbia, Montenegro and other parts of the former Yugoslavia in late 2016, stopping at the sites of battles between Muslims and Christians during the centuries of Ottoman rule, and in early 2017 travelled to some of the bloodiest sites of the 1990s Balkan wars.

White supremacy

White supremacy is also complex and multiple. White supremacy, as a category of extremist social movements and networks, contains different segments: neo-Nazis; racist skinheads; white power gangs; the alt-right; and traditional white supremacist movements, including the Ku Klux Klan; the Council of Conservative Citizens; European fascisms; and Nazism. FIANZ, like the Anti-Defamation League, uses the term white supremacy rather than white nationalism, which is “a term that originated among white supremacists as a euphemism for white supremacy”. We also adopt the ADL definition of white supremacy as:

a term used to characterize various belief systems central to which are one or more of the following key tenets: 1) whites should have dominance over people of other backgrounds, especially where they may co-exist; 2) whites should live by themselves in a whites-only society; 3) white people have their own "culture" that is superior to other cultures; 4) white people are genetically superior to other people. As a full-fledged ideology, white supremacy is far more encompassing than simple racism or bigotry. Most white supremacists today further believe that the white race is in danger of extinction due to a rising “flood” of non-whites, who are controlled and manipulated by Jews, and that imminent action is needed to “save” the white race.

However, this is a narrow definition of white supremacy as ideology. We also need a wide definition of white supremacy as historical sociological fact. Both moments – subjective (vicious thoughts, feelings, beliefs, behaviours, and habits of agents) and objective (unjust social structures and processes) – of white supremacy must be analysed and theorised.



Ahistorical, methodologically nationalist analyses of white supremacy as ideology are inadequate to the tasks of interpretation and explanation. White supremacist movements can only be accurately understood in connected national and global historical contexts as reactionary struggles against progressive victories on the anti-imperial, anti-colonial, anti-slavery, and anti-racist fronts. Dylann Roof, the white supremacist terrorist who massacred nine black parishioners and injured one at Emanuel Africa Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, wore the flags of Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa, for example. As former United States President Barack Obama tweeted in response to the Christchurch-inspired white supremacist terrorist attack in El Paso, Texas, “the El Paso shooting follows a dangerous trend: troubled individuals who embrace racist ideologies and see themselves obligated to preserve white supremacy”. The global nature of white supremacist terrorism should point analysts to white supremacy as the organising principle of the Western world order that has structured human life in the modern age, the long cycle of which is coming to an end. White supremacy only ceased to be the explicit principle of the world order after World War II, and it would take several decades after WWII to achieve geopolitical decolonisation, black civil rights in the United States, and the end of apartheid in South Africa. Structural and institutional racism endure at national, regional, and global levels.


The wide definition of white supremacy as social fact is: structural and institutional forms of racism at global, regional, national levels that reproduce white wealth, privilege, power and Western global dominance, and normalise Western culture. These structures and institutions were created by long histories of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide. They are today reproduced subconsciously or implicitly (in general), despite conscious or explicit disavowals of inegalitarian social relations expressed in modern human rights discourse and by European Enlightenment ideals of liberty, equality, and solidarity.



The Far Right Spectrum

Recent seminal research by Bjorgo and Ravndal (2019)¹¹ has provided a conceptualisation of the spectrum of the violent far right. The names of the organisations or movements may vary country to country however their ideological nuance is based on wreaking violence and terror. The categories are ideal type¹²

CONCEPTUALISATION OF FAR RIGHT SPECTRUM¹³



¹¹<https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Extreme-Right-Violence-and-Terrorism-Concepts-Patterns-and-Responses.pdf>

¹² <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Extreme-Right-Violence-and-Terrorism-Concepts-Patterns-and-Responses.pdf>

¹³<https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Extreme-Right-Violence-and-Terrorism-Concepts-Patterns-and-Responses.pdf>



7.00 - CONCERNS OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY (2019/2020)

Prior Engagement 1: FIANZ Nationwide Hui

FIANZ, as part of Royal Commission submission process, also undertook an extensive grass-roots consultation process with hui in the cities below. There were also people from other places who participated in these sessions.

- Dunedin
- Christchurch
- Wellington
- Palmerston North
- Hamilton
- Auckland



As such, FIANZ has a baseline index of key issues of concern, as highlighted by the wider Muslim community in the above cities. In addition to the above hui in the six centres, there were also focus group sessions.




KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING HUI

(Ranking of issues based on number of comments by those attending the hui)

Affected Status	Response
Islamophobia (including Media)	23.90%
Social Cohesion and Inclusivity & Diversity	11.90%
Gun License, Ammunition and Related	10.70%
Hate Speech	10.70%
NZIC, SIS, NIP and Related	8.30%
Justice	7.10%
RWE	6.00%
Consultation and Implementation of Recommendations	4.80%
Accountability	3.60%
Police	3.60%
Christchurch Issues Ignored	3.60%
Racism	2.40%
Mental Health and Wellbeing	1.20%
Education	1.20%
Community Matters	1.00%




KEY ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING HUI






8.00 - MUSLIM COMMUNITY PROFILE

A changing demographic profile



Based on the NZ Census, Muslims are one of the most rapidly growing religious group in New Zealand with the population increasing six-fold between 1991 and 2006. Another 80% growth from 2006 to present date. However, their national demographic footprint is very small. Muslims now constitute about 1% of the population.





23% of the Muslim population are born in NZ. Immigration has resulted in significant numbers from Asia. This has been a demographic shift away from the Pacific (Fiji) as the main country of birth.




Our ethnicity and WHERE WE LIVE

Whilst the largest concentration of Muslims are in Auckland, the community is now all over the country (Source:2018 NZ Census.)



Our Ethnicity





NZ Muslim Population By Region (2019 NZ Census)

Region	Population
Northland Region	324
Auckland Region	40,221
Waikato Region	4,329
Bay of Plenty Region	780
Gisborne Region	78
Hawke's Bay Region	660
Taranaki Region	531
Manawatu-Wanganui Region	1,641
Wellington Region	5,346
Tasman Region	54
Nelson Region	99
Marlborough Region	63
West Coast Region	66
Canterbury Region	4,512
Otago Region	1,593
Southland Region	324
TOTAL – REGIONAL COUNCIL	60,621



**The Federation of
Islamic Associations
of New Zealand (Inc.)**

اتحاد الجمعيات الإسلامية النيوزيلندية

SINCE 1979