FIANZ

**The Federation of
Islamic Associations
of New Zealand (Inc.)**

اتحاد الجمعيات الإسلامية النيوزيلندية

SINCE 1979

~~Starting~~
Continuing the
Conversation

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What we cover in this document

10 february 2022

1.0   Framing the approach

This is a preliminary scoping document on deradicalisation from the FIANZ perspective.

We recognise there shall be other more insightful perspectives from various faith, ethnic, interest, ideological, ethno-national and other community groups in due course.

This scoping document has three key metrics to determine its efficacy:

Firstly, it is aimed at providing a NZ-centric approach to deradicalistion.

**Secondly,** it is nuanced with pragmatism with a critical appreciation of the way forward.

Thirdly, it identifies some baseline foundations for the civil society / public sector nexus on deradicalistion.

The narrative on deradicalisation needs to be necessarily broad and inclusive to ensure stakeholders' sustained commitment and the social energy for change. The public sector engagement model is gradually evolving post-March 15, hence a patient and robust approach is needed.

Changes also need to be based on informed decisions within the NZ context and not necessarily based on a parade list of overseas academic research and Five Eyes 'guidance' to give a semblance of credibility. The lived experience of communities in Aotearoa and our own home-grown research are essential realities to ensure sustainable and relevant solutions.

Recognising Te Tiriti as the foundation of Aotearoa New Zealand, we have the opportunity to be on the right side of history when addressing deradicalisation since our modern exposure to this type of extremism is relatively recent.

Deradicalisation and its operative synonyms have a plethora of definitional tangents. As an all-encompassing attribute for peacefully moving individuals and groups away from violent extremism,[1] this process is evident in most countries impacted by violent extremism.[2] In some countries there are formalised regimes in place with integrated evaluation systems, whilst others have utilised a more ad hoc approach.[3] Aotearoa New Zealand is in the latter category. As such, it is both timely and necessary to establish a context-specific policy framework with aligned operative programmes. Developing a need-focussed de-radicalisation solution lends itself to a perfect congruence of the All-of-Society(AOS) and All-of-Governance(AOG) approach. This is a critical success factor when anchored to social cohesion and part of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCOI) narrative.[4]

At the outset it is important to note that the agenda items in this report are through na Aotearoa New Zealand lens. They are based on the tri-value threads of integration, adaptability and scalability.

- Integration with the post-Royal Commission dual-policy directions of social cohesion and national security;

- Adaptability across different interest, ideological, ethnic and faith based strata within society and;

- Scalability in terms of both numbers and intensity of intervention.

[1] https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/a_new_approach_epub.pdf
[2] http://www.icct.nl/app/uploads/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf
[3] https://www.iemed.org/publication/deradicalization-experiences-in-europe-and-the-arab-world/
[4] https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/
[5] See Court Documents R v Samsudeen
[6] See https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/

> *Focussing only on deradicalisation without addressing baseline issues of discrimination, racism and inequity is akin to ignoring social sinkholes in our multicultural landscape.*

All the above prerequisites are part of the lessons learned to ensure survivability in a context of political vacillation and budget constraints within a COVID-19 era.

The agenda also recognises that there are substantive underlying causes of radicalisation which have to be considered. Deradicalisation may be perceived as an anathema when the underlying causes of inequity, discrimination and social hegemony are not energetically addressed. At a lived-experience level, ethnic and religious discrimination are the most apparent baseline drivers of violent extremism, however there are other vulnerable triggers such as bullying, mental health issues, struggling to fit in, as well as low level criminality.[5] Digital consumerism has also dominated the narrative particularly since March 15.[6]

3.00   Taking stock of our patch

There have been over 6100 references to 'terrorism' in parliamentary debates since 2006, but only 15 mentions of 'deradicalisation' and 'counter violent extremism' since 2020[7]. 9/11 and the ensuing Islamophobia were the dominant themes until the tragedy of 15 March. The political agenda had, to a great extent, been controlled by reactive responses to events rather than any semblance of proactive planning, policy or programmes. A review of the debates (more than 30 hours) notes than there has been very minimal reference to addressing the underlying causes of radicalism and extremism in the NZ context. At a time of media-mediated democracy, it appears raising problems makes for better parliamentary sound-bites than proffering solutions.

The RCOI started a well thought out narrative in this context, by stressing the importance of aligning social cohesion with national security.

"Fundamental to New Zealand's future wellbeing and security is social cohesion.[8]   … Royal Commission.

Recently, and for the first time, a Government Minister also acknowledged this paradigm shift in his policy paper on Intelligence and Security in our Changing World.[9]

It is apparent in the narrative of most Government agencies, that there is juxta-positioning of Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) with deradicalisation. This is not uncommon elsewhere. However, there is a significant perception mine-field in this collocation. For instance, for the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), CVE entails a wide-breadth approach which includes prescriptive counter-terrorism legislation, such as the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002.[10] As one of NZ's foremost scholars of international law noted , "the biggest failing of this law is that it is weak on deradicalisation and the importance of the rehabilitation and reintegration.."[11]   In Australia where CVE programmes started much earlier than in NZ, there is growing pessimism around deradicalisation mainly arising from the disconnect between the interests of Muslim communities and Government policies. As noted in a seminal report:

" [we]'should not have had Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) forced down our throats.' " (AMWCHR,ADI and Deakin University.)[12]

[7] https://www.parliament.nz/en/site-search?term=DERADICALISATION&sections_hansard-debates=on&sections_mps-and-electorates=on&sections_get-involved=on&sections_visit-and-learn=on&sections_footer-contents=on&timeframe=All&_=1644099257203&sort=updated&direction=desc
[8] https://christchurchattack.royalcommission.nz/the-report/findings-and-recommendations/end-note/
[9] https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/intelligence-and-security-our-changing-world-speech-victoria-university-wellington-centre
[10] https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0034/latest/DLM151491.html
[11] https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/52SCFD_EVI_92685_FD2722/bcf5baf5f0e889c5fd339c509c5036f02a1d3d75
[12] https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2021-09/apo-nid314664.pdf

In New Zealand, the CVE approach and focus of the various agencies is varied. The following table provides a summary of some of the notable features from our perspective.

Counter violent extremism tangents of different agencies			
Govt Agency	*Approach*	*Specific mention of Deradicalisation*	*Notable*
DPMC	Counter Terrorism and CVE as one strategy[13]	No	Addresses causes of violent extremism and promotes social cohesion.[14]
Treasury	Joint Review of CVE Online	No	Review of current legislation related to content.[15]
DIA	Online Safety Policy	No	$17 million funding over 4 years on on-line harm[16] I Indicates a government commitment to deradicalization.
Police	He Aranga Ake	No but refers to 'disengaging'	A comprehensive $8.44 million multi-agency approach with appropriate cultural considerations.[17]
NZSIS	Counter Terrorism and CVE as multipronged approaches	No	Work underway to develop and inform the public with terrorism behavioural indicators[18]
Justice	Terrorism Suppression Act Part 1, Part 2 & Extended Control Orders	Yes	"Control orders can help facilitate the rehabilitation and reintegration of an individual."[19]
Corrections	Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) working group since 2015	Yes	Monitoring 216 people at risk of violent extremism – developed individualised plans.[20]

Given that most of the above are recent initiatives , save Corrections' CVE working group, there are no formal evaluation studies on the efficacy of the varied approaches, as yet. At best we can draw upon some recent home-patch case studies of radicalised persons and their pathways.

[13] https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-10/New%20Zealands%20Countering%20Terrorism%20and%20Violent%20Extremism%20Strategy.pdf
[14] https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-10/New%20Zealands%20Countering%20Terrorism%20and%20Violent%20Extremism%20Strategy.pdf
[15] https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2020-05/ria-dia-cve-may20.pdf
[16] https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/Resource-material-Our-Policy-Advice-Areas-Online-Safety-Policy?OpenDocument#seven
[17] https://fyi.org.nz/request/16046/response/62713/attach/3/LAMUSSE%20Ti%20IR%2001%2021%2022758%20approved%20response%20and%20docs%20Redacted.pdf
[18] https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/terrorism-challenges-the-dynamic-nature-of-the-terrorism-and-violent-extremism-risk/
[19] https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/Impact-summary-RIA-Extended-Control-Orders.pdf
[20] https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/126333692/is-nz-equipped-to-rehabilitate-those-who-pose-a-risk-of-violent-extremism

	Case Study 1	*Case Study 2*	*Case Study 3*
Age	*26*	*29*	*Teenage*
Evidence of radicalisation – Prosecution / Conviction	Making objectionable publications, distribution and one charge of possession of objection-able material – total of 62 objectionable files	Distributing restricted material - 2 materials Possession of 2 objec-tionable materials	On-Line radicalisation – planned to ram a car into a group of people
Detected prior to causing harm	Yes	Yes	Yes
Suffering Mental Trauma	No	Suffering PTSD – Medical Professional	Suffering PTSD – Medical Professional
Blaming wider society	Yes	Yes	Yes
In Court	Pleaded Guilty	Pleaded Guilty	Pleaded Guilty
Potential for future violence	Yes (Pre-sentence Report)	Yes (according to Police)	Yes (Pre-sentence Report)
Prison	Yes - three years 9 months Some time in solitary confinement	Yes (no rehabilitation and no socialisation programmes) in Unit 10, under solitary confine-ment conditions	No (noted that prison would mean limited access to the rehabilita-tion and socialising programmes he needed)
Supervision Sentence		Post- prison : Conditions included staying at a " west Auckland mosque, not to be violent, not to have devices capable of accessing the internet, a culturally appropriate probation officer to moni-tor.	Released to community, under intensive supervi-sion, under GPS monitor-ing and living in super-vised accommodation. Live at a particular address and be moni-tored by the Judge with regular reports
Additional Notes	Intensive rehabilitation in Muslim Community – large organisation with support services and religious advisors. Support from MPES.	Left to stay in a separate accommodation adjacent to the mosque prayer area. The person who agreed to this was from a relatively small, rented mosque without a known rehabilita-tion infrastructure. We understand his profession was that of a radio journal-ist (to be confirmed). No evidence of any structured rehabilitation programme implemented. Subjected to 24-hour secret surveillance by authorities.	Under the supervision of an appropriately experi-enced person from the Muslim community
Status	Now lives a normal and peaceful life	Killed by Police when he was attacking innocent shoppers in a supermar-ket.	Now lives a normal and peaceful life

Key Lessons Learned:
- Formalised and intensive rehabilitation and reintegration programmes are effective
- Surveillance approach is ineffective
- Involvement of community supportive infrastructure (people& resources) essential
- Rehabilitation and reintegration programmes require funding support
- Importance of employment and stable accommodation.

Deradicalisation		
Case Study 1 Reintegration Mode	Case Study 2 Surveillance Mode	Case Study 3 Rehabilitation mode

In addressing the issue of CVE by the different agencies, a number of systemic anomalies have arisen which require clarification. For instance, intelligence-led policing under the National Intelligence Operating Model (2021) has made no reference to community-oriented policing (COP) which is a key driver for social cohesion. In fact , the NZ Police Hub and Spoke Model of Partnerships and Diversity seems to have no input from the community. It incorporates Five Eyes (FELEG) but no reference has been made in the working model to community consultation. There are niceties in the Preamble and Principle section, but the front-end and back-stopping support ignores the essential community stakeholder engagement. In such a context it would be difficult to locate community-led deradicalisation within this model.
NZ Police Intelligence Hub and Spoke Model[21]

No Mention of any Input
from Community ?

Requires Clarification !

Similarly, the Treasury's publication of DIA's CVE-on-line- Changes to Censorship Legislation to better protect New Zealanders from on-line harm[22] have made substantive claims of evidence-led change. Yet closer scrutiny has revealed that the NZ legislative prescription on on-line harm is based on a USA study of residents of metropolitan New York and Boston and their experience after two mass violence events. Applying US cultural traits and imposing them on Tangata Whenua and Pakeha is both ethically incongruous and empirically dubious. Misrepresentation abounds in this respect. The US study referred to a " cycle of high distress " which is significantly different to the DIA's claim of " negative psychological effects". In fact there is no mention at all of 'negative psychological effects'[23] in the entire article. As such, DIA and Treasury are basing their legislation on absolutely false assumptions. The study in question basically tracked the impact of media on past large-scale collective trauma (terror attacks) and noted that later media coverage of similar tragedies may fuel a cycle of distress.[24] However, what is of most concern is that the US study makes no mention of 'on-line content' in their research design, methodology or conclusion yet the DIA refers to the study to justify their assertion of "online violent extremist content".[25] This would appear to be a misinterpretation and misapplication of evidence and regretfully is still available on the Treasury site.[26] These are the types of anomalies which have fuelled concerns about deradicalisation programmes being based on 'junk science'.[27]

22 https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2020-05/ria-dia-cve-may20.pdf
23 https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aav3502
24 https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aav3502
25 https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2020-05/ria-dia-cve-may20.pdf
26 https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2020-05/ria-dia-cve-may20.pdf
27 https://www.alternet.org/2016/10/junk-science-behind-uks-massive-program-deradicalize-potential-terrorists/

The integrity of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) may be questioned when it directly contradicts a District Court judge. The analysis and advice in the Regulatory Impact Statement on the Extended Control Orders,[28] disputes the Notes of Judge R J Collins[29]. The Judge in sentencing Patel in relation to the Films, Videos and Publication Classification Act 1993 (FVPCA) categorically stated:

" The media and everyone else need to appreciate that you do not face a terrorism charge " - Judge R J Collins[30]

 Yet the Ministry of Justice incorrectly states :

"Prevalence of terrorism offences in New Zealand ….the number of individuals charged with FVPCA offences relating to terrorism.."

28 https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-04/ria-justice-eco-apr21.pdf
29 https://www.districtcourts.govt.nz/assets/unsecure/2016-09-20/b90977e843/2016-NZDC-11454-R-v-Imran-Patel.pdf
30 https://www.districtcourts.govt.nz/assets/unsecure/2016-09-20/b90977e843/2016-NZDC-11454-R-v-Imran-Patel.pdf

The Judge categorically stated that the FVPCA charges have no bearing on terrorism yet the MOJ states exactly the opposite. When the MOJ resorts to such unethical, and in our view totally false statements, as part of their analysis to justify Extended Control Orders, it raises considerable anxiety in the CVE and deradicalisation space of their motivation and integrity. The Treasury compounds this by having the template on their website.[31] This requires serious review.

Almost all the agencies have such anomalies as part of their CVE uptake and the above are some indicative examples. Community organisations need to have trust in the Government apparatus. The Government agencies in their response need to be evidence-based in order to earn respect and commitment. Deradicalisation programmes will suffer without such transparency.

31 https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-04/ria-justice-eco-apr21.pdf

5.00   Policy considerations

For commitment by community groups to deradicalisa-
tion programmes, there is a need for an All-of-Gov-
ernment (AOG) approach to develop the overarching
policy framework.[32] Despite different agencies having
their own tangent, it is still not too late for a coordinat-
ed national policy. It was precisely this lack of coordi-
nation and the ensuing fragmentation which degraded
our national policy capacity in the area of intelligence
and security, which the RCOI noted.

The first consideration is that deradicalisation is not a
Muslim issue. Perceptions have to be purposely culti-
vated that deradicalisation is an All-Of-Society (AOS)
concern. Past experience, as noted in the RCOI find-
ings, is that there have been a confluence of view-
points by politicians, media, academics and civil serv-
ants which led to Muslims being considered a 'suspect
community'. Such perceptions still abound, particularly
in the media, and will sound the death knell for any
meaningful deradicalisation programme engagement.
In this respect, significant credit should be given to the
NZSIS for setting the new public sector terminologies
on the spectrum of ideologies which give rise to
extremism - Identity Motivated Violent Extremism and
Faith Motivated Extremism.[33] This provides objective
clarity and   discards the previous myopic view which
unfairly tainted the Muslim community.

Recent evidence highlights that radicalisation is not a
Muslim issue, particularly when it comes to possess-
ing 'objectionable material'.[34]

[32] In this context , it is important to note the varied usage of terms for agenda setting - the DPMC uses the term 'Strategy', the Police uses 'Model', the DIA
     uses 'Policy"   and other agencies have similar terms.   For the sake of clarity we use the term 'National Policy'(NP)
[33] https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/nzsis-director-general-opening-statement-to-intelligence-and-security-committee/
[34] https://www.treasury.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-04/ria-justice-eco-apr21.pdf

Number of FVPCA (Objectionable Material) Prosecutions 2016 -2019

Muslims charged under FVPCA-Objectionable Material (Various Islamic Content)

Other charged under FVPCA-Objectionable Material (15 March livestream)

The second consideration is that pragmatism dictates that any NP framework requires political and fiscal scaffolding support. The energy of proactive stakeholders who engage as civil society advocates with the public sector should not have their expectations dashed by political and budgetary inertia. Simply put, this precondition needs to be addressed at the outset otherwise the default adhoc approach will continue. We note that the fiscal tap has already allocated over $25 million to different Ministries on CVE related programmes, hence the funding precedence has already been set.

Social Cohesion is the overarching national trajectory and it is important that the NP on deradicalisation is firmly anchored   to this. This would not only provide policy legitimacy but also ensure political acceptability. Deradicalisation in essence is striving to ensure societal wellbeing and is a bulwark for ethnic and religious community resilience . However, the generic approach needs to be mediated with the understanding that it cannot be a "one-size-fits-all" approach. A segmented and bespoke approach is key to the efficacious management of deradicalisation. These segments cover not just the demographic spectrum but also include sectors such as education, religion, workplace, interest and ideological groups.   NZ-specific research is needed in this area, rather than simply making assumptions based on the experience of other countries. The other strand within social cohesion is the need to actively engage with stakeholders to co-design deradicalisation programmes. In this respect, instead of contracting external consultants the focus should be on funding community stakeholders.

Recent experience in NZ suggests that there are distinct staircased loci where deradicalisation interventions need to be factored. For the sake of simplicity, and in the absence of NZ research in this area, these locations may be broadly considered as per below:

OVER ARCHING NP ON DERADICALISATION
From prevention and disengagement to reintegration

In Community
(Schools/Colleges/Uni
; Workplace/
Religious Institutions/
F amily etc)

Person of Interest -
Pre-Prosecution
(Police; NZSIS)

Post-Prosecution
(Corrections;
Police, NZSIS)

Reintegration into Community
(Schools/Colleges/
Uni; Workplace/
Religious
Institutions/ Family
etc

In this context, there is the inevitability of 'turf competition' between the various Government agencies. This will require detailed and informed scoping sessions between the agencies   and community   stakeholders. At issue is the agency responsible for the overarching policy coordi- nation should also have a formative and summative eval- uation role. This ensures that the lessons learned lead to on-going improvements to the policy framework.   Much work needs to be done in this space and like other post-Royal Commission initiatives, there is a uniquely NZ contextual relevance for such an approach. Given that the scale of radicalism in NZ is relatively low, the time frame may be balanced in keeping with available resources and funding.

6.00   The way forward

6.1   Determining the needs

In an evidence-based approach and to support proposed budget approval, an in-depth Need Analysis Study (NAS) shall be required. The NAS would determine the following:

- o Scope of the Deradicalistion Problem (Situational Analysis including Demand Matrix)
- o Time frame for Implementation (a 5 year- Developmental Plan)
- o Target Populations for Prevention Programmes
- o Budgetary Parameters
- o Quality Assurance Index

6.2   National policy on deradicalisation

It is envisaged that a series of five hui be held with Public Sector , Ethnic and Faith Based Communities, Interest Groups and the Media to discuss:

- o The Lead Coordinating Agency for the NP
- o Key Policy Issues
- o Alignment with Social Cohesion Programmes
- o Key Evaluation Metrics
- o Finalising an AOS & AOG Policy Document

6.3   Strategies and workscope of individual agencies

It is envisaged that in support of the NP , each agency shall have their own particular focus and areas of responsibility. This needs to be discussed with the Community. The specifics of the individual agency strategies and the workscope need to be aligned with the Social Cohesion programmes.

6.4   Community & interest group input

Communities and Interest Groups:

- o   Particularly those who have a national presence
- o   Shall be invited to submit technical and financial proposals on deradicalisation programmes
- o   The funding shall be for 5 years with annual independent review
- o   Each community may have their own approach, method and management of the deradicalisation programmes, but must align with the NP and Social Cohesion

7.00   Toolkit on deradicalisation

The following is a template toolkit developed by FIANZ. The credentials of FIANZ on deradicalisation include:

- o   Over 30 years of national experience in community outreach
- o   National network of Imams and religious scholars and leaders
- o   Over 6 years of specific experience in deradicalisation including individual cases
- o   Input from medical professionals (including psychologists)
- o   Input from deradicalistion experts
- o   Supportive infrastructure and logistics back-support nationally
- o   Qualified evaluation and monitoring experts

It is envisaged that other communities will also develop their own template toolkits aligned to the needs of their own community.

Toolkit on al-wasatiyyah

Al-wasatiyyah the middle way

Al-wasatiyyah is aimed at balancing extreme viewpoints and fanatical inclinations in a person's life.

Al-wasatiyyah carries the message of moderation and doing good to oneself and others. It emphasises a personal level of steadfastness and righteousness. It encourages the abandonment of negativity. It emphasises spiritual development with a focus on doing social good.

Deradicalisation

Disengagement

Countering Violent Extremism

EXIT Deutschland

Counter Radicalisation

Anti-radicaliszation

Reintegration

Sakina (Saudi Arabia)

CONTEST (Prevent - UK)- UK

Rehabilitation

Al Hitar (Yemen)

EXIT Fryshuset

Aarhus (Denmark) Desistance

De-escalation

The Al-Wasatiyyah Toolkit is a purpose-specific resource for Muslim communities on deradicalisation from a Muslim perspective.

It is developed by Muslims, for Muslims and the programmes are managed by Muslims.

It incorporates an integrated approach to the   prevention, detection and rehabilitation of those who are radicalised or have a propensity towards extremism.

It shall be based in local Masjid and Islamic Centres and resourced through Government grants .

It envisages contracted experts and Imams supported by a National Executive Management Team of four officials .

The Toolkit Consists Of:
- *Navigational Tools*
- *Prevention Tools*
- *Evaluation Tools*

The toolkit enables local Muslim communities to assist Government agencies, particularly the Police and Corrections towards the rehabilitation and reintegration of Muslims.

It also provides for a checklist of Quality Assurance measures in keeping with all health and safety related legislation.

The toolkit shall be available in at least the 12 major languages of the Muslims in Aotearoa New Zealand.

1.00 SUPPORT NAVIGATION TOOLS (SNT)

1.1 TARGET POPULATION

The target population shall be Muslim

- individuals
- groups or clusters who have been referred by
- family members
- community leaders
- education providers
- employers
- Government agencies
- self-referral.

1.2 PURPOSE OF THE SUPPORT NAVIGATION TOOLS

To diagnose and then offer bespoke tarbiyah (religious guidance, education, counselling and self-development) with backstopping support services as part of the disengagement process.

1.3 COMPONENTS OF THE SUPPORT NAVIGATION TOOLS

Diagnostic Programme: Administered by at least three persons (triangulation of viewpoints)

- o Interviews by trained community counsellors (language/ gender)
- o Diagnosis by Muslim psychologists (qualified and certificated)
- o Imam or religiously qualified person

Focus : Identify behavioural traits, knowledge of Islam, life-history, past trauma , issues impacting on mental health.

Written Report: Recommendations and timeframe for support

Supportive Programme: Delivered and managed by trained community mentors and Imams
o   Identify wrap-around needs
o   Housing
o   Vocational Training or Placement
o   Arranging Group Support
o   Mental Health Programme
o   Social Life
o   Religious Learning
o   Family Support
o   Educational Support
o   Budgetary Planning
o   Legal Assistance
o   Immigration help (for non-residents)

Focus: Individualised /group case work approach with regular team reviews

Written Report: Quarterly reports to external agencies as required

2.00 PREVENTION TOOLS FOR COMMUNITY

2.1 TARGET POPULATION

The prevention tools are aimed at the general Muslim population but particularly at :

- o School Age Youth (15-18 age group with or without their parents)
- o Youth (18 -30 age group, male and female)
- o Recent migrants/refugees
- o Those exhibiting low-level criminality
- o Parents
- o Sisters and Mothers
- o Community Elders
- o Imams and other Religious Leaders

2.2 PURPOSE OF PREVENTION TOOLS

The toolkit provides community awareness prevention tools to improve an understanding of radicalisation. The syllabus includes:

- o Modules on psychological, religious and social indicators
- o Modules of Islamic core values and principles
- o Modules on safe usage and monitoring of on-line behaviour
- o Modules on reasoning with religious clarification
- o Modules on disengagement through mentoring programmes
- o Modules on engaging with police, corrections, mental health services and judicial services

2.3   DELIVERY MODES

Delivery modes include:

- o   Language appropriate on-line programmes
- o   Language and gender appropriate F2F Workshops
- o   Targeted blended mode
- o   Non-Interactive videos by community and religious elders
- o   Packaged self-learning booklets

2.4   TIME FRAME

- o   Each Module shall be 2 hours
- o   The full programme shall be conducted over a period of 4 weekends

3.00 EVALUATION TOOLS

3.1 PURPOSE
To understand the efficacy of the toolkit programmes and
what lessons have been learned in managing the pro-
grammes. This also includes specifically:

- o   To provide accountability to all community and
        public sector stakeholders
- o   To improve programmes on an on-going basis
        (formative development)
- o   To contribute to the national policy development

3.2 COMPONENTS
The three key components are:

- o   Monitor (the inputs and the outputs)
- o   Evaluate (the outcomes- formative and
        summative)
- o   Evaluate (the impact)

3.3 METRICS & METHODOLOGY
These will be decided in consultation with stakeholders
within a timeframe aligned with the scope of the work.

3.4 REPORTS
All reports shall be widely available and will be part of the
contract for deliverables.

3.5 CONFIDENTIALITY
All personal and case study information shall be subject to
strict confidentiality and shall remain within FIANZ. No per-
sonal or case study information shall be shared with external
agencies. This is essential to maintain the credibility and
trust of the community.

The Federation of
Islamic Associations
of New Zealand (Inc.)

اتحاد الجمعيات الإسلامية النيوزيلندية

SINCE 1979