

FIANZ Submission to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attack on Christchurch Mosques



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

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
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
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List of abbreviations

- ADL – Anti-Defamation League
- ASIO – Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
- BfV – German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution
- CTAG - Combined Threat Assessment Group
- DDIS – Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security
- DIA – Department of Internal Affairs
- DPMC – Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet
- FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States)
- FIANZ – Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand
- FVEY – Five Eyes
- GCSB – Government Communications Security Bureau
- HRA – Human Rights Act
- HRC – Human Rights Commission
- HUMINT – Human Intelligence
- IWCNZ – Islamic Women’s Council of New Zealand
- MBIE – Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment
- MFAT – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- MI5 – The Security Service (United Kingdom)
- MIP – Ministry of Primary Industries
- NAB – National Assessments Bureau (DPMC)
- NIP – National Intelligence Priority
- NSC – National Security Committee
- NSS – National Security System
- NSPD – National Security Policy Directorate
- NZDF – New Zealand Defence Force
- NZIC – New Zealand Intelligence Community
- NZSIS – New Zealand Security and Intelligence Service
- ODESC - Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination
- ODESC(G) – Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (Governance)

OEC – Office of Ethnic Communities
RWE – Right Wing Extremism
SIB – Security and Intelligence Board
SIGINT – Signals Intelligence
SPLC – Southern Poverty Law Centre
SRRP – Strategic Risk and Resilience Panel
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
US – United States
WS – White Supremacy



About FIANZ

The Federation of the Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ) was established in 1979. FIANZ is constituted by seven regional associations:

- New Zealand Muslim Association Incorporated (NZMA), Auckland
- South Auckland Muslim Association Incorporated (SAMA), Auckland
- Waikato Muslim Association Incorporated (WMA), Hamilton
- Manawatu Muslim Association Incorporated (MMA), Palmerston North
- International Muslim Association of New Zealand Incorporated (IMAN), Wellington
- Muslim Association of Canterbury Incorporated (MAC), Christchurch
- Otago Muslim Association Incorporated (OMA), Dunedin

FIANZ is thus an apex umbrella body guiding the New Zealand Muslims in the promotion of religious, social, educational, cultural and economic activities in accordance with the principles of Islam as enshrined in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah. FIANZ plays an important and valuable role in caring for the Muslim community and advocating for the many and varied interests of New Zealand Muslims. FIANZ endeavours to build better understanding between the Muslim community, Government, the wider society, and the various ethnic and religious communities of Aotearoa, so as to live harmoniously for the progress, peace, and prosperity of all. FIANZ has developed a close relationship with central Government over four decades, and is engaged in advocacy, engagement, and intercultural and interfaith dialogue. We are an active and integral part of Aotearoa New Zealand's civil society.


FIANZ's primary functions include:

- Fostering good relations between the New Zealand Muslim community, Government, and all other New Zealand citizens and communities.
- Helping Muslims living in New Zealand integrate well into the local society.
- Promoting the interests and enhancing the effectiveness of the regional Muslim Associations in New Zealand with a view to cooperate and co-exist well with other faith-based and ethnic groups in New Zealand.

- Maintaining a high standard of Islamic practice and undertaking welfare and educational activities.
- Developing and maintaining good relations with the Diplomatic Corps in Wellington and Canberra and other international organisations such as the World Muslim League, the Arab League and the Islamic Development Bank.

FIANZ has advocated patience and prayer to all New Zealand Muslims, as a prerequisite to reflecting on the tragedy and to acting with wisdom and courage in the pursuit of justice.¹ New Zealand Muslims have demonstrated aroha, patience, and mercy, and are grateful to New Zealand emergency services, Government, Ministers of the Crown, faith communities, and members of the public. FIANZ and the New Zealand Muslim community are especially thankful for Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, whose compassion, empathy, principles, and courage have rightly been recognised around the world. FIANZ commends the New Zealand Government for convening the Royal Commission to investigate what happened before 15 March and what can be done after 15 March to prevent such a tragedy ever happening again.

¹ The Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (March 31, 2019) "Christchurch-The Healing Process", FIANZ.
<https://fianz.com/christchurch-the-healing-process>



FIANZ President's Foreword

In the Name of God (Allah), The Most Beneficent, The Most Merciful.

New Zealanders witnessed a horrific act of terrorism on 15 March 2019 that martyred 51 Muslims during Friday prayers at Masjid An-Nur and Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch – may God grant those who lost their lives in these attacks the highest places in Paradise. May He help us strengthen the unity and aroha that our communities and our country witnessed following that dreadful massacre. Ameen.

The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attack on Christchurch Mosques was formed by New Zealand Government. The Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ), as the umbrella organisation for the nearly sixty thousand Muslims of New Zealand, tasked one of its National Directorates to coordinate its submission.

FIANZ recognizes that the future of every community and nation lies in its youth; and although we often live the legacy and experience of people's actions, FIANZ wants things to be done differently. So, we decided to bring our youth from across the country to prepare the submission on our behalf, to enable them to define their own legacy by setting out the actions they would like to see implemented in New Zealand to ensure their security and wellbeing and the security and wellbeing of the whole country in the future. The youth have used the Royal Commission's terms of reference to research and critically examine the role played by the relevant State sector agencies leading up to 15 March 2019, and to establish recommendations they believe will work so that a similar horrific event will never happen to our country again.

This submission made multi-point recommendations that are forward-looking and inclusive of all New Zealanders regardless of faith, ethnicity or culture, reflecting the Islamic teachings on the unity of humankind, enjoyment of patience, justice, hope, perseverance, and love.

The submission recognises there were historical massacres of Māori people in Aotearoa prior to 15 March 2019, including in places of worship, and that the healing processes for these past atrocities against Māori continue. In Islam, the process of healing/repentance when a crime or sin is committed involves the recognition that the crime/sin is committed, sincere regret and admission of guilt, asking for God's forgiveness, apologising to those harmed, forming the sincere intention never to commit the same sin/crime again or verbal utterances and actions that show resolve to not repeat the mistake again, and restitution for the injustices suffered where applicable. The steps involved in the healing process are aptly articulated from a Māori perspective as the "9 R's" that lead to reconciliation: recognition, responsibility, remorse, restitution, reparation, redesign, refrain, reciprocity, and remembrance.²

The Muslim youth who prepared this submission under the mentorship of the BMC Chair, Abdur Razzaq Khan, consulted widely with the Muslim community from Dunedin to Auckland, and held focus group discussions to prepare this document. Thus, the document could be said to represent the collective contribution of New Zealand Muslims to the Royal Commission's inquiry. It is therefore our hope and wish that the findings and the recommendations be strongly considered by the Royal Commission in its final report.

I wish on behalf of FIANZ to thank the New Zealand Government for establishing the Royal Commission of Inquiry, the FIANZ youth team that helped put this submission together, the many individuals who contributed to FIANZ's national engagements and focus groups regarding the submission, and to the Royal Commission of Inquiry for the opportunity to make this submission.

We Pray to God to help the Commission make recommendations that will help the families of those martyred on 15 March 2019 at Christchurch, our community, our people and our country Aotearoa to heal; and May He Protect Aotearoa and all humanity from such horrific occurrences ever happening again.

² Dr R. Joseph (28 November 2019) "Living Harmoniously in a diverse world – A Māori perspective". Keynote address at Faith & Society Symposium, University of Waikato.



Kia kotahi tatou

Dr Mustafa Farouk

President FIANZ

February 2020

Our process


We are a group of young researchers from across Aotearoa New Zealand. We are undergraduate students, recent graduates, and postgraduate researchers. We came together under the guidance and authorisation of FIANZ to collaboratively research and produce the FIANZ submission to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attack on Christchurch Mosques.

Our initial research process involved a comprehensive desk review of open source intelligence products. These included:

- mainstream media reports;
- peer-reviewed academic articles and books;
- non-governmental organisation, think tank, and civil society publications;
- unclassified NZIC, NZDF, MFAT, and NZ Police documents;
- unclassified documents from Western security and intelligence agencies; and
- Official Information Act responses from relevant State sector agencies.

We asked some research questions, and compiled our initial research findings using Google Drive. We met monthly to critically discuss our research and draft report, and to prepare for meetings with the Royal Commissioners. We also met over two days in Auckland prior to our national tour to prepare our presentation and work on logistics. We communicated regularly on WhatsApp to coordinate and to share information.

We held hui in Dunedin, Christchurch, Wellington, Palmerston North, Hamilton and Auckland between 2 and 7 December. Several of us live in Christchurch. One of the core members of our group was a direct victim of the attack. We had to make an emergency department visit while we were in Christchurch, after the hui, because of complications resulting from his injuries sustained during the attack. Alhamdulillah thanks be to God, he was able to continue with us to the North Island.



Turnout was proportionate and in line with our expectations. At each hui, we handed out the executive summary of the report, which outlined our findings and the multi-point programme. We presented our account of events and our main findings in relation to the Terms of Reference. This was followed by a question and answer session that opened the floor to members of the Muslim community to ask for clarification on the report or presentation, provide feedback, and share experiences and perspectives. The report was projected on screen so that any questions about its content could be answered. We explained that the minutes from the meeting would be included in the report, so even if the feedback did not change the report through our editorial process, it would be recorded and seen by the Royal Commission.

The discussion was robust, and some key themes emerged from across the motu. The sample of the New Zealand Muslim community that participated in the hui generally accepted our account of events and our findings in relation to the questions whether the relevant State sector agencies failed to meet required standards, and are at fault, and if there was an inappropriate concentration of, and priority setting for, counter-terrorism resources. The sample of the New Zealand Muslim community was almost unanimous that our submission to the Royal Commission should be positive and future-focussed, and that our recommendations should be inclusive of everyone in Aotearoa New Zealand.

We heard concerns around:

- institutionalised bias and discrimination in the NZIC and the Police;
- the failure of the Police to take hate crimes seriously and to follow up;
- frustrations around the limited scope of the terms of reference, particularly the response and the justice system;
- the treatment of the bodies of the martyred;
- whether our findings were too critical and accusatory in their tone, even if in substance they were correct;
- our need to be fair and balanced in both our findings and recommendations;

- whether the multi-point programme was perhaps too aspirational and idealistic;
- the cultural capability of the New Zealand Government to solve the problems, and to develop a NZIC that performs its functions to required standards.

We also heard a desire to:

- reciprocate the aroha and manaakitanga of Aotearoa New Zealand;
- give back and make a positive difference to our country;
- not be perceived as seeking "special treatment", but the respect, protection, and fulfilment of human rights and formal equality under the law;
- make our recommendations inclusive of all New Zealanders;
- receive equal treatment by relevant State sector agencies.

The focus groups on Sunday 9 December came from across the motu to Auckland to discuss the document in detail. They included :

1. Women
2. Youth
3. Scholars of Islam
4. Academics
5. Community Members

There were two focus groups, and two sessions on the day. The first session focussed on our findings, the second focussed on our recommendations.

Questions for the first session:

1. What do you think went wrong that enabled 15 March to happen?
2. What are your thoughts about our findings?
3. Give examples of the securitisation of Islam (the framing of Muslims and Islam as a security concern).

Questions for the second session:

1. Based on your experiences, how can we prevent another attack?
2. Suggest 5 key recommendations that we will write policy briefs for.
3. Come up with the timeline and milestones for measuring progress.



The overarching sentiment was positive. Again, there was broad agreement about our account and our findings. Robust conversation produced consensus on a range of issues and ironed out some faults in the draft. This process brought together the Muslim community, and has spawned other initiatives, like a professional directory, and a Muslim working group that will develop technological solutions to the problem of online extremism. Another spinoff of this process is a victim-led project that will give victims a platform to tell their stories themselves, and to air their grievances. Victims' voices must be given a platform and a sympathetic ear.

We then compiled our minutes from the national hui and the two focus groups, and extracted key themes and points of consensus and. We then edited the draft document to produce the final version that, to the greatest extent possible, addresses the concerns and desires of the New Zealand Muslim community and its leadership from across the country. We are a diverse community with internal politics and differences. We do not speak in one voice. We can only do our best to consult widely and reach consensus. May God (Allah Subhanahu wa Ta'ala) forgive our shortcomings, and may He reward everyone who participated.

Abdur Razzaq,
Chairperson,
FIANZ Royal Commission Submission
24 February 2020

Executive summary

On 15 March 2019, 51 Muslim worshippers were martyred and 49 were injured in the terrorist attacks during Salaat-ul-Jumu'ah (Friday congregational prayer) on Masjid An-Nur and the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch. It is considered to be from the Qadar of Allah (Subhanahu wa Ta'ala). Belief in Divine will being a pillar of belief in Islam.

The Police and NZSIS did not anticipate and plan for the attack because the Police and the NZSIS were not monitoring the terrorist. The Police and the NZSIS were not monitoring the terrorist because RWE was either not previously a national intelligence priority or was not included in the detailed requirements for previous NIP relating to counter-terrorism. RWE was not included in the National Intelligence Priorities (NIP) or detailed requirements for counter-terrorism because the threat of RWE had not been analysed and assessed by the NZIC until mid-2018. The failure to analyse and assess the threat of RWE until nine months before the attack occurred because the NZIC's engagement with Muslims was flawed, the NZIC lacks diversity, the NZIC is institutionally racist and Islamophobic, and because of the securitisation of Islam and Muslims.

The intelligence cycle begins with priority setting. Not including RWE in the previous NIP or the detailed requirements for the counter-terrorism NIP led to an inappropriate concentration of or priority setting for counter-terrorism resources. The result was that there was no systematic gathering and analysis of HUMINT and SIGINT on the activities of RWEs in New Zealand to assess their intent and capability of perpetrating or financing one or more acts of terrorism, and the impact and immediacy of any potential attacks. The NZIC did not surveil the online and offline activities of RWEs (including the Christchurch terrorist) who:

- produce, distribute, and consume extremist content online;
- travel domestically or globally for the purposes of planning, training for, or perpetrating one or more acts of terrorism;
- communicate and network with other extremists;
- finance global terrorism and extremist movements; and



- use the internet to recruit, motivate, or inspire others.

Additionally, the NZ Police failed to properly assess the terrorist as a “fit and proper” person to hold a firearms licence, which enabled the terrorist attack by permitting the terrorist to legally purchase weapons and ammunition.


FIANZ proposes a multi-point programme to protect and advance the security and wellbeing of Aotearoa New Zealand. The multi-point programme is organised into eight interrelated, interdependent categories:

1. Security
2. Hate
3. Terrorism
4. Weapons
5. Racism
6. Nationhood
7. Information
8. Superdiversity

Usage of Terms – Underlying Explanations and Specificity

Right wing extremism

1. There is not one universal – trans-historical, cross-cultural – political spectrum on which all ideologies can be graded. Ideologies are spectral. There are extremes on the spectra of liberalism, socialism, conservatism, Islamism, nationalism, and other political ideologies. Some political ideologies are inherently extreme, insofar as they are, often self-consciously, so far beyond the norms of the social contexts which they aim to change, that they have no popular or legitimate paths to power. They champion their cause through violence, or exit away from mainstream society. RWE ranges over forms of extremism on the spectra of ideologies on the political right, and rightist political ideologies that are inherently extreme – particularly white supremacy. However, during the age of Western imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide, white supremacist ideology was not considered inherently extreme in relation to the existing norms of Western societies. White supremacy was once “common sense” in almost all modern Western political philosophy – socialist, liberal, and conservative – and across Western academic disciplines.
2. RWE is complex and multiple. It cannot be given an essential definition. RWE is a constellation of causes, ideologies, narratives, movements, and networks that share common features or family resemblances. RWE is not identical with white supremacy. White supremacy is a commonality among different forms of RWE in the West. However, there are non-white and non-Western forms of RWE, and not all RWEs in the West are necessarily white. Hindu RWE demonstrates the difficulties around defining RWE and further complicates the



relationship between terrorism and religion, political ideologies, and regimes in power, for example.³

3. Supremacism is common to most types of RWE. Xenophobia is also a commonality. RWE ideologies and narratives tend to centre on real or imagined antagonisms between racial, religious, or ethnic in-groups and out-groups. Relatedly, RWE ideologies tend to essentialise in-group and out-group identities and values, and represent internal and external forces of change to demographics, identity, or values as inherently degenerative. RWE ideologies tend to be reactionary; they are nostalgic for an imaginary lost utopia of pure identity, social unity, and uncorrupted tradition.⁴
4. RWE narratives tend to be paranoid and conspiratorial. This is a common feature of extremist narratives in general. White supremacist anti-Semitic conspiracy theories that circulate in RWE networks combine RWE elements into narratives of a Jewish globalist cabal masterminding the destruction of Western civilisation. The narratives are variations on the theme that there is a Jewish global conspiracy to socially engineer demographic and normative changes and economic collapse that threaten white, hetero-patriarchal, individualist, capitalist, Christian Western civilisation by controlling the media and banking industries, corrupting academia and culture, puppeteering governments, instigating wars, financing leftist social movements, and manipulating mass migration. Billionaire Jewish philanthropist, George Soros, has now become the face of this faceless enemy on the transnational extreme right. Leftist and non-Western, non-white manifestations of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are also problems. Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, which have again proliferated around the world, are a problem across religious, social, political, national, ethnic, and other differences.

³ Ujjwal Kumar Singh (2019) "Law, State and Right-Wing Extremism in India", *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 14:3, 281-284. DOI: 10.1080/18335330.2019.1667518

⁴ Kristy Campion (2019) "Australian Right Wing Extremist Ideology: Exploring Narratives of Nostalgia and Nemesis", *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 14:3, 208-226, DOI: 10.1080/18335330.2019.1667013

5. Some forms of RWE are single-issue, such as anti-abortion violent extremism. RWEs might focus on single issues, such as gender roles, gun rights, or central government, on which they hold extreme views and for which they are willing to take violent action, while holding moderate views on other core RWE issues. RWE causes are generally nationalistic, and are rooted in national particularities, such as irredentist claims or historical narratives of national victimhood or lost glory. While some RWE movements are specific to particular national contexts, most contemporary RWE is instead focused on transnational categories of whiteness and masculinity, or the perceived threats of Judaism, Islam, non-white migration, liberal capitalism, or the left, to their conception of Western identity, values, and way of life, and to white male power. Contemporary RWE – like extremism on the Islamist spectrum – bears the marks of global hypermodernity: it is digital, mediated, networked, personalised, deterritorialised, and decontextualised.

6. RWE is not accurately framed as a new historical development with explanatory factors solely in recent history, such as the influx of refugees and migrants from Africa and the Middle East to Europe in 2015-2016, the global recession following the 2007/8 global financial crisis, or the historic election in 2008 of the first African-American President of the United States of America.⁵ RWE existed throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and was last resurgent during the 1990s. The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, which killed 168 people and injured over 680 others, was the most horrific manifestation of RWE during this era in the United States.⁶

7. Contemporary RWE has evolved with and adapted to technological, political, economic, aesthetic, social, and geopolitical transformations, but it is connected to older generations. Extreme ideologies, movements, and groups on the nationalist spectrum, irredentism, ethnic and religious conflict, and

⁵ Janet Reitman (November 3, 2018) "U.S. Law Enforcement Failed to See the Threat of White Nationalism. Now They Don't Know How to Stop It", The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/magazine/FBI-charlottesville-white-nationalism-far-right.html>

⁶ FBI (N.D) "Oklahoma City Bombing". <https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing>



genocide, have been defining features of the post-colonial and post-Soviet worlds and the global security environment.

8. Before the attack, the Christchurch terrorist live streamed himself in his car listening to the song "God is a Serb", written in 1993 in support of Radovan Karadzic, a Bosnian Serb leader convicted of genocide for his role in the massacre of 8,000 Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995. In his manifesto, the terrorist claimed to be working "part time as a kebab removalist", an 8chan alt-right meme referencing the genocide of Bosnian Muslims, and wrote "kebab remover" on one of the weapons used in the attack.⁷ During his radicalisation process, the terrorist performed a nationalist "dark tour" of Turkey, then Serbia, Montenegro and other parts of the former Yugoslavia in late 2016, stopping at the sites of battles between Muslims and Christians during the centuries of Ottoman rule, and in early 2017 travelled to some of the bloodiest sites of the 1990s Balkan wars.⁸

White supremacy

9. White supremacy is also complex and multiple. White supremacy, as a category of extremist social movements and networks, contains different segments: neo-Nazis; racist skinheads; white power gangs; the alt-right; and traditional white supremacist movements, including the Ku Klux Klan; the Council of Conservative Citizens; European fascisms; and Nazism. FIANZ, like the Anti-Defamation League, uses the term white supremacy rather than white nationalism, which is "a term that originated among white supremacists as a euphemism for white supremacy". We also adopt the ADL definition of white supremacy as:

a term used to characterize various belief systems central to which are one or more of the following key tenets: 1) whites should have dominance over people of other backgrounds,

⁷ Tess Owen (March 16, 2019) "Decoding the racist memes the alleged New Zealand shooter used to communicate", Vice. https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/vbwn9a/decoding-the-racist-memes-the-new-zealand-shooter-used-to-communicate

⁸ Wilma McKay and Kate Shuttleworth (March 21, 2019) "'Hiding in plain sight': In quiet New Zealand city, alleged gunman plotted carnage", The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hiding-in-plain-sight-in-quiet-new-zealand-city-alleged-gunman-plotted-carnage/2019/03/21/1846de9e-4a7b-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html

especially where they may co-exist; 2) whites should live by themselves in a whites-only society; 3) white people have their own "culture" that is superior to other cultures; 4) white people are genetically superior to other people. As a full-fledged ideology, white supremacy is far more encompassing than simple racism or bigotry. Most white supremacists today further believe that the white race is in danger of extinction due to a rising "flood" of non-whites, who are controlled and manipulated by Jews, and that imminent action is needed to "save" the white race.⁹

10. However, this is a narrow definition of white supremacy as ideology. We also need a wide definition of white supremacy as historical sociological fact. Both moments – subjective (vicious thoughts, feelings, beliefs, behaviours, and habits of agents) and objective (unjust social structures and processes) – of white supremacy must be analysed and theorised.

11. A historical, methodologically nationalist analyses of white supremacy as ideology are inadequate to the tasks of interpretation and explanation. White supremacist movements can only be accurately understood in connected national and global historical contexts as reactionary struggles against progressive victories on the anti-imperial, anti-colonial, anti-slavery, and anti-racist fronts. Dylann Roof, the white supremacist terrorist who massacred nine black parishioners and injured one at Emanuel Africa Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, wore the flags of Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa, for example.¹⁰ As former United States President Barack Obama tweeted in response to the Christchurch-inspired white supremacist terrorist attack in El Paso, Texas, "the El Paso shooting follows a dangerous trend: troubled individuals who embrace racist ideologies and see themselves obligated to preserve white supremacy".¹¹ The global nature of white supremacist terrorism should point analysts to white supremacy as the organising principle of the Western world order that has structured human life in the modern age, the long cycle of which is coming to an end. White

⁹ ADL "Defining Extremism: A Glossary of White Supremacist Terms, Movements and Philosophies" <https://www.adl.org/education/resources/glossary-terms/defining-extremism-white-supremacy>

¹⁰ Zack Beauchap (18 June 2018) "The racist flags on Dylann Roof's jacket, explained", Vox. <https://www.vox.com/2015/6/18/8806633/charleston-shooter-flags-dylann-roof>

¹¹ Barack Obama (6 August 2019) Twitter <https://twitter.com/BarackObama/status/1158453079035002881>



supremacy only ceased to be the explicit principle of the world order after World War II, and it would take several decades after WWII to achieve geopolitical decolonisation, black civil rights in the United States, and the end of apartheid in South Africa. Structural and institutional racism endure at national, regional, and global levels.

12. The wide definition of white supremacy as social fact is: structural and institutional forms of racism at global, regional, national levels that reproduce white wealth, privilege, power and Western global dominance, and normalise Western culture. These structures and institutions were created by long histories of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide. They are today reproduced subconsciously or implicitly (in general), despite conscious or explicit disavowals of inegalitarian social relations expressed in modern human rights discourse and by European Enlightenment ideals of liberty, equality, and solidarity.

SETTING THE CONTEXT-Timeline: from Oslo to Christchurch

Resurgent right wing extremism in the global threatscape

13. FIANZ maintains that the global security trend of resurgent right wing extremism had become apparent several years ago, dating back at least until the 2011 Norway terrorist attacks, in which Anders Breivik killed 77 people, including 69 members of the youth wing of the Norwegian Labour Party,¹² and injured a total of 319 people. "Going Breivik" is a term reportedly used on RWE forums to mean readiness to take violent direct action.¹³ The Christchurch terrorist cited Breivik and other RWE terrorists in his online manifesto, and his name and the names of other white supremacists were written on the weapons used in the attacks.¹⁴ In the aftermath of the Christchurch terror attacks, the NZSIS and GCSB released a single email indirectly referencing the Norway terrorist attack, and have refused on security grounds to say if they hold other emails about Breivik.¹⁵ Unless further internal correspondence and briefs from this time can be obtained by the Royal Commission, this void suggests that the global significance of the Oslo attack, and the links between Breivik and resurgent RWE, were missed by the NZIC.


14. The Global Terrorism Database, the most comprehensive unclassified database of terrorist attacks in the world, identified 350 RWE terrorist attacks in Europe,

¹² Rachel Pinder (July 25, 2011) "NZ MP's 'horrible' wait for Norway news", New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10740764

¹³ Asne Seierstad (18 March 2019) "The Anatomy of White Terror", <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/opinion/new-zealand-tarrant-white-supremacist-terror.html>

¹⁴ John Ferguson (March 15 2019) "Disciples of Hate Inspired Killer", The Australian, <https://www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/disciples-of-hate-inspired-killer/news-story/06d36e0e5ece362596124bf12ce32442>

¹⁵ Phil Pennington (July 2, 2019) "GCSB and SIS release one email relating to far-right killer Anders Breivik", RNZ. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/393472/qcsb-and-sis-release-one-email-relating-to-far-right-killer-anders-breivik>



North America, and Australia from 2011 through 2017.¹⁶ A New York Times analysis of white supremacist terrorist attacks since 2011, based on data from the Global Terrorism Database, found that at least one third of white supremacist terrorists were inspired by others who perpetrated similar terrorist attacks, professed a reverence for them, or exhibited an interest in their tactics.¹⁷ Links continue to be added to the chain of attacks initiated by Breivik.¹⁸

15. The Christchurch terrorist attack and its predecessors were referenced in the manifesto of John Earnest, the 19-year-old white nationalist terrorist who attacked the Chabad of Poway synagogue in California on 27 April 2019, on the last day of the Jewish Passover holiday. One died and three were injured.¹⁹

16. Minutes before perpetrating a mass shooting in El Paso, Texas, on 3 August 2019, in which 20 were murdered and 21 wounded, Patrick Crusius, 21, electronically published a 2,300-word anti-immigrant manifesto which referenced the Christchurch attack. The attack was the most lethal RWE terrorist attack in the United States since Oklahoma City. The manifesto encouraged likeminded individuals to take direct action on “low security targets” and describes how he “figured an under-prepared attack and a meh manifesto is better than no attack and no manifesto” – heralding a dangerous new global threatscape where RWEs rapidly plan and execute attacks on soft targets. Immediately after the attacks, a Google spreadsheet formatted as a league table (date, location, number of kills) of RWE terrorist attacks circulated on the online forum 8chan.²⁰

¹⁶ Weiyi Cai and Simone Landon (April 3, 2019) “Attacks by White Extremists Are Growing. So Are Their Connections”, New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/03/world/white-extremist-terrorism-christchurch.html>

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Reuters (August 5, 2019) “Lone wolf attackers inspire each other, NATO chief says” <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-newzealand-shooting-nato/lone-wolf-attackers-inspire-each-other-nato-chief-says-idUSKCN1UV0FB>

¹⁹ Deanna Paul (28 April 2019) “Authorities identify suspect in ‘hate crime’ synagogue shooting that left 1 dead, 3 injured”, The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/04/27/california-synagogue-shooting-multiple-injuries/?utm_term=.46c02ef8b3b5

²⁰ Andrew Marantz (August 4, 2019) “The El Paso Shooting and the Virality of Evil”, The New Yorker. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-el-paso-shooting-and-the-virality-of-evil>

17. A third copycat attack since 15 March was perpetrated on the Al Noor Islamic Centre in Baerum, Norway by Philip Manshaus, 21, on 10 August 2019 (apparently mistimed for Eid al-Adha). One elderly man was injured before the terrorist was overpowered by worshippers. Prior to the attack, Manshaus murdered his stepsister, 17, in their family home.²¹ In a meme posted on the day of the attack on a new forum called Endchan, Manshaus glorified 2019 RWE terrorists Crusius, Tarrant, and Earnest. Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg condemned the attack as a "direct attack on Norwegian Muslims" and "religious freedom".²²

18. On 2 June 2019, Walter Lübcke, a member of Chancellor Angela Merkel's CDU Party who supported the Chancellor's pro-migration stance, was assassinated by a RWE terrorist. The assassin was connected to the Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund, an active German neo-Nazi terrorist organisation.²³ After the Lübcke assassination, it was revealed by the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), the domestic security and intelligence agency, that there are 24,000 right wing extremists in Germany including 12,700 who are "violence-oriented".²⁴ The BfV revealed later in June that a neo-Nazi cell called Nordkreuz (Northern Cross) had compiled a list of political opponents using police data, and ordered 200 body bags and quicklime in preparation for a potential collapse of state order ("Day X"). Of the more than 30 members, most were associated with Germany's police and

²¹ Jason Burke (August 11, 2019) "Norway mosque attack suspect 'inspired by Christchurch and El Paso shootings'", The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/11/norway-mosque-attack-suspect-may-have-been-inspired-by-christchurch-and-el-paso-shootings>

²² Rick Noack (August 12, 2019) "How an unarmed 65-year-old stopped a gunman from attacking a Norwegian mosque", The Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/08/12/how-an-unarmed-year-old-stopped-gunman-attacking-norwegian-mosque>

²³ Ben Knight (June 17, 2019) "Walter Lübcke murder raises specter of neo-Nazi terrorism", Dw. <https://www.dw.com/en/walter-l%C3%BCbcke-murder-raises-specter-of-neo-nazi-terrorism/a-49238157>

²⁴ Jenny Hill (June 23, 2019) "German politician's murder raises spectre of far-right attacks", BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48716944>



military, including several former and one active member of the elite forces unit of the state police of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.²⁵

19. A fourth copycat attack was then perpetrated in the German city of Halle by Stephan Balliet, 27, on 9 October 2019. The attack targeted a synagogue, but the terrorist was unable to enter. Inside the synagogue, 51 people were marking Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism. After failing to forcibly enter the synagogue, the terrorist shot and killed a woman in a nearby street and a man inside a kebab shop located 500 meters from the synagogue. Two were wounded. The terrorist had four kilos (9lb) of explosives in his car. The attack was intended to create a "worldwide effect" by deliberately mimicking tactics used by the Christchurch terrorist, prosecutors allege. Approximately 2,200 people watched a livestream posted on Twitch, a streaming platform, during which he made misogynistic and anti-Semitic comments.²⁶

20. There have also been notable RWE counter-terrorism success stories in Western countries since March 15. In the two weeks after the El Paso shooting, United States authorities foiled seven further RWE attacks:

- Conor Climo, 23, Nevada (8 August 2019);
- Brandon Wagshol, 22, Connecticut (15 August 2019);
- Tristan Scott Wix, 25, Florida (16 August 2019);
- James P. Reardon, 20, Ohio (17 August 2019);
- Eric Lin, 35, Florida (20 August 2019);
- Thomas Matthew McVicker, 38, Tennessee (20 August 2019);
- Rodolfo Montoya, 37, California (20 August 2019).²⁷

21. In the United Kingdom, Morgan Seales, 20, and Gabriele Longo, 26, were jailed on 23 October 2019 for encouraging a Christchurch copycat attack on a

²⁵ Ben Knight (June 29, 2019) "German neo-Nazi doomsday prepper network 'ordered body bags, made kill lists'", DW. (<https://www.dw.com/en/german-neo-nazi-doomsday-prepper-network-ordered-body-bags-made-kill-lists/a-49410494>)

²⁶ BBC (10 October 2019) "German synagogue shooting was far-right terror, justice minister says", <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50003759>

²⁷ Sam Levin (24 August 2019) "Police thwarted at least seven mass shootings and white supremacist attacks since El Paso", The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/20/el-paso-shooting-plot-white-supremacist-attacks>

WhatsApp group called Christian White Militia, possessing material for terrorist purposes, and collecting or making a record of information useful in the preparation of an act of terrorism.²⁸ A total of seven RWE attacks have been foiled by British authorities, but it is not clear from open source information how many of these seven foiled attacks were plotted post-Christchurch or were explicitly copycat attacks.²⁹

22. In Australia, Cormac Rothsey, 43, was arrested on 5 September as part of a New South Wales joint counter-terrorism investigation with the Australian federal police into online RWE activity following a report to the National Security Hotline. Rothsey allegedly expressed admiration for the Christchurch terrorist on Facebook, and threatened to attack a Mosque during Friday congregational prayers. He also threatened to kill New Zealand Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern.³⁰

Significant RWE terrorist attacks and events

23. This timeline includes significant terrorist attacks and events beginning with Oslo, but excludes the thousands of reported and unreported incidents of hate speech and violence against Jews, Muslims, black people, migrants, other minorities, and women around the world. This timeline represents only a small fraction of the hundreds of RWE attacks and events in Europe, North America, and Australia from 2011 to 2019. This timeline also excludes the thousands of people killed during the same period by Islamist extremist terrorists, the immense majority of whom are Muslims living in Muslim majority states.³¹

²⁸ BBC (23 October 2019) "Pair jailed for inciting copycat terror attacks", BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-tyne-50161137>

²⁹ Mark Hosenball (10 September 2019) "Britain foiled 22 attacks since March 2017, top counter-terrorism officer says", Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-security/britain-foiled-22-attacks-since-march-2017-top-counter-terrorism-officer-says-idUSKCN1VU1YH>

³⁰ The Guardian (6 September 2019) "Man arrested over violent rightwing extremist threats on social media". <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/sep/06/man-arrested-over-violent-rightwing-extremist-threats-on-social-media>

³¹ Hannah Ritchie, Joe Hasell, Cameron Appel and Max Roser (2019) "Terrorism", Our World in Data. <https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism#which-regions-experience-the-most-terrorism>



24. This timeline highlights patterns in RWE terrorist target selection:

- visible Muslims, Jews, migrants, and ethnic minorities;
- places of worship;
- religious holidays;
- law enforcement and government officials; and
- centre-left and pro-migration parties and politicians.

25. Between Oslo and Christchurch, there were at least 38 attacks that targeted places of worship across North America. These included Christian churches, Sikh temples, Jewish synagogues, and Islamic mosques. All five RWE attacks in Australia from 2011 through 2017 targeted mosques and Islamic centres.³² In Germany, there were 950 attacks on Muslims and Muslim institutions such as mosques in 2017, almost all were RWE motivated.³³ In 2018, 813 anti-Muslim attacks were perpetrated in Germany, with the number of people injured increasing from 32 to 54.³⁴

22/07/2011

Anders Breivik, 32, killed eight people in Oslo, Norway, by detonating a car bomb and then went on to murder 69 young people attending a summer camp organised by the Workers' Youth League, the youth wing of the Norwegian Labour Party, on the island of Utøya. Breivik's online manifesto, "2083: A European Declaration of Independence", expressed RWE views on Muslim immigration, European integration, "Cultural Marxism", and multiculturalism.

November 2011

German media revealed that the Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist Underground) neo-Nazi cell

³² Weiyi Cai and Simone Landon (April 3, 2019) "Attacks by White Extremists Are Growing. So Are Their Connections", New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/03/world/white-extremist-terrorism-christchurch.html>

³³ Andrea Shalal (March 3, 2018) "At least 950 attacks on Muslims reported in Germany in 2017: report". Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-crime-islam/at-least-950-attacks-on-muslims-reported-in-germany-in-2017-report-idUSKCN1GE2V3>

³⁴ DW (April 2, 2019) "Germany sees fewer attacks on Muslims and mosques in 2018". <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-sees-fewer-attacks-on-muslims-and-mosques-in-2018/a-48156765>

operated for 13 years, despite federal and regional intelligence services reportedly having infiltrated the group. Between 2000 and 2007, the cell murdered 10 people in Germany. Ethnic Turks were the primary targets, but victims also included ethnic Kurds, one ethnic Greek, and one ethnic German policewoman.³⁵ The NSU attempted to kill 43 additional targets and conducted three bomb attacks and 15 armed robberies. The failure by authorities to recognise or publicly acknowledge that these violent episodes constituted a campaign of neo-Nazi terrorism created one of the most significant crises of German law enforcement and intelligence agencies since WWII.³⁶

5/08/2012

Wade Michael Page, 40, killed six and wounded three others when he opened fire with a 9-millimeter semiautomatic handgun in a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, United States.³⁷


29/04/2013

Pavlo Lapshyn, 25, stabbed and killed Mohammed Saleem, 82, as the pensioner returned from Green Lane Mosque in Small Heath, Birmingham, United Kingdom. Lapshyn attempted three bombings on local mosques, on 21 June 2013, 28 June 2013, and 12 July 2013 using improvised explosive devices, timed for Friday congregational prayers on each occasion to maximise casualties. The device he planted

³⁵ Iveta Ondruskova (October 7, 2018) "The victims of the neo-Nazi NSU murder spree", DW. <https://www.dw.com/en/the-victims-of-the-neo-nazi-nsu-murder-sprees/g-44606301>

³⁶ Daniel Koehler (2019) "Violence and Terrorism from the Far Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat", ICCT Policy Brief, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. 2 <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf>

³⁷ Erica Goode and Serge F. Kovaleski (August 6, 2012) "Wisconsin Killer Fed and Was Fueled by Hate-Driven Music", The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/us/army-veteran-identified-as-suspect-in-wisconsin-shooting.html>



in July had 100 nails wrapped around it to maximise carnage. He was jailed for 40 years.³⁸

1/11/2013

Paul Anthony Ciancia, 23, killed a United States government Transportation Security Administration officer at point blank range, and injured several other people during a shooting at Los Angeles International Airport. He was carrying a single page manifesto that referred to right wing conspiracy theories about the "New World Order", the Federal Reserve, and fiat currency.³⁹ Ciancia was sentenced to life plus 60 years for murder in a case investigated by the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force.⁴⁰

13/04/2014

73-year-old Frazier Glenn Miller Jr., founder and grand dragon of the Carolina Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, opened fire outside a Jewish Community Center and in the carpark of a nearby retirement community, Village Shalom, in Overland Park, Kansas, United States. Three people were killed in the attack.⁴¹

23/05/2014

Elliot Rodger stabbed his three roommates to death then drove to a sorority house at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and shot several women. He then killed or injured several pedestrians with both gunfire and his vehicle

³⁸ Vikram Dodd (October 25, 2013) "Pavlo Lapshyn jailed for 40 years for murder and mosque bombs", The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/ukrainian-white-supremacist-murder-mosque-bombs-pavlo-lapshyn>

³⁹ SPLC (2 November 2013) "Hatewatch Exclusive: Alleged Lax Shooter Referenced 'Patriot' Conspiracy Theories", <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2013/11/02/hatewatch-exclusive-alleged-lax-shooter-referenced-%E2%80%98patriot%E2%80%99-conspiracy-theories>

⁴⁰ United States Department of Justice (7 November 2016) "California Man Sentenced to Life Plus 60 Years for 2013 Shooting Spree at Los Angeles International Airport and First-Degree Murder of Transportation Security Administration Officer", <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-man-sentenced-life-plus-60-years-2013-shooting-spree-los-angeles-international>

⁴¹ Emma G. Fitzsimmons (April 13, 2014) "Man Kills 3 at Jewish Centers in Kansas City Suburb", The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/us/3-killed-in-shootings-at-jewish-center-and-retirement-home-in-kansas.html>

before exchanging fire with police and killing himself. Seven were murdered and 14 wounded.⁴² The terrorist attack was celebrated and Elliot Rodger glorified by members of the transnational online community of alt-right incels.⁴³

8/06/2014

Jerad Miller, 31, and Amanda Miller, 22, killed two police officers, Igor Soldo and Alyn Beck, and an intervening armed civilian, Joseph Wilcox, in a Las Vegas attack. The couple covered Soldo's dead body with a Revolutionary War-era flag bearing an image of a coiled snake and the slogan "Don't Tread on Me", a swastika, and a note reading "the beginning of the revolution". Amanda killed Jerard and herself in a standoff with police. The couple expressed anti-government and white supremacist views on social media.⁴⁴

August 2014


The internet culture war over progressive influence in gaming referred to as #GamerGate emerged from a debate over ethics in gaming journalism initiated by a disturbing blog by a disgruntled ex-boyfriend of an indie game developer, and escalated into a number of terrifying harassment campaigns against women in gaming and journalists. Gamergate brought together a volatile mix of misogynists and racists that now dominate the online alt-right, and coined or popularised much of the coded language of the alt-right, such as "social justice warrior (SJW)".⁴⁵

⁴² Martin Pengelly (May 25, 2014) "California killings: UK-born Elliot Rodger blamed for deaths", The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/25/elliott-rodger-suspect-california-mass-murder-shooting-stabbing>

⁴³ Rachel Janik (April 24, 2018) "'I laugh at the death of normies': How incels are celebrating the Toronto mass killing", Southern Poverty Law Centre. <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/04/24/i-laugh-death-normies-how-incels-are-celebrating-toronto-mass-killing>

⁴⁴ <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/06/10/world/crime-legal-world/las-vegas-cop-killers-harbored-anti-government-neo-nazi-ideology>

⁴⁵ Abby Ohlheiser (October 7, 2015) "Why 'social justice warrior,' a Gamergate insult, is now a dictionary entry", Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/10/07/why-social-justice-warrior-a-gamergate-insult-is-now-a-dictionary-entry/>



12/09/2014

Eric Frein, 31, staged an ambush-style sniper shooting outside a state police barracks in Blooming Grove, Pennsylvania. Cpl. Bryon Dickson, 38, was killed and Trooper Alex Douglass, 31, was critically wounded. Frein was convicted on charges of terrorism, capital murder, and attempted murder, and sentenced to death. Frein was an anti-government survivalist.⁴⁶

January 2015

In the immediate aftermath of the horrific IS-inspired terrorist attacks in France on satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo (07/01/2015) and on a Jewish supermarket (09/01/2015), six mosques and a restaurant were attacked in "retaliation". Shots were fired at mosques in Port-la-Nouvelle, Albi, Saint Júery, Vendôme, Soissons, and Digne-les-Bains. In Villefranche-sur-Saône, a kebab shop near a mosque was targeted by an improvised explosive device.⁴⁷ The acts were classified as RWE terrorism by French authorities.

10/02/2015

Muslims, Deah Barakat, his wife Yusor Abu-Salha, and her sister Razan Abu-Salha were murdered by neighbour, Craig Hicks, 46, in a racially and religiously motivated attack in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Fred Barbash (27 April 2017) "‘Literally hunting humans’: Eric Frein, sniper who killed Pa. trooper, sentenced to death", Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/04/27/murder-in-his-heart-eric-frein-sniper-killer-of-pa-trooper-sentenced-to-death/>

⁴⁷ EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) (2016) p.41
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/europol_tesat_2016.pdf

⁴⁸ BBC (June 12, 2019) "Chapel Hill killer jailed for life for 2015 murder of Muslim students".
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48618064>

17/07/2015

Dylann Roof, 21, killed nine parishioners and injured one at Emanuel Africa Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. All nine victims were black.⁴⁹

23/07/2015

John Russell Houser, 59, opened fire during a screening of Trainwreck at the Grand 16 movie theatre in Lafayette, Louisiana, killing two people and injuring nine. Houser then committed suicide. He had expressed RWE views and conspiracy theories in online forums and message boards.⁵⁰ In a journal, Houser wrote "thank you for the wake up call Dylann".⁵¹

22/10/2015

Anton Lundin Pettersson, 21, attacked Kronan School in Sweden with a sword, wearing a mask and uniform evoking Nazism, killing a male student and a teacher's aide, and stabbing another male student and a teacher who were hospitalised in critical condition. He was killed by police. Niclas Hallgren, the chief of police in Trollhättan, called the attack a hate crime with a racism perspective and said the attacker "chose dark skinned people, not white".⁵²

02/06/2016

A Mic report into the alt-right's use of triple parentheses or the (((echo))) to highlight the names of prominent Jews and organisations thought to be owned or controlled by Jews

⁴⁹ Jason Horowitz, Nick Corasaniti and Ashley Southall (June 17, 2015) "Nine Killed in Shooting at Black Church in Charleston", The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/us/church-attacked-in-charleston-south-carolina.html>

⁵⁰ SPLC (24 July 2015) "Lafayette Theater Shooter Fan of David Duke, Neo-Nazis, and Antigovernment Conspiracies", <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2015/07/23/lafayette-theater-shooter-fan-david-duke-neo-nazis-and-antigovernment-conspiracies>

⁵¹ Associated Press 13 January 2016) "Louisiana movie theater shooting gunman's hate-filled journal released", The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/13/louisiana-theater-fatal-shooting-trainwreck-journal-released-john-houser-dylann-roof>

⁵² David Crouch (October 23, 2015) "Sweden school attack: police treat killing of pupil and teacher as racist hate crime", The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/23/sweden-school-attack-police-investigate-racist-motive-for-double>



brought the practice to mainstream attention. Mic claims that the practice originated with right wing blog the Right Stuff, whose podcast The Daily Shoah (the Hebrew term for the Holocaust) featured a segment called "Merchant Minute" that gave Jewish names a cartoonish "echo" sound effect when uttered.⁵³ Google removed a browser extension meant to automatically place the ((echo)) notation around Jewish names on web pages in response to the Mic story.⁵⁴

16/06/2016

UK Labour MP, Jo Cox, 41, was murdered by Thomas Mair, 53. Mair repeated the now-banned RWE group, National Action's slogan: "Death to traitors, freedom for Britain" at his trial.⁵⁵

22/07/2016

Timed exactly five years after the Oslo attacks, Iranian-German "David S." (who self-identified as racially "Aryan"), 18, killed nine people in a white nationalist attack on a shopping centre in Munich, Germany. Most the targets were ethnically Albanian or Turkish. David S. killed himself.⁵⁶

August 2016

Australian, Phillip Galea, 31, was charged with plotting terrorist attacks against Melbourne left-wing anarchist groups, and was allegedly preparing a terrorist training manual that he hoped would lead to "thousands upon

⁵³ Anthony Smith and Cooper Fleishman (June 2, 2016) "(((Echoes))), Exposed: The Secret Symbol Neo-Nazis Use to Target Jews Online", MIC.

<https://www.mic.com/articles/144228/echoes-exposed-the-secret-symbol-neo-nazis-use-to-target-jews-online>

⁵⁴ Cooper Fleishman and Anthony Smith (June 3, 2016) ""Coincidence Detector": The Google Chrome Extension White Supremacists Use to Track Jews", MIC.

<https://www.mic.com/articles/145105/coincidence-detector-the-google-extension-white-supremacists-use-to-track-jews>

⁵⁵ Reuters (June 18, 2016) "'Death to traitors, freedom for Britain' accused killer of lawmaker Jo Cox tells court", South China Morning Post. <https://www.scmp.com/news/world/europe/article/1977092/death-traitors-freedom-britain-accused-killer-lawmaker-jo-cox>

⁵⁶ Darko Janjevic (July 22, 2017) "Munich shooter liked Nazis, Breivik, identified as Aryan, says report", DW. <https://www.dw.com/en/munich-shooter-liked-nazis-breivik-identified-as-aryan-says-report/a-39803749-0>

thousands" of RWE terrorist attacks. This was the first time that federal anti-terrorism legislation was used against an individual politically motivated by RWE ideology.⁵⁷

December 2016

Under Theresa May's premiership, United Kingdom Home Secretary Amber Rudd proscribed the first RWE group, National Action, under the Terrorism Act 2000. The UK Government took further action in September 2017, proscribing Scottish Dawn and National Socialist Anti-Capitalist Action as aliases of National Action. In November 2018, six people were convicted of being members of National Action.⁵⁸

29/01/2017

Alexandre Bissonnette, 27, opened fire on the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec City. Six Muslim worshippers were killed and nineteen others were injured.⁵⁹ His name was one of those scrawled on the Christchurch terrorist's weapons.

20/03/2017

White military veteran, James Jackson, 28, approached and fatally stabbed African-American, Timothy Caughman, 66, multiple times with a sword. The attack was practice for executing a larger terrorist plot. Jackson's manifesto included an emblazoned swastika and a Crusader's Cross and read "The racial World War starts today... This political terrorist attack is a formal declaration of global total war on the Negro races". Jackson was found guilty on rare state charges of murder as terrorism and murder as a hate crime. It was

⁵⁷ SBS News (14 October 2019) "Accused Victorian terror plotter wanted to 'target left-wing and Muslim groups'", <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/accused-victorian-terror-plotter-wanted-to-target-left-wing-and-muslim-groups>

⁵⁸ Home Office News Team (March 19, 2019) "Fact sheet: Right-wing terrorism" <https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2019/03/19/factsheet-right-wing-terrorism/>

⁵⁹ BBC (March 29, 2018) "Canadian man pleads guilty to Quebec mosque attack", RNZ. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/world/353644/canadian-man-pleads-guilty-to-quebec-mosque-attack>



the first conviction of a white supremacist on terrorism charges in New York.⁶⁰

26/05/2017

Jeremy Joseph Christian, 35, killed two white men and wounded a third when the trio intervened to stop Christian harassing two Muslim women on a train in Portland, Oregon, United States.⁶¹

19/06/2017

Darren Osborne, 47, drove a rented white van into a group of Muslim worshippers during Ramadan, killing one and injuring 12 at Finsbury Park Mosque, London, United Kingdom.⁶²

12/08/2017

Marchers at the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, United States, chanted "Jews will not replace us", referring to the "great replacement" conspiracy theory and title of the Christchurch terrorist's manifesto. The rally became a day of violent clashes between hundreds of white supremacists and counter-protestors.

James Alex Field Jr.,²⁰ killed one counter-protester and injured 35 others by intentionally ramming his car into another vehicle on a street crowded with counter-protestors.⁶³

September 2017

Four soldiers in the British Army were arrested under Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 by Police in conjunction with

⁶⁰ Jan Ransom (February 13, 2019) "White Supremacist Who Killed Black Man to Incite Race War Sentenced to Life in Prison", The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/nyregion/james-harris-jackson-timothy-caughman.html>

⁶¹ Matthew Haag and Jacey Fortin (May 27, 2017) "Two Killed in Portland While Trying to Stop Anti-Muslim Rant, Police Say", The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/27/us/portland-train-attack-muslim-rant.html>

⁶² BBC (February 1, 2018) "Darren Osborne guilty of Finsbury Park mosque murder". <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-42910051>

⁶³ Paul Duggan (November 23, 2018) "Self-professed neo-Nazi to go on trial in deadly crash at Charlottesville rally". https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/self-professed-neo-nazi-to-go-on-trial-in-deadly-crash-at-charlottesville-rally/2018/11/22/78fd8efe-eda1-11e8-8679-934a2b33be52_story.html

counter-terror units from the West Midlands, Wales and the East Midlands, consequent to a Home Office Police Force-led operation supported by the Army.⁶⁴ The UK Ministry of Defence then released a leaflet detailing criteria for identifying right wing extremists in the Army.

December 2017

Nick Giampa, 17, murdered Buckley Kuhn-Fricker and Scott Fricker, the parents of his ex-girlfriend, in their home in Reston. Giampa shot himself, and was taken to hospital in critical condition. He stabilised and was charged as a juvenile with two counts of murder. Giampa's alleged motive was that the Frickers intervened to end his relationship with their daughter upon discovering his RWE views on social media including praise of Adolf Hitler and Atomwaffen Division propaganda (his parents dispute this account, and the case is yet to be tried).⁶⁵

10/01/2018

Florida leader of neo-Nazi cell, Atomwaffen Division, Brandon Russell, 22, was sentenced to five years in prison for possession of explosives.

Police found the explosive material hexamethylene triperoxide diamine, ammonium nitrate, nitromethane, empty shell casings, fuses and electric matches during a search conducted after his roommate, Devon Arthurs, 18, murdered two other roommates, Jeremy Himmelman, 22, and Andrew

⁶⁴ Danny Boyle and Hayley Dixon (September 5, 2017) "British soldiers arrested by terror police for allegedly being members of banned neo-Nazi group", The Telegraph. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/05/four-alleged-members-neo-nazi-group-arrested-suspicion-planning/>

⁶⁵ Justin Jouvenal (25 September 2019) "Va. teen accused of killing girlfriend's parents to be tried as an adult", Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/va-teen-accused-of-killing-girlfriends-parents-to-be-tried-as-an-adult/2019/09/24/3e628fae-af13-11e9-a0c9-6d2d7818f3da_story.html



Oneschuk, 18. All four roommates were members of the neo-Nazi cell.⁶⁶ Arthurs was declared mentally incompetent to stand trial for the murders. He claims to have converted to Islam and to have murdered his roommates because they ridiculed his religion, and to prevent a terrorist attack he believed they were planning to carry out.⁶⁷ Upon arrest, Arthurs advised police that Russell had explosive materials in the house.⁶⁸

03/02/2018

Luca Traini, 28, shot six African migrants in Macerata, Italy. Traini was a failed political candidate in a local election for the anti-immigrant Northern League.⁶⁹ His name was one of those scrawled on the Christchurch terrorist's weapons.

23/04/2018

Incel terrorist, Alek Minassian, 25, killed 10 and injured 16, some critically, in a vehicular attack using a hired van on a busy street in Toronto, Canada.⁷⁰ Minassian wrote a post on Facebook expressing his terrorist motives: "Private (Recruit) Minassian Infantry 00010, wishing to speak to Sgt 4chan please. C23249161. The Incel Rebellion has already begun!

⁶⁶ Niraj Chokshi (20 January 2018) "Neo-Nazi Leader in Florida Sentenced to 5 Years Over Homemade Explosives", New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/10/us/brandon-russell-sentenced-neo-nazi.html>

⁶⁷ WFLA (3 April 2019) "More doctors to evaluate accused double murderer with neo-Nazi ties in Tampa", News Channel 8. <https://www.wfla.com/news/hillsborough-county/more-doctors-to-evaluate-accused-double-murderer-with-neo-nazi-ties-in-tampa/>

⁶⁸ United States Department of Justice (9 January 2018) "Neo-Nazi Leader Sentenced To Five Years In Federal Prison For Explosives Charges", <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/neo-nazi-leader-sentenced-five-years-federal-prison-explosives-charges>

⁶⁹ Stefano Pitrelli and Michael Birnbaum (February 3, 2018) "Man shoots, wounds at least 6 'people of color' in Italian city amid tensions", Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/suspect-shoots-wounds-at-least-six-people-of-color-in-italian-city-amid-tensions/2018/02/03/58c93240-08f1-11e8-ae28-e370b74ea9a7_story.html

⁷⁰ Rachel Janik (April 24, 2018) "'I laugh at the death of normies': How incels are celebrating the Toronto mass killing", Southern Poverty Law Centre. <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/04/24/i-laugh-death-normies-how-incels-are-celebrating-toronto-mass-killing>

We will overthrow all the Chads and Stacys! All hail the Supreme Gentleman Elliot Rodger!".⁷¹

The Southern Poverty Law Centre began tracking male supremacist ideology as a result, analysing male supremacism as fundamental to the ideology of the racist alt-right and the radicalisation path of young white men, linking the origins of the online "manosphere" to the older men's rights movement, gamergate, and "pickup artistry".⁷²

March 2018

Lance Corporal Mikko Vehvilainen, 34, of the British Army was convicted under the Terrorism Act 2000 for being a member of National Action and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Vehvilainen was connected to three other soldiers, two of whom were disciplined and one of whom was expelled from the Army.⁷³

June 2018


French police cracked the RWE terrorist cell of nine men and one woman, Action des Forces Operationnelles (Operational Forces Action), led by a former police officer. 14 handguns, 22 rifles, thousands of cartridges and improvised explosives were found during police raids. Action des Forces Operationnelles planned to murder veiled women, Imams, and recently released Islamist prisoners, and to attack mosques and halal grocery stores.⁷⁴ The terrorist cell advocated violence against Muslims, referred to as "the enemy within".

⁷¹ Dan Bilefsky and Ian Austen (April 24, 2018) "Toronto Van Attack Suspect Expressed Anger at Women", The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/world/canada/toronto-van-rampage.html>

⁷² Southern Poverty Law Centre "Male Supremacy" <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/male-supremacy>

⁷³ Telegraph Reports (November 12, 2018) "Army veteran worked for neo-Nazi group recruiting active soldiers", Telegraph. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/11/12/serving-army-afghan-veteran-recruiter-neo-nazi-terrorists-targeting/>

⁷⁴ Adam Nossiter and Aurelien Breeden (June 28, 2018) "Shadowy Cell in France Plotted to Kill Muslim Civilians, Authorities Say", The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/world/europe/france-far-right-plots-muslims.html>



26/08/2018

8,000 far right extremist protestors mobilised in the city of Chemnitz, Saxony, Germany, led by several hundred identifiable neo-Nazis.⁷⁵

September 2018

The President of the BfV, Hans-Georg Maaßen, was removed from office for his alleged neo-Nazi sympathies and for failing to adequately monitor, analyse, assess, and govern the resurgent threat of neo-Nazism and RWE in Germany.⁷⁶

22/10/2018 –
1/11/2018

“MAGA Bomber” Cesar Sayoc, 57, sent sixteen pipe bombs to prominent critics of President Trump. Targets of the attacks included former President Obama, former Vice President Biden, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, billionaire Jewish philanthropist George Soros, former CIA Director John Brennan, former National Intelligence Director James Clapper, former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, Democratic Congresswoman Maxine Waters, Democratic Senator Kamala Harris, Democratic Senator Cory Booker, the New York offices of cable news network CNN, Democratic billionaire donor Tom Steyer, and actor Robert De Niro.⁷⁷

25/10/2018

Gregory Bush, 51, killed two black people at a supermarket after failing to enter his primary target, the predominantly black First Baptist Church of Jeffersontown, Kentucky, United States.⁷⁸

27/10/2018

Robert Gregory Bowers, 46, opened fire on the Pittsburgh

⁷⁵ Katrin Bennhold (August 30, 2018) “Chemnitz Protests Show New Strength of Germany’s Far Right” The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/world/europe/germany-neo-nazi-protests-chemnitz.html>

⁷⁶ Associated Press (September 23 2018) “German Government Reaches Deal in Spy Chief Disput”, The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/23/world/europe/germany-intelligence-chief-hans-georg-maassen.html>

⁷⁷ Victoria Bekiempis (August 5, 2019) “Cesar Sayoc, who sent pipe bombs to Trump critics, gets 20 years in prison”. The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/aug/05/cesar-sayoc-sentencing-pipe-bombs-targets-trump-critics>

⁷⁸ Karen Zraick and Matt Stevens (October 25, 2018) “Kroger Shooting Suspect Tried to Enter Black Church Before Killing 2 in Kentucky, Police Say”, The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/us/louisville-kroger-shooting.html>

Tree of Life synagogue in the deadliest act of anti-Semitic violence in US history. 11 congregants were murdered, four police officers and two others were injured.⁷⁹ Bowers spread anti-Semitic conspiracy theories on social media platforms, and blamed Jews for non-white migration to Western countries: "Jews are waging a propaganda war against Western civilization and it is so effective that we are headed towards certain extinction within the next 200 years and we're not even aware of it".⁸⁰

06/11/2018

Six right wing extremists were arrested in France for plotting to assassinate President Emmanuel Macron.⁸¹

02/11/2018

Incel terrorist, Scott Paul Beierle, 40, shot six women (one of the women six times), killing two, and pistol whipped a male, at Hot Yoga Tallahassee. Beierle killed himself at the scene. Beierle served in the Army from 2008 to 2010. Beierle had a history of sexual harassment and assault against women and of posting online videos, tweets, and self-produced music expressing misogyny and white supremacy.⁸²

08/11/2018


A neo-fascist was arrested for plotting the assassination of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez to take revenge for Mr. Sánchez's plans to exhume the remains of the fascist dictator Francisco Franco from the Valle de los Caídos. The

⁷⁹ Campbell Robertson et. al. (October 27, 2018) "11 Killed in Synagogue Massacre; Suspect Charged With 29 Counts", The New York Times <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/us/active-shooter-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting.html>

⁸⁰ Joel Achenbach (October 28, 2018) "A conspiracy theory about George Soros and a migrant caravan inspired horror", The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-conspiracy-theory-about-george-soros-and-a-migrant-caravan-inspired-horror/2018/10/28/52df587e-dae6-11e8-b732-3c72cbf131f2_story.html

⁸¹ DW (November 7, 2018) "France detains 6 over plot to attack Emmanuel Macron". <https://www.dw.com/en/france-detains-6-over-plot-to-attack-emmanuel-macron/a-46184514>

⁸² Steve Hendrix (June 7, 2019) "Scott Paul Beierle's attack on a Florida yoga studio was fueled by male supremacy, a movement with ties to other hate groups", The Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/local/yoga-shooting-incel-attack-fueled-by-male-supremacy/>



suspect, 63, was in possession of an arsenal of weapons, including sniper rifles and a submachine gun.⁸³

25/01/2019

A federal judge sentenced three members of a right wing militia group called the "Crusaders" to prison sentences between 25 and 30 years for a plot to bomb an apartment complex housing Somali Muslims and a small mosque. Curtis Allen, Gavin Wright, and Patrick Stein wrote a manifesto in which they said they hoped their attack, scheduled for the day after the General Election, would "wake people up".⁸⁴ The men discussed and carried out surveillance on potential targets before deciding on the apartment complex because it contained a mosque. A confidential source, who the Crusaders attempted to recruit from a Kansas militia, tipped off the FBI and continued to act as an informant. An undercover FBI agent was in communication with the cell. An FBI search on various residences, cars, storage units, and Allen's business turned up weapons, explosive material, an HMTD detonator, bomb-making documents, goggles, and bags of fertilizer.⁸⁵ Allen, Wright, and Stein were sentenced on charges of conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction and conspiring to violate the civil rights of their intended victims.⁸⁶

⁸³ DW (November 8, 2018) "Spanish man plotted to kill Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez". <https://www.dw.com/en/spanish-man-plotted-to-kill-prime-minister-pedro-sanchez/a-46215310-0>

⁸⁴ Stephen Piggott (October 14, 2016) "3 Men Arrested in Plot to Bomb Kansas Apartment Complex, Mosque Following Presidential Election", Southern Poverty Law Centre. <https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/10/14/3-men-arrested-plot-bomb-kansas-apartment-complex-mosque-following-presidential-election>

⁸⁵ FBI News (April 12, 2019) <https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/three-sentenced-in-plot-to-bomb-somali-immigrants-041219>

⁸⁶ Alice Mannette (January 26, 2019) "U.S. judge sentences men to 25 to 30 years for plot to bomb Somalis", Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kansas-crime-somalia/u-s-judge-sentences-men-to-25-to-30-years-for-plot-to-bomb-somalis-idUSKCN1PJ14H>

FINDINGS



Structure and functions of the NSS

26. The National Security System (NSS) is the machinery that governs Aotearoa New Zealand's national security. Central government is the primary agent responsible for protecting New Zealand's national security due to its core capabilities, constitutional powers, and governance functions in both normal and emergency situations.⁸⁷ The NSS has a flexible structure that enables its agencies to function normally without the direct involvement of national leadership. The NSS is involved in the governance of threats and hazards that may adversely and systemically impact on the core interests, functioning, and continuity of New Zealand. A fit for purpose NSS is critical to the security and wellbeing of Aotearoa.

27. The NSS takes an interest in risks that have:

- Unusual features of scale, nature, intensity, or possible consequences;
- Challenges for sovereignty, or nation-wide law and order;
- Multiple or interrelated problems, which when taken together, constitute a national or systemic risk;
- A high degree of uncertainty or complexity such that only central government has the capability to tackle them;
- Interdependent issues with the potential for cascade effects or escalation.

A NSS response to a risk may be initiated under conditions that necessitate a centralised, coordinated response.⁸⁸

28. The NSS has a three-level governance and operational structure:

- The Cabinet National Security Committee (NSC), led by the Prime Minister – who also holds the portfolio of “National Security and Intelligence”;
- Chief Executives – the various structures which comprise the Officials’ Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC), led

⁸⁷ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2017) “National Security Handbook”, 10.
<https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-03/dpmc-NZIC-handbook-aug-2016.pdf>

⁸⁸ Ibid, 11-12.

by the Chief Executive of DPMC – who is the “lead official” for the whole National Security System, a role encompassed by the descriptor “Chair of ODESC”;

- Senior officials and other officials (Committees, Working Groups and Watch Groups), who work together in formal structures and less formally in pursuit of shared national security objectives.⁸⁹

The NSC oversees intelligence and security, including policy and legislative proposals relating to the sector, and coordinates and directs NSS responses to major national or international crises or circumstances affecting national security.

29. The core New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC) includes the:

- New Zealand Security and Intelligence Service (NZSIS), specialised in human intelligence (HUMINT);
- Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), specialised in signals intelligence (SIGINT); and
- Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), which is responsible for the overall management and direction of the NZIC.
- The wider NZIC includes the Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DDIS), Police, Customs, Immigration, the Ministry of Primary Industries (MIP), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT).

30. There is no definition of national security in New Zealand legislation, rather there is an “all hazards – all risks” approach to national security. The concept remains flexible to adapt to the changing strategic security environment. Seven key objectives underpin the NSS:

- Ensuring public safety – providing for, and mitigating risks to, the safety of citizens and communities (all hazards and threats, whether natural or man-made);
- Preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity — protecting the physical security of citizens, and exercising control over territory consistent with national sovereignty;

⁸⁹ Ibid, 11.



- Protecting lines of communication – these are both physical and virtual and allow New Zealand to communicate, trade and engage globally;
- Strengthening international order to promote security – contributing to the development of a rules-based international system, and engaging in targeted interventions offshore to protect New Zealand’s interests;
- Sustaining economic prosperity – maintaining and advancing the economic wellbeing of individuals, families, businesses and communities;
- Maintaining democratic institutions and national values – preventing activities aimed at undermining or overturning Government institutions, principles and values that underpin New Zealand society;
- Protecting the natural environment – contributing to the preservation and stewardship of New Zealand’s natural and physical environment.⁹⁰

31. It is important to understand that counter-terrorism is only one element of national security, and only one of the critical functions performed by the NSS. The NSS is responsible for protecting the security of the nation-state and its territory, people, property, infrastructure, institutions, and information, from a variety of traditional and non-traditional security threats and hazards, ranging from “state and armed conflict, to transnational organised crime, cyber security incidents, natural hazards, biosecurity events and pandemics”.⁹¹

To achieve national security, New Zealand takes a “holistic and integrated” approach to governing threats and hazards. The NSS Handbook explains this approach as the “4-Rs”:

- Reduction;
- Readiness;
- Response;
- Recovery.

⁹⁰ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2017) “National Security Handbook”, 8. <https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-03/dpmc-NZIC-handbook-aug-2016.pdf>

⁹¹ Ibid, 7.

32. It appears there was a systemic dysfunction of the NZIC resulting in a failure to reduce the risk by “identifying and analysing long-term risks and taking steps to eliminate these risks if practicable, or if not, to reduce their likelihood and the magnitude of their impact”.⁹² As a consequence the required standards of performance may not have been met.

FIANZ acknowledges and is sincerely grateful to the courageous police for their heroic efforts arresting the terrorist. We are grateful to emergency services and hospital staff for saving lives and treating the wounded. We are forever grateful to New Zealand. FIANZ is an active part of the recovery process and commends the Government’s actions post-Christchurch, and welcomes the Royal Commission as an integral part of that recovery process.

33. The inability to anticipate or plan for the 15 March attack because of an inappropriate concentration of, or priority setting for, counter-terrorism resources on other perceived terrorism threats. This assertion is made with the sincere intention of improving the functioning of the NSS, strengthening the NZIC, and protecting and advancing the security and wellbeing of Aotearoa New Zealand.

The facts are that between Oslo and Christchurch, there was no systematic gathering and analysis of HUMINT and SIGNIT on the activities of RWE individuals, networks, or organisations to assess their capability and intent of perpetrating one or more acts of terrorism and the impact and immediacy of the terrorist act(s). This is because RWE was either not previously an NIP or an intelligence requirement under the NIP relating to counter-terrorism. By failing to monitor, analyse, and accurately assess the global security trends and emerging threats to New Zealand, by failing to include RWE in previous NIP policy cycles, and by failing to surveil the online and offline activities of RWEs (including the Christchurch terrorist) who:

- produce, distribute, and consume extremist content online;
- travel domestically or globally for the purposes of planning, training for, or perpetrating one or more acts of terrorism;

⁹² Ibid.



- communicate and network with other extremists; finance global terrorism and extremist movements; and
 - use the internet to recruit, motivate, or inspire others;
- the NZIC did not meet the required performance standards.

34. Our interpretation of the phrase “required standards” in the Terms of Reference (4.d.) is based on the statutory objectives, functions, powers, duties, and limitations of the security and intelligence agencies specified in Part 2 of the Security and Intelligence Act 2017, which is the governing legislation for the NZIC.⁹³ Section s4AAA(1) of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 specifies the principles underpinning performance of the functions of the NZSIS as “keeping New Zealand society secure, independent, and free and democratic”.⁹⁴ DPMC’s 2016 National Security System Handbook sets out more specific operating standards and procedures for the NSS and the NZIC.⁹⁵

35. The inappropriate concentration of, and priority setting for, counter-terrorism resources on Islamist extremism, to the neglect of RWE, was not a legislative requirement but a policy choice made by Government. Nor does the governing legislation impede the relevant State sector agencies using their powers to govern the threat of RWE within legislative limits and in accordance with applicable principles and general duties. The Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 s5.2 states that terrorism can be “carried out for the purpose of advancing an ideological, political, or religious cause”.⁹⁶ No priority is given to any one of these motives. Terrorism is not defined by the Act in such a way as to make terrorism motivated by violent extremist political ideologies on the Islamist spectrum the exclusive focus of the relevant State sector agencies or

⁹³ Parliamentary Counsel Office (2017) “Intelligence and Security Act 2017”
<http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/0010/37.0/DLM6920925.html>

⁹⁴ Parliamentary Counsel Office (1969) “New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969”
<http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1969/0024/latest/whole.html#DLM3881556>

⁹⁵ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2017) “National Security Handbook”
<https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-03/dpmc-NZIC-handbook-aug-2016.pdf>

⁹⁶ Parliamentary Counsel Office (2002) “Terrorism Suppression Act 2002”.
<http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0034/latest/DLM152702.html>

the ideal typical form of terrorism or the statistical norm from which other forms deviate.

Specific issues of concern:

36. ODESC(G), which is the primary governance board responsible for the identification and governance of national security risks.⁹⁷ ODESC(G) did not ensure that capability and systems were in place to identify RWE as a major risk to New Zealand, and to provide that appropriate arrangements are made across Government to efficiently and effectively mitigate and manage RWE. Logically, there was either:

- a systemic failure to include RWE on the forward agenda for the board and to prepare papers on the matter during the time that the global security trend had become apparent (refer to timeline above), or
- if the matter was on the agenda, and papers were prepared, ODESC(G) failed to correctly identify and assess the risk, and govern it appropriately.

37. DPMC, which did not adequately scan for domestic and external risks, assess domestic and external risks of national security significance, and coordinate policy advice and policy making to ensure that risks are managed appropriately.⁹⁸ Based on the evidence provided DPMC should have included RWE in the NIP in previous years.

- The NAB is the leader of New Zealand's intelligence assessments community and provides overall coordination of New Zealand's intelligence collection efforts through its leadership of the NIP.⁹⁹ The NAB failed to provide accurate intelligence assessments to assist Government decision-makers on events and developments relating to RWE that are relevant to New Zealand's national security and international relations.

⁹⁷ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2017) "National Security Handbook", 15.

<https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-03/dpmc-NZIC-handbook-aug-2016.pdf>

⁹⁸ Ibid, 21.

⁹⁹ Ibid, 34.



- The NSPD Security and Intelligence Policy team should have provided policy advice on RWE to inform the Government's overall priorities for intelligence collection and assessment.
- The NSPD National Risk Unit, established mid-2017, did not fulfil its role in supporting agencies to identify, assess, and govern national security risks by ignoring the threat of RWE.
- SRRP provides a "rigorous and systematic approach to anticipating and mitigating strategic national security risks".¹⁰⁰ The SRRP failed to promote resilience by testing, challenging and providing advice to ODESC(G) on the threat of RWE and the inappropriate concentration of, or priority setting for, counter-terrorism resources due to the securitisation of Islam and Muslims.
- The DPMC Deputy Chief Executive Security and Intelligence supports the CE by leading and coordinating the NZIC, overseeing the functioning of the NSS, advising on national security direction, and ensuring that policies, systems and capabilities are up to the required standards. The office of the DPMCE CE 2014-2018 did not perform the functions of the office.
- The DPMC Chief Executive is New Zealand's lead official for national security, and heads the national security architecture. As the head of the national security architecture from 2012-2018, which overlaps with the global resurgence of RWE, the CE is the lead official responsible for the systematic failure of the NSS to identify, assess, and govern the security threat of RWE. The degree to which the official is responsible depends on their actions in their first months in the position, and whether they had any role in turning the attention of the NZIC to identifying, assessing, and governing the threat of RWE, or continued down the path set by their predecessor.

38. NZSIS, which failed to monitor, analyse, and assess the threat of RWEs, including the Christchurch terrorist, to New Zealand's national security. The office of the Director-General of Security is responsible for the failure of the

¹⁰⁰ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2017) "National Security Handbook", 17.
<https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-03/dpmc-NZIC-handbook-aug-2016.pdf>

NZSIS to keep up with New Zealand's evolving threatscape and threat actors. The internal review into RWE only began in mid-2018, which was manifestly far behind the global security trend of the resurgence of RWE.

39. CTAG, an interdepartmental unit located at the NZSIS, did not inform Government's risk management processes by providing timely and accurate assessment of terrorist threats to New Zealanders and New Zealand's interests.¹⁰¹

40. Police should not have assessed the terrorist as a "fit and proper" person to hold a firearms licence, as this enabled the terrorist attack by permitting the terrorist to legally purchase weapons and ammunition.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.



Contesting the NZIC security narrative

41. The Director-General of Security for the NZSIS, in her opening remarks to Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee on 20 February 2019, misinformed Parliament and the public about the global security environment and threat of RWE when she described the "rise of right wing extremism [internationally]" as "slow, but concerning".¹⁰² The Director-General stated that her intention was to "briefly outline the key threats" that she believes "New Zealand is facing and what we are doing about them". Under the first heading, "Terrorism and Violent Extremism", of ten paragraphs, only the final paragraph, comprising a single sentence, mentions the threat of RWE. The DG detailed the work that the NZSIS was doing to monitor suspected Islamist extremists in New Zealand and New Zealanders who may have travelled to international conflict zones. Five paragraphs containing two or more sentences, and one containing one sentence, discuss Islamist extremist terrorist organisations and extremist ideologies on the Islamist spectrum.

42. There is no comparable transparency and accountability regarding what the NZSIS was doing about the rising threat of RWE. The Director-General does not mention the establishment of the internal review of RWE nine months prior,¹⁰³ its rationale, its scope, its human or financial resourcing, its preliminary findings, or what work the NZSIS is doing with New Zealand Police and other agencies or with international partners to monitor, assess, and reduce the threat. This imbalance reinforces the official security narrative

¹⁰² Rebecca Kitteridge (February 20, 2019) "Speech: Opening statement to the Intelligence and Security Committee", NZSIS. <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/speech-opening-statement-to-the-intelligence-and-security-committee/>

¹⁰³ Tracy Watkins (March 19, 2019) "Far-Right Extremists Were on The Government's Radar Before Mosque Attack", Stuff. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-shooting/111377200/far-right-extremists-were-on-the-governments-radar-before-mosque-attack>

in which the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism is elevated and the threat of RWE terrorism is elided or downplayed.

The local context

43. The Director-General framed the RWE threat as “international”, with no mention or assessment of the threat posed by RWE to New Zealand. Yet, there was open source intelligence on the domestic rise of RWE and the existence of white nationalist groups in New Zealand, with an active membership estimated between 200 and 250 by expert in domestic RWE movements, Distinguished Professor Paul Spoonley.¹⁰⁴ A July 2017 New Zealand Herald story chronicled three significant events in the rise of RWE in the domestic security environment. First was the emergence of a white supremacist movement at the University of Auckland, second was the National Front clashes outside Parliament in Wellington, and third was the establishment of the youth-oriented Dominion Movement.¹⁰⁵

44. The strongest evidence for monitoring, measuring, and assessing the scale of the threat of RWE is hate crime data. New Zealand does not record hate crime data. As Dame Susan Devoy, former Race Relations Commissioner, stated publicly the day after the Christchurch terrorist attack, the New Zealand Muslim community, led by IWCNZ, together with the HRC, repeatedly asked Government to begin recording hate crime data, and were repeatedly ignored.¹⁰⁶

The global context

45. The analysis and assessment of the international rise of RWE as “slow” is not supported by the statistics on hate crimes and terrorist attacks on Western

¹⁰⁴ Michael McGowan (March 21, 2019) “New Zealand asks: how was the threat from the far right missed?”, The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/21/new-zealand-asks-how-was-the-threat-from-the-far-right-missed>

¹⁰⁵ Kirsty Johnston (July 11, 2017) “How NZ’s growing alt-right movement plans to influence the election”, New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11888810

¹⁰⁶ Susan Devoy (March 16, 2019) “Hatred Lives in New Zealand”, The Spinoff. <https://thespinoff.co.nz/news/16-03-2019/hatred-lives-in-new-zealand/>



countries. The Director-General did not mention any of the 350 RWE terrorist acts in Europe, North America, and Australia from 2011 through 2017,¹⁰⁷ or any other trends or events related to RWE. In Australia, which also fails to record hate crime data, former Race Discrimination Commissioner, Tim Soutphommasane, said he repeatedly pushed for the creation of a database to record hate crime based on the feedback from minority communities that “people felt that the danger posed by racist extremism was more pronounced than it had been in the past”.¹⁰⁸ Apart from New Zealand and Australia, the other three FVEY countries – the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States – collect national hate crime data. This enables these countries to analyse and assess the rising security threat of RWE.

46. In the UK, hate crimes rose by 17% in the year 2017/2018.¹⁰⁹ Racially-motivated hate crimes accounted for approximately two thirds of incidents. There were 101,000 racially motivated incidents per year on average in the United Kingdom between 2015 and 2018.¹¹⁰ Correlating with the increase in hate crimes, the UK Home Office documented the increasing number of RWE-related referrals to its counter-terrorism programme, Prevent, in 2017/2018. Of the 7,318 individuals referred to the Prevent programme, 3,197 (44%) were referred for Islamist extremism and 1,312 (18%) were referred for RWE. Yet, of the 394 individuals who received Channel support, the UK’s deradicalisation programme, 179 (45%) were referred for Islamist extremism and 174 (44%) were referred for RWE.¹¹¹ The UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy, Contest, describes the RWE threat as “evolv[ing] in recent years” and

¹⁰⁷ Weiyi Cai (April 3, 2019) “Attacks by White Extremists Are Growing. So Are Their Connections”, New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/03/world/white-extremist-terrorism-christchurch.html>

¹⁰⁸ Jamie Tarabay (June 18, 2019) “Could the Christchurch Attacks Have Been Prevented?”, The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/world/australia/new-zealand-terrorism-christchurch.html>

¹⁰⁹ United Kingdom Home Office (16 October 2018), “Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2017/18” https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/748598/hate-crime-1718-hosb2018.pdf

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 7.

¹¹¹ United Kingdom Home Office (13 December 2018) “Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2017 to March 2018”, Statistical Bulletin 31/18. 4. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/763254/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2017-mar2018-hosb3118.pdf

“growing”.¹¹² RWE was elevated to a national security risk in 2014.¹¹³ In October 2018, the UK’s domestic security and intelligence agency, MI5, became the lead agency for governing the growing threat of RWE to the UK’s national security.¹¹⁴

47. In the US, official FBI statistics reveal that hate crimes rose overall by 17% in 2017; anti-Semitic hate crimes rose by 37%.¹¹⁵ In 2018, the Southern Poverty Law Centre tracked 1,020 hate groups across the United States, surpassing the previous record in 2011 under President Obama.¹¹⁶ The SPLC attributes the rise to the “mainstreaming of hate” by politicians and the “fears and frustrations” of the white majority over migration, trade, and technology, heightened by United States Census Bureau projections that white people will no longer be a majority by 2044. Between 2009 and 2018, right wing extremists were responsible for more than three-quarters of the 313 people murdered by extremists in the United States.¹¹⁷ A 2018 Washington Post analysis found that “attackers motivated by right-wing political ideologies have committed dozens of shootings, bombings and other acts of violence, far more than any other category of domestic extremist” in the last decade. Of the 263 incidents of domestic terrorism between 2010 and the end of 2017, a third (92) were perpetrated by RWEs, a third were committed by attackers whose motives were either “unknown or not clearly political”, Islamist extremist terrorists committed 38 attacks, and left wing extremist terrorists

¹¹² United Kingdom Home Office “Contest”, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/oct/28/mi5-lead-battle-against-uk-rightwing-extremists-police-action>

¹¹⁵ FBI National Press Office (November 13, 2018) “FBI Releases 2017 Hate Crime Statistics”, FBI. <https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2017-hate-crime-statistics> for full data see: <https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2017>

¹¹⁶ Heidi Beirich (February 20, 2019) “White supremacy flourishes amid fears of immigration and nation’s shifting demographics”, Southern Poverty Law Centre. <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2019/year-hate-rage-against-change>

¹¹⁷ The Economist (March 21, 2019). “Why white nationalist terrorism is a global threat”. <https://www.economist.com/international/2019/03/21/why-white-nationalist-terrorism-is-a-global-threat>



committed 34 attacks.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, three quarters of killings committed by RWEs in the United States during this same period were committed by white supremacists according to ADL reports. All extremist-related murders in 2018 were committed by RWEs; white supremacy specifically accounted for 78%.¹¹⁹

48. The constitutional framework and the politicised security environment in the United States can be seen as obstacles to governing the persistent and resurgent security threat of domestic terrorism.¹²⁰ However, the United States National Strategy for Counter-Terrorism 2018 states that:

The United States has long faced a persistent security threat from domestic terrorists who are not motivated by a radical Islamist ideology but are instead motivated by other forms of violent extremism, such as racially motivated extremism, animal rights extremism, environmental extremism, sovereign citizen extremism, and militia extremism. Such extremist groups attempt to advance their agendas through acts of force or violence. Notably, domestic terrorism in the United States is on the rise, with an increasing number of fatalities and violent nonlethal acts committed by domestic terrorists against people and property in the United States.¹²¹

49. The FBI Director Christopher Wray stated in July 2019 that the agency has made about 90 domestic terrorism-related arrests since October 2018, and the majority were linked to RWE. The FBI states that it is “aggressively” investigating domestic terrorism and hate crimes.¹²²

¹¹⁸ Wesley Lowery (November 25, 2018) “In the United States, right-wing violence is on the rise”. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-the-united-states-right-wing-violence-is-on-the-rise/2018/11/25/61f7f24a-deb4-11e8-85df-7a6b4d25cfbb_story.html

¹¹⁹ ADL (2018) “Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2018” <https://www.adl.org/murder-and-extremism-2018#the-perpetrators>

¹²⁰ In the aftermath of the 2009 Department of Homeland Security report on right wing extremism scandal, see Mark Hosenball (August 10, 2012) “Focus on violent extremists hampered by U.S. laws, political pressure”. REUTERS. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-extremists-idUSBRE8781M220120809>. For a more recent discussion post-Christchurch, see Jonah Shepp (May 9, 2019) “The Rise of the Far Right Is a Global Security Threat”, New York Intelligencer. <http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/05/rise-of-the-far-right-is-a-global-security-threat.html>

¹²¹ The White House (October 2018) “National Strategy for Counter-terrorism of the United States of America”. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/NSCT.pdf>

¹²² Matt Zapotosky (July 23, 2019) “Wray says FBI has recorded about 100 domestic terrorism arrests in fiscal 2019 and many investigations involve white supremacy”, The Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national->

50. Of the 86 terrorist attacks in Germany from 2008 to 2015, 60 (70%) were perpetrated by RWEs, and many were directed against immigrants.¹²³ Anti-Semitic crime and hate crime targeting foreigners each increased by almost 20% in Germany in 2018, according to the annual report on politically motivated crime presented by Germany's Interior Minister and the Head of its Federal Criminal Police Office. The report found that hate crimes against people perceived as foreigners increased from 6,434 in 2017 to 7,701 in 2018, while anti-Semitic crimes increased during the same period to 1,799 from 1,504.¹²⁴

51. European and Australian authorities have likewise documented a rise in RWE in recent years. The EUROPOL European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-STAT) 2018 stated that the "violent right-wing extremist spectrum is expanding, partly fuelled by fears of a perceived Islamisation of society and anxiety over migration".¹²⁵ The 2017 report notes that refugees and ethnic minorities in the EU face increased violence "intended to seriously intimidate sections of the population".¹²⁶ In October 2016, ASIO's director general, Duncan Lewis, said radical anti-Islamic groups, particularly Reclaim Australia, were of interest to ASIO to the extent that there was the possibility or actuality of violence.¹²⁷ This statement followed the first instance of federal

[security/wray-says-fbi-has-recorded-about-100-domestic-terrorism-arrests-in-fiscal-2019-and-most-investigations-involve-white-supremacy/2019/07/23/600d49a6-aca1-11e9-bc5c-e73b603e7f38_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/19/immigration-does-lead-more-terrorism-by-far-right-killers-who-oppose-immigration)

¹²³ Richard J. McAlexander (July 19, 2019) "Terrorism does increase with immigration — but only homegrown, right-wing terrorism" <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/19/immigration-does-lead-more-terrorism-by-far-right-killers-who-oppose-immigration>

¹²⁴ Christopher F. Schuetze (May 14, 2019) "Anti-Semitic Crime Rises in Germany, and Far Right Is Blamed", The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/world/europe/anti-semitic-crime-germany.html>

¹²⁵ EUROPOL (2018) "European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018" https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/tesat2017_0.pdf

¹²⁶ EUROPOL (2017) "European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2017" https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/tesat2017_0.pdf

¹²⁷ Australian Associated Press (18 October 2016) "Reclaim Australia in Asio's sights, intelligence chief tells senators", The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/oct/19/reclaim-australia-in-asios-sights-intelligence-chief-tells-senators>



anti-terrorism laws being used against a person allegedly holding RWE views, Phillip Galea, aged 31 at the time of his arrest in August 2016.¹²⁸

The official security narrative

52. This elision or downplaying of RWE is a longstanding issue. In a 2016 speech given to the New Zealand Centre for Public Law at Victoria University's Faculty of Law, the DG of the NZSIS describes how "one of the things that I love about living in New Zealand is that we can walk the streets free from the fear of the type of events that have happened in Paris, Brussels, Ottawa, London and Sydney".¹²⁹ Her frame of reference is exclusively Islamist extremist terrorism. There is no mention of Oslo, Trollhättan, Quebec, Pittsburgh, or Macerata. The event signified by "London" is not Finsbury Park: the implication is that this is not the "type of event" that she is referring to. The DG then qualifies her statement about global terrorism by claiming that "terrorism is not a 'Muslim' issue", and by insisting that using Islam "as a justification for violent acts is abhorrent to the vast majority of New Zealand Muslims, who contribute so much to this country".

53. However, the DG then continues to frame terrorism as a Muslim issue by stating that "the unfortunate reality is that a terrorist event in New Zealand would probably have a very negative impact on New Zealand Muslims, because of the likely public backlash". While this reflects a concern of the New Zealand Muslim community about a potential attack perpetrated by a Muslim, the Director-General wrongly assumed that a "terrorist event" (unqualified) would be perpetrated by a Muslim. In the NZIC's official security narrative, New Zealand Muslims could only be the perpetrators, not the victims of terrorism, thus making terrorism a Muslim issue.

¹²⁸ Kristina Kukulja (9 August 2016) "Terrorism arrest linked to alleged 'right-wing extremist'", <https://www.sbs.com.au/news/terrorism-arrest-linked-to-alleged-right-wing-extremist>

¹²⁹ Rebecca Kitteridge (June 3, 2019) "Protecting New Zealand as a Free, Open and Democratic Society: The Role of the NZSIS", New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service. <https://www.nzic.govt.nz/assets/assets/Speech-to-Victoria-University-3-June-2016.pdf>

54. This is no mere slip of the tongue revealing an implicit bias of the Director-General: 10 years of public NZSIS documents fail to address the global security trend of resurgent RWE, and implicitly frame terrorism as a Muslim issue.¹³⁰ The NZSIS Annual Report 2018 states that:

The NZSIS analyses global trends relating to violent extremism to understand how these may translate to activity in New Zealand. This enables the NZSIS to assess whether existing threats are increasing or diminishing, and whether new threats are emerging. The NZSIS provides decision makers with intelligence reporting to mitigate potential threats early, as well as advice to shape New Zealand's response to these threats. Where appropriate, other agencies and international partners are provided with information about these threats.¹³¹

55. The report does not name, analyse, or assess the global trends relating to the threat of RWE or interpret and explain how the "threat environment we are operating in now" developed as a result of a "complicated set of global and local circumstances" through the lens of the resurgence of nationalism and populism as destabilising geopolitical forces, the hegemonic transition away from Western dominance and challenges to the rules-based international order, or the RWE attacks "carried out in a number of countries with similar outlooks and democratic ideals as New Zealand, including Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), France, and the United States of America (USA)".¹³² The 2017 Briefing to the Incoming Minister for the GCSB and NZSIS states that the "counter-terrorism environment in New Zealand is still dominated by the influence of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)".¹³³ There is no naming, analysis, or assessment of the threat of RWE to New Zealand. (We note that many sentences and paragraphs are redacted on

¹³⁰ Jane Patterson (March 20, 2019) "10 years of public spy documents and no mention of white supremacist threats", The Spinoff. <https://thespinoff.co.nz/politics/20-03-2019/10-years-of-public-spy-documents-and-no-mention-of-white-supremacist-threats/>

¹³¹ New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (2018), "Annual Report 2018", 13. <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/2018-NZSIS-Annual-Report.pdf>

¹³² Ibid, 12-14.

¹³³ Andrew Hampton and Rebecca Kitteridge (2017). "Briefing to the Incoming Minister", Beehive. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-12/GCSB%20and%20NZSIS_0.PDF



national security grounds, but question why, if RWE is redacted, the same grounds do not apply to Islamist extremist terrorism.)

The 2018 GCSB Annual Report frames violent extremism exclusively in terms of the threat posed by ISIL and Al-Qa'ida when outlining the strategic operating environment.¹³⁴ The official security narrative of the NZIC therefore fails to objectively analyse and assess all forms of terrorism with professionalism and political neutrality, despite statements to the contrary.

Conclusion

56. The way national security has been constructed through the official security narrative in New Zealand prevented the NZIC from imagining the possibility that New Zealand Muslims could be the targets of a terrorist attack, rather than the terrorist threats to be countered. The implicit framing of terrorism as an exclusively "Muslim issue" by the Director-General, despite her explicit disavowal of the essential connection between terrorism and Islam, reveals a deeply entrenched way of seeing the world that stopped New Zealand from making sense of the situation at the time and the evolving threatscape.
57. On 15 March 2019 – only 23 days after the Director-General made her opening remarks to Parliament – catastrophe struck Christchurch and initiated a wave of potential and actual copycat attacks around the world. To others, because the official security narrative framed Muslims as perpetrators, not victims, the Christchurch terrorist attack was a surprise. It didn't make sense. It wasn't normal. It was a black swan. Before the attack, many New Zealand Muslims felt insecure because we knew what was happening globally. We knew what was happening locally online and offline. New Zealand Muslims knew from lived experience that the environment was becoming increasingly hostile, even if we could not base our claims on empirical evidence as hate crimes were not being officially recorded. We were reading the world news. We knew what was happening in other Western countries. We could see the

¹³⁴ GCSB (2018) Annual Report. 14. <https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/assets/GCSB-Annual-Reports/2018-GCSB-Annual-Report.pdf>

trend. We asked for help.¹³⁵ We knew we were vulnerable to such an attack. We did not know who, when, what, where, or how. But we knew. Our security narrative was true. The NZIC's official security narrative was inaccurate, and misinformed New Zealand.

¹³⁵ Anjum Rahman (March 17, 2019) "We warned you. We begged. We pleaded. And now we demand accountability", The Spinoff. <https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/17-03-2019/we-warned-you-we-begged-we-pleaded-and-now-we-demand-accountability/>



The National Intelligence Priorities

58. The national intelligence priorities (NIP) are intended to determine the operational work of the NZSIS and GCSB. The NIP begin the intelligence cycle. The NIP are not set by the agencies autonomously, but are approved by the Cabinet National Security Committee (NSC). In accordance with the NIP, the NZSIS and GCSB collect and analyse information for their Government customers to assess and use to make decisions, rather than for their own ends.

59. New Zealand's threatscape and threat actors are constantly evolving. The NIP function is to concentrate and prioritise the resources of the relevant State sector agencies on the areas that are most important to New Zealand's security and wellbeing. The NIP are refreshed annually to keep up with changes to the security environment and New Zealand's interests. The NIP are based on the seven key security objectives outlined on page 36.

60. DPMC leads and coordinates the NZIC during the NIP setting process. Once the NSC agrees on Government priorities, the Officials' Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination (ODESC), subcommittees, and units within the DPMC support the NSC by producing detailed intelligence requirements for each of the priorities that determine the operational work of the NZIC, and assess what is practical and achievable given the capabilities and resources of the NZIC.¹³⁶

61. A new set of priorities were approved by Cabinet in December 2018. For the first time in 2019, DPMC released an unclassified version of the NIP. The priorities are, in alphabetical order:

- Biosecurity and human health. Threats to New Zealand's biosecurity and human health arising from human activity.

¹³⁶ Hon Sir Michael Cullen, KNZM and Dame Patsy Reddy, DNZM (2016) "Intelligence and Security in a Free Society: Report of the First Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand", 37.

<http://www.igis.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Review-report-Part-1.pdf>

- Environment, climate change and natural resources. International environment, climate change and natural resources challenges that may impact New Zealand's interests and national security.
- Foreign influence, interference and espionage. Acts of interference, influence and espionage in and against New Zealand that would erode New Zealand's sovereignty, national security or economic advantage.
- Global economy, trade and investment. Developments in international trade governance, and New Zealand's bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral trading relationships.
- Implications of emerging technology. The implications of emerging technology and innovation trends for New Zealand's national security, international relations and economic wellbeing.
- International governance, geopolitics and global security. Developments in international governance, geopolitics and global security that may impact New Zealand's interests.
- Malicious cyber activity. Cyber threats to New Zealand from state-sponsored and other malicious actors.
- Middle East regional security. The implications of events in the Middle East region on New Zealand's national security, international relations and economic wellbeing.
- New Zealand's strategic interest in the Asia region. The implications of events in the Asia region on New Zealand's national security, international relations and economic wellbeing.
- Pacific regional stability. Protecting and promoting stability, security and resilience in the Pacific region.
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. Non-proliferation and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons.
- Space security. The implications of the exploitation of space and space-based technology on New Zealand's national security, international relations and economic wellbeing.



- Territorial security and sovereignty. Threats to New Zealand's territorial security and sovereign rights arising from illegal, unregulated, negligent, harmful (or potentially harmful) human activity.
- Terrorism. Threats to New Zealand, New Zealanders and New Zealand's interests from terrorism (ideologically, politically or religiously motivated violence) at home and abroad.
- Threats to New Zealanders overseas. Threats to the safety and success of New Zealand people, platforms and missions (military, police, diplomatic and civilian) overseas.
- Transnational organised crime. Threats to New Zealanders and New Zealand's interests from transnational organised crime, including trafficking, irregular migration, financial crime, fraud and corruption.¹³⁷

62. The NIP for 2019/2020 relating to terrorism uses the motive-neutral language of the Terrorism Suppression Act. This report was released after 15 March. Previous iterations of the NIP are classified. However, the NZSIS publicly state that ongoing focus areas include counterterrorism, espionage, foreign interference, and regional stability.¹³⁸ The fact is that RWE was not a focus of the NZIC until nine months before the attack. The Minister Responsible for the NZSIS and GCSB, stated that "the SIS undertook its programme of work to consider how they had to gear up to deal with" the issue of RWE, based on global trends.¹³⁹ The New York Times reports that Minister was "unsure whether the work had gotten as far as identifying specific white supremacists or groups in New Zealand, and he would not say whether he had signed any warrants allowing individuals linked to far-right groups to be spied on". "I don't know how far they'd got," he stated.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ DPMC (2019) Annual Report 2018/2019 for the year ended 30 June 2019. 85.
<https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2019-10/dpmc-annual-report-2019.pdf>

¹³⁸ Jamie Tarabay (June 18, 2019) "Could the Christchurch Attacks Have Been Prevented?", The New York Times.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/world/australia/new-zealand-terrorism-christchurch.html>

¹³⁹ Tracy Watkins (March 19, 2019) "Far-Right Extremists Were on The Government's Radar Before Mosque Attack", Stuff.
<https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-shooting/111377200/far-right-extremists-were-on-the-governments-radar-before-mosque-attack>

¹⁴⁰ Jamie Tarabay (June 18, 2019) "Could the Christchurch Attacks Have Been Prevented?", The New York Times.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/world/australia/new-zealand-terrorism-christchurch.html>


63. There are three possibilities that explain the focus of counter-terrorism activities:

- Before the 2019/2020 priorities, the NIP for counter-terrorism was focussed exclusively on Islamist extremist terrorism, or did not include RWE.
- The NIP for counter-terrorism was motive-neutral, but the detailed intelligence requirements of what information was needed on the topic of counter-terrorism were focussed on Islamist extremist terrorism, or did not include RWE.
- NZSIS's work programme and capabilities were inappropriately concentrated on Islamist extremist terrorism because of autonomous decisions made by the Director-General, operational strategic planning, path dependencies, or organisational culture (such as hiring and promotion practices, implicit biases, or beliefs about the subject matter of counter-terrorism). The NIP may not be as determinative of NZSIS counter-terrorism activities as other factors.

64. The 2014 NZIC Performance Improvement Framework (PIF) report concluded that priorities were inadequately defined.¹⁴¹ We question whether prior to the 2014 PIF, the intelligence priorities for counter-terrorism were thus inadequately defined. Did the NZIC make autonomous decisions about their counter-terrorism priorities during the targeted review of capability, capacity, and legislation?¹⁴² If so, did this initiate a cycle of intelligence priority setting that reinforced an inappropriate concentration of counter-terrorism resources and capabilities? It could be that, prior to the two major 2014 reviews, the resources and capabilities of the NZIC were already concentrated on Islamist extremist terrorism due to contingencies of institutional history that created path dependencies. For example, the NZSIS 2012 Annual Report states that the National Assessments Committee requested that the NZIC produce strategic papers for each of the "vectors of harm" identified in the 2009

¹⁴¹ Peter Bushnell and Garry Wilson (2014) "Performance Improvement Framework: Review of the agencies in the core New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC)", State Services Commission, 6.

¹⁴² NZSIS (2015) Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2015. 10 <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/media/nzsis-ar15.pdf>



Wintringham Review of the NZIC. This work, led by the NZSIS, was the basis for the Cabinet paper that informed “decision making on intelligence priorities and resourcing, and provided a framework for the mitigation of national security risks”.¹⁴³ The Royal Commission is urged to inquire whether path dependencies for the institutional evolution of the NZIC caused an inappropriate concentration of, or priority setting for, counter-terrorism resources. Relevant information on this matter may have been produced during the NZSIS’s internal review into RWE.

65. There are five “risk drivers” in NZ’s strategic security environment:

- societal pressures
- economic risks
- environmental risks
- security trends
- technological challenges.¹⁴⁴

Resurgent RWE, and related trends, like populism and nationalism, cross-cut all but one of the risk drivers (environmental risks). The failure to include RWE in the NIP or detailed requirements would thus be a failure to meet required standards.

Societal pressures

66. Populist and nationalist movements and RWE have the explicit goal of undermining democratic institutions, shared values, and the inclusiveness and cohesiveness of open societies. New Zealand’s 2018 Strategic Defence Policy Statement analyses how these contemporary forces of disruption and disorder have exploited accelerating societal pressures.¹⁴⁵ RWE uses strategies of accelerationism and destabilisation to subvert democratic institutions and

¹⁴³ NZSIS (2012) Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2012. 6 <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/media/nzsis-ar12.pdf>

¹⁴⁴ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2017) “National Security Handbook”.
<https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-03/dpmc-NZIC-handbook-aug-2016.pdf>

¹⁴⁵ New Zealand Defence Force (2018) Strategic Defence Policy Statement, 18.
<http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2018/strategic-defence-policy-statement-2018.pdf>

transform open market liberal or social democratic Western state-societies into white ethno-states.¹⁴⁶

Economic risks

67. The global resurgence of populism, nationalism, and RWE is an economic risk driver insofar as the political objectives of populism, nationalism, and RWE threaten openness to global markets for capital, labour, primary resources, and intermediate or final goods in global value chains. As

a small open market economy, dependent on capital and labour imports and commodity exports, our security and wellbeing depends on trade. Populism, nationalism, and RWE threaten the rules-based international order and the multilateral trading system that New Zealand has actively contributed to since its origins at the end of WWII to prevent global conflict and advance trade between nations.

Security trends

68. The global resurgence of RWE and broader trends of rising populism and nationalism are connected to other geopolitical trends. These include the hegemonic transition to a post-Western order, the hegemonic decline of the United States, the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar nation-state system, and the return of great power conflict.¹⁴⁷ The post-WWII rules-based international order was constructed by the victorious Allies "with the clear aim of avoiding a repeat of the nationalism, totalitarianism and conflict of the

Three Forces Pressuring the International Order





Figure 1: Strategic Defence Police Statement 2018, p.16

¹⁴⁶ ADL (April 16, 2019) "White Supremacists Embrace "Accelerationism"" <https://www.adl.org/blog/white-supremacists-embrace-accelerationism>

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 18.



1930s and 1940s".¹⁴⁸ There is a broad consensus among scholars that the Western-dominated rules-based order is in a state of crisis.¹⁴⁹ New Zealand's 2018 Strategic Defence Policy Statement assesses that:

In Western democracies, nationalist and populist political movements have reflected an accelerating gap between the very wealthy and the working poor, as well as cultural anxiety associated with immigration and demographic shifts. These are forces broader than any singular election result. Public distrust of institutions and elites, questions around the credibility of information, and increasing political polarisation (in some cases exacerbated by foreign influence campaigns) have led to a new level of support for disruption of established norms, institutions, and systems.

Key portions of electorates believe globalisation, immigration and multilateral institutions have come at the expense of their prosperity and cultural identity. This worldview drives inward focus, and is openly sceptical – and sometimes hostile – to elements of the international order, including economic openness.¹⁵⁰

69. Extremist ideologies are identified by NZDF as a complex disruptor which affect open societies like ours "disproportionately" and are the "forces of disorder".¹⁵¹

70. New Zealand's national security is threatened by trends within other countries where the rule of law is being replaced by the rule of interest groupings of class, race, ethnicity, sect, or tribe, or authoritarian rule. As politics within countries become more disorderly and conflictual they become more threatening to our national security and wellbeing. As a small state with an open market economy, New Zealand relies for our security and wellbeing on a rules-based order that limits sovereignty and regulates competition through

¹⁴⁸ Chatham House (2015) "Challenges to the Rules-Based International Order", The Royal Institute of International Affairs, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/london-conference-2015/background-papers/challenges-to-rules-based-international-order>

¹⁴⁹ G. John Ikenberry (2018) "The End of Liberal International Order?", *International Affairs*, 94:1. 7. https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/inta94_1_2_241_ikenberry.pdf

¹⁵⁰ New Zealand Defence Force (2018) Strategic Defence Policy Statement, 16-18. <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2018/strategic-defence-policy-statement-2018.pdf>

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 16.

norms and mutually agreed rules.¹⁵² New Zealand cannot achieve security and wellbeing in a world where might makes right and where strong nations dominate weak nations.¹⁵³ The global rise of populism, nationalism, and RWE therefore directly threaten our security and wellbeing.

71. The rise of populism, nationalism, and RWE in the United States and Europe is linked to Russian “cyber-enabled information warfare” and interference in the domestic politics of Western countries.¹⁵⁴ These activities serve Russia’s strategic objectives of destabilising the international order; discrediting the global liberal hegemony by challenging the “internal coherence” of open societies;¹⁵⁵ weakening NATO; and disintegrating the European Union. Financial and ideological ties between Putin’s Russia and the Western far-right were made public as early as 2014.¹⁵⁶ Extremist memes, images, and narratives were generated and disseminated by pages with Russian state links. According to analysis by USA Today, of the roughly 3,500 Facebook ads which were created by the Russian-based Internet Research Agency published by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, more than half (1,950) aimed to stoke racial tensions, and accounted for 25 million ad impressions. The Internet Research Agency was at the centre of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s February 2019 indictment of 13 Russians and three companies seeking to exert malign foreign influence over the 2016 US Presidential election.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² “Speech by Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade Brook Barrington, delivered by Ben King, MFAT Deputy Secretary, Americas and Asia Group, at the University of Canterbury, 20 September 2018” <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/ministry-statements-and-speeches/new-zealands-place-in-a-changing-world/>

¹⁵³ New Zealand Defence Force (2018) Strategic Defence Policy Statement, 13. <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2018/strategic-defence-policy-statement-2018.pdf>

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 19

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 17.

¹⁵⁶ Mitchell A. Orenstein (March 25, 2014) “Putin’s Western Allies Why Europe’s Far Right Is on the Kremlin’s Side”, Foreign Affairs. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-03-25/putins-western-allies>

¹⁵⁷ Nick Penzenstadler, Brad Heath, Jessica Guynn (May 11, 2018) “We read every one of the 3,517 Facebook ads bought by Russians. Here’s what we found”, USA Today. <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/05/11/what-we-found-facebook-ads-russians-accused-election-meddling/602319002/>



Technological challenges

72. RWEs use the internet and social media to produce and consume extremist ideology; publish manifestos; glorify terrorists; mobilise; coordinate training (including combat); organise domestic and global travel for extremist purposes; finance terrorism; recruit, inspire, and motivate violent extremists; and communicate with others.¹⁵⁸ The use of anonymous identities on the public internet, and of encryption, create longstanding technological challenges for security and intelligence agencies. The internet and the data economy lack effective global governance, and there is no multilateral legal or normative framework for regulating the defensive and offensive cyber activities of state and non-state actors.

73. The online gamer community has been hijacked by the alt-right. The emergence of the "reactionary male gamer" began with the 2014 Gamergate affair (see the above timeline). The Christchurch terrorist's repeated use of gaming countercultural references and memes in his manifesto,¹⁵⁹ and the live streaming of his attacks in the aesthetic style of a first-person shooter was a new phase in the "gamification" of RWE terrorism.¹⁶⁰ The Christchurch terrorist's manifesto was a recursive "s**tpost".¹⁶¹ The transnational online alt-right movement has weaponised trolling, s**tposting, and memes, which were birthed on 4chan in the 2000s, to strategically encode different messages for primary and secondary audiences.¹⁶²

74. Gab is the largest of the alternative social media platforms serving RWEs, generating approximately 800,000 members and 5 million page views a

¹⁵⁸ CSIS Briefs (November 7, 2018) "The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States," Center for Strategic and International Studies. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-far-right-extremism-united-states>

¹⁵⁹ Rumi Khan (July 6, 2019) "The Alt-Right as Counterculture: Memes, Video Games and Violence", Harvard Political Review. <https://harvardpolitics.com/culture/alt-right-counterculture/>

¹⁶⁰ PBS News Hour (August 4, 2019) "The 'gamification' of domestic terrorism online", PBS. <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/the-gamification-of-domestic-terrorism-online>

¹⁶¹ Aja Romano (March 16, 2019) "How the Christchurch shooter used memes to spread hate", Vox. <https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/3/16/18266930/christchurch-shooter-manifesto-memes-subscribe-to-pewdiepie>

¹⁶² Aja Romano (January 11, 2017) "How the alt-right uses internet trolling to confuse you into dismissing its ideology", Vox. <https://www.vox.com/2016/11/23/13659634/alt-right-trolling>

month. The neo-Nazi websites, Daily Stormer and Stormfront generate 4.3 million and 2.2 million page views a month respectively.¹⁶³ Epik has now become the host to the RWE community. Epik provides security services to the Daily Stormer, Gab, as well as InfoWars, a website run by conspiracy theorist Alex Jones, Radio Wehrwolf, and video sharing site Bitchute, which hosts right wing terrorist content. After the 3 August 2019 terrorist attack in El Paso Texas, United States, CloudFlare withdrew services from 8chan, prompting it to sign up with Epik on 5 August. Epik's web infrastructure provider, Voxility, immediately dropped Epik as a customer in response.¹⁶⁴ Spark has publicly stated that it will block access to 8chan if it finds a new host.¹⁶⁵ In addition to platforms and websites on the open internet, right wing extremists use the dark web, the part of the internet that uses encryption to provide anonymity for users and to mask locations, to communicate and coordinate their activities.¹⁶⁶

75. The Network Contagion Research Institute and ADL's Center on Extremism produced the first in-depth study of genocidal language and conspiracy theories ("white genocide") pervasive on Gab and 8chan. The report found that white supremacists use these social media networks to aid and abet terror through conspiracies and coded language, and that online extremist communities disseminate extremist narratives, memes, and images on mainstream social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and Reddit.¹⁶⁷ A

¹⁶³ Heidi Beirich (February 20, 2019) "White supremacy flourishes amid fears of immigration and nation's shifting demographics", Southern Poverty Law Centre <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2019/year-hate-against-change>

¹⁶⁴ Katie Paul, Elizabeth Culliford (August 7, 2019). "8chan owner called before Congress, as latest host drops site", Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-shooting-tech/8chan-owner-called-before-u-s-congress-as-latest-host-drops-site-idUSKCN1UX012>

¹⁶⁵ 1 News (August 9, 2019) "In wake of latest mass shootings, Spark promises to block 8Chan in NZ if it comes back online", TVNZ. <https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/in-wake-latest-mass-shootings-spark-promises-block-8chan-nz-if-comes-back-online>

¹⁶⁶ Jacob Aasland Ravndal (March 16, 2019) "The Dark Web Enabled the Christchurch Killer", Foreign Policy. 2019 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/16/the-dark-web-enabled-the-christchurch-killer-extreme-right-terrorism-white-nationalism-anders-breivik/>

¹⁶⁷ ADL (N.D) "Gab and 8chan: Home to Terrorist Plots Hiding in Plain Sight". <https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/gab-and-8chan-home-to-terrorist-plots-hiding-in-plain-sight>



post-Christchurch 2019 report by the Instituted for Strategic Dialogue identified around 1.48 million tweets referencing the Great Replacement theory between 1 April 2012 and 1 April 2019 in English, French and German. The volume of tweets mentioning the Great Replacement steadily increased in the seven years leading up to the Christchurch attack, approximately tripling in four years from just over 120,000 in 2014 to just over 330,000 in 2018.¹⁶⁸

76.A 2018 Data and Society report, *Alternative Influence: Broadcasting the Reactionary Right on YouTube*, examines the emergence of an online “alternative influence network”. This alternative influence network consists of an assortment of scholars, media pundits, and internet celebrities using YouTube to promote a range different views from versions of libertarianism and conservatism to overt white nationalism, “marked by their general reactionary stance vis-à-vis progressive politics and social justice”.¹⁶⁹ Figures in this constellation include media pundits with mainstream appeal, such as Jordan Peterson, Stefan Molyneux, and Lauren Southern. Algorithms push users on mainstream platforms such as YouTube toward extremist narratives and conspiracy theories, and toward terrorist and extreme violent material.¹⁷⁰

State sector engagement with the Muslim community

77.The state sector engagement with the Muslim community has been varied and we have been disappointed that certain agencies failed to take seriously or follow up on concerns raised with them related to racism and Islamophobia. IWCNZ (who have made their own submission in this regard) repeatedly asked relevant State sector agencies for resources to be invested in

¹⁶⁸ 'The Great Replacement': The Violent Consequences Of Mainstreamed Extremism', 19. <https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/The-Great-Replacement-The-Violent-Consequences-of-Mainstreamed-Extremism-by-ISD.pdf>

¹⁶⁹ "Alternative Influence Network", 8. https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/DS_Alternative_Influence.pdf

¹⁷⁰ Jessie Daniels (2018) "the algorithmic rise of the "alt-right""
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1536504218766547>

monitoring the rise of RWE, globally and nationally, for over five years, all to no avail.¹⁷¹

78. As former Labour MP, David Shearer, who sat on the Foreign Affairs Committee, said of the passage of the Countering Terrorist Fighters Legislation Bill under urgency: “When it comes to halal butchery and slaughtering techniques, which New Zealand earns hundreds of millions of dollars a year from, [Muslims] are feted and they are accepted and they are listened to. But when it comes to something like this, where their community is at possible threat, they are not. I think that we need to, as a matter of urgency, acknowledge and bring those people in”.¹⁷² NZIC believed that Muslims in general and Muslim women in particular might be epistemically reliable informants on suspected threats within our families and communities, but could not be taken seriously as knowing agents when it came to other security matters or to the global security environment.

The New Zealand Muslim community looks for a concrete commitment to future engagement on security matters based on respect, openness, inclusion and sincerity.

Lack of diversity in the NZIC

79. NZSIS and GSCB commendably released a joint Diversity and Inclusion Strategy as part of the NZIC workforce strategy. As the document states, “Diversity is our first line of defence”. Conversely, the systemic failure over decades to recruit, develop, and promote ethnically and religiously diverse staff that reflect the changing demographics, values, experiences, and perspectives of Aotearoa New Zealand has led to the situation where groupthink left us defenceless. To her credit, the current DG has personally

¹⁷¹ Anjum Rahman (March 17, 2019) “We warned you. We begged. We pleaded. And now we demand accountability”, The Spinoff. <https://thespinoff.co.nz/society/17-03-2019/we-warned-you-we-begged-we-pleaded-and-now-we-demand-accountability/>

¹⁷² Audrey Young (December 9, 2014) “Foreign fighters bill passes 94 - 27”, New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11371580



tried to shake the “old image” of the NZSIS as staffed by Cold Warriors.¹⁷³ However, the NZSIS has 335 staff who are disproportionately white and male compared to the general population. As a percentage of all staff, only 6.5 percent are Māori, 6.5 percent are Asian, 2.6 percent are Pasifika and only 2 percent are from the Middle East, Latin America and Africa.¹⁷⁴

80. FIANZ agrees with the NZIC’s own assessment that “to succeed against increasingly complex global threats, the GCSB and NZSIS must develop a dynamic, agile workforce that reflects diversity in its widest context... We also need to ensure that the different perspectives that come with diversity are valued and harnessed”.¹⁷⁵ Indeed:

We should also not be afraid to ask ourselves the hard questions including whether we are excluding people of different cultures, religions or ethnicities unnecessarily. Testing our own unconscious bias plays a big part in developing a diverse and inclusive culture.¹⁷⁶

81. However, the GCSB has made no significant progress on ethnic diversity between 2014 and 2018, although it optimistically claims (without providing evidence) to have made “modest improvement in some areas”.¹⁷⁷ NZSIS has the goal of increasing ethnic diversity by 1% each year. By 30 June 2020, NZSIS aims to have “57 employees who come from Māori, Pacific, or other ethnic backgrounds, representing 13.1 percent of the organisation”.¹⁷⁸ However, this target is unambitious in relation to the wider State sector and fails to aspire to represent the superdiversity of contemporary Aotearoa New

¹⁷³ Audrey Young (November 1, 2014) “We’re about security not spying: SIS chief”, New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11351368

¹⁷⁴ Guyon Espiner (March 27, 2019) “Guyon Espiner: Were NZ’s intelligence agencies looking in the wrong direction?”, RNZ. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/on-the-inside/385670/guyon-espiner-were-nz-s-intelligence-agencies-looking-in-the-wrong-direction>

¹⁷⁵ New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (2017) “Diversity is our first line of defence”. <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/media/Diversity-and-Inclusion-Strategy.pdf>

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, 16.

¹⁷⁷ Government Communications Security Bureau (2018) “Annual Report,” <https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/assets/GCSB-Annual-Reports/2018-GCSB-Annual-Report.pdf>

¹⁷⁸ New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (2017) “Diversity is our first line of defence”. 21. <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/media/Diversity-and-Inclusion-Strategy.pdf>

Zealand. Moreover, there are no statistics on the ethnic and religious diversity of the senior leadership and analysts within the NZIC, or specific targets and policies for the development and promotion of diverse talent.

82. Additionally, the current criteria for obtaining Top Secret Special Clearance creates a barrier to entry for potential recruits from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds. A closely related issue is that agents from the United Kingdom and other FVEY countries are readily recruited by the NZIC into senior positions, which creates a disconnect with the local experiences, values, and perceptions that make New Zealand unique among our FVEY partners. (It is a further question why, given the increasing emphasis on RWE, experiences of RWE attacks, and successes in preventing RWE attacks in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, and Australia, that NZIC recruits from these countries did not share this knowledge and develop our capacity for governing the threat in previous years.)

Institutionalised racism in the NZIC

83. Institutional racism was defined by Sir William MacPherson in the 1999 Report on the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (United Kingdom) as:


The collective failure of an organization to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.¹⁷⁹

Institutional racism including a myopic and Islamophobic view of Muslims may have contributed to the inertia surrounding prioritising RWE.

84. The Inquiry was prompted by Stephen Lawrence's murder on 22 April 1993 by a gang of white supremacists, and the problematic handling of the investigation by Police. Sir William MacPherson, in that report, took great care

¹⁷⁹ Sir William MacPherson (February 1999) "The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry", para 6.34.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/277111/4262.pdf



to make his criticism of the Police accessible to its targets. He cautiously avoided accusations of racism against the ethical integrity of individuals working for the Police. He framed his findings in the Stephen Lawrenson Inquiry in such a way as to clarify that institutional racism was a defect that had to be corrected for the Police to effectively perform their critical role in the functioning of society. The findings, though highly critical, were not anti-Police, but anti-racist, and forward-looking. The Report's 70 recommendations were designed to show "zero tolerance" for racism. They included targeted measures to improve race relations in the Police and the accountability of the Police. They also included targeted measures for the whole of government and society to respond to the issue of institutional racism, and change for the betterment of the United Kingdom. 67 of the recommendations led to specific changes in policy, practice, or legislation within two years of the publication of the report.¹⁸⁰ We urge the Royal Commission to take the same approach to their findings and recommendations.

85. Inquiries in the Aotearoa New Zealand context, including the Waitangi Tribunal's 2019 Hauora Kaupapa Inquiry into Health Services and Outcomes, have revealed that institutional racism is widespread across the health, education, welfare, and justice systems in Aotearoa New Zealand. Te Uepū Hāpai i te Ora – the Safe and Effective Justice Advisory Group, argue that racism is "endemic throughout our society".

Racism can manifest in overt acts of racial violence and abuse; in racist attitudes such as prejudice, stereotyping and profiling; in beliefs that western ways of doing things are 'normal' or 'superior' to those of other cultures, and that others should assimilate or adapt; and in institutional and systemic racism, in which organisations and social systems systematically discriminate against some ethnicities or cultures.¹⁸¹

¹⁸⁰ Ben Quinn (22 February 2019) "Macpherson report: what was it and what impact did it have?", The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/feb/22/macpherson-report-what-was-it-and-what-impact-did-it-have>

¹⁸¹ Safe and Effective Justice Advisory Group (2019) "Turuki! Turuki! Move together!", 45. <https://www.safeandeffectivejustice.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/28ce04fd87/Turuki-Turuki-Report-Interactive.pdf>

86. Puaoteatatu (1988), the ground breaking Report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Māori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare characterises institutional racism as the “most insidious and destructive form”.

It is the outcome of monocultural institutions which simply ignore and freeze out the cultures of those who do not belong to the majority. National structures are evolved which are rooted in the values, systems and viewpoints of one culture only. Participation by minorities is conditional on their subjugating their own values and systems to those of “the system” of the power culture.¹⁸²

87. Institutional racism may be operative even if the thinking and acting subject is not explicitly racist, but has been socialised and institutionalised into thinking and acting in certain ways and not others. This is referred to as “implicit bias” or “unconscious bias”. Institutions may unintentionally cause, perpetuate, or worsen the unjust disadvantage, discrimination, marginalisation, abuse, or misrepresentation of a group. Based on the known facts, the NZIC is not necessarily immune to this enduring structural issue in Aotearoa New Zealand. We do not allege that the NZIC is staffed by white supremacists or individuals who hold explicit racial animus or anti-Muslim bias.

88. The NZIC approach and method unintentionally causes, perpetuates, and worsens the unjust disadvantage, discrimination, marginalisation, abuse, and misrepresentation of Muslims by:

- securitising Islam (rather than neutrally securitising all forms of terrorism);
- failing to analyse, assess, and govern the threat of RWE until mid-2018;
- failing to adequately engage with the Muslim community;
- contributing to an enabling environment for anti-Muslim hostility through the official security narrative; and
- accidentally supporting or legitimating the RWE narrative.

¹⁸² Ministry of Social Development (September, 1988) “THE REPORT OF THE MINISTERIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON A MAORI PERSPECTIVE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE”, 18. <https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/archive/1988-puaoteatatu.pdf>



89. Anti-Muslim bias or Islamophobia can be described at an individual level as the stereotyping of, biases against, or acts of hostility toward Muslims individually or collectively, or Islam as a religion. At the institutional, systemic, and societal levels, anti-Muslim bias or Islamophobia can be manifested as the securitisation of Islam, or constructing Muslims as a security threat.¹⁸³ We discuss the securitisation of Islam and Muslims on pages 56-67.
90. Over the past decade, the NZIC failed to identify, analyse, assess, and govern the threat of RWE to New Zealand through the “values, systems, and viewpoints” of the dominant culture. This was the outcome of the monocultural institutional history of the NZIC.
91. New Zealand Muslims reasonably expect appropriate and professional service from the NZIC, especially given the focus of the NZIC on our community. We were, and remain, subject to systematic discrimination and unconscious bias, prejudice, stereotyping, and profiling by authorities.
92. The NZIC’s official security narrative has helped to create an enabling social environment for anti-Muslim bias or Islamophobia. Further, the official security narrative may be perceived by RWEs to support or legitimate their “counter-jihad” narrative in which Muslims and Islam are represented as a terrorist, demographic, ontological, and normative threat to whiteness and Western civilisation.¹⁸⁴

Conclusion

93. With hindsight, it is undisputable that the NZIC failed to analyse and assess global security trends and the risk of RWE to New Zealand until it was too late. There was a systematic failure to identify, analyse, and assess the threat of RWE, and to take steps to eliminate or reduce these risks, until the NZSIS’s internal review began nine months before the attack, in mid-2018. We have

¹⁸³ Cited in <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/CHPC/Reports/RP9315686/chpcrp10/chpcrp10-e.pdf>

¹⁸⁴ Arun Kundnani (2012) “Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence in Europe”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague. <https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Kundnani-Blind-Spot-June-2012.pdf>

heard repeatedly that the NZSIS “had been looking specifically at violent right wing extremism for about nine months before the attacks”.¹⁸⁵ But this does not answer the pertinent question why the NZSIS was not focussed on RWE before then. Why did the NZIC not have the foresight to anticipate and plan for an attack of this nature, or the ability to analyse and assess the emerging trend of RWE attacks increasing in frequency and intensity until nine months before the attack? The statistics and the timeline of RWE events and attacks from Oslo to Christchurch demonstrate that the global trend in violent extremism had been emergent since 2011.

94. The NZIC failed to identify, analyse, and assess the threat of RWE, and to take steps to eliminate or reduce these risks until the NZSIS internal review into RWE began in mid-2018. This is a failure to meet required standards when RWE is analysed in terms of the five risk drivers in our strategic security environment.

95. We would suggest that the Royal Commission appraise the internal review into RWE. Some of the questions which need to be addressed its rationale, its scope, its human or financial resourcing, its preliminary findings, or what work the NZSIS was doing with Police and other relevant State sector agencies or with international partners to monitor, assess, and reduce the threat. Was the internal review proportionate to the magnitude of the threat of RWE? Was the internal review a priority? How senior were the analysts leading and working on the internal review? Were any actions taken as a result of its preliminary findings (if any)? The biggest question that must be answered is why the internal review into RWE did not begin until mid-2018, seven years after the Oslo attack, and well after the global security trend and the direct threat to New Zealand’s national security had emerged.

96. The NZIC claims to be, and is required by relevant standards to be, ideology-neutral. If the NZIC is concerned with behaviours, not identities or belief and

¹⁸⁵ Rebecca Kitteridge (18 September 2019) “Speech: Understanding Intelligence”, <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/speech-understanding-intelligence/>



value systems, then the fact that RWE had only begun to be analysed and assessed nine months before 15 March is sufficient evidence of an inappropriate concentration of, and priority setting for, counter-terrorism resources over decades.


97. It would appear, based on open source information, that previous iterations of the counter-terrorism NIP were focussed exclusively on Islamist extremist terrorism, or did not include RWE. Else, the specific intelligence requirements for the counter-terrorism NIP did not include RWE and other forms of terrorism. If either situation is the case, then DPMC needs to explain why it did not coordinate and lead the NIP process. Another plausible explanation is that institutional factors other than the NIP are more determinative of the counter-terrorism activities of the lead agencies. We do not have access to the relevant classified information.

98. The probable failure to include RWE in previous NIP cycles either as a priority in relation to counter-terrorism or as a specific intelligence requirement is explained also by the inadequate NZIC engagement with the Muslim community, a lack of diversity in the NZIC, and institutionalised racism and anti-Muslim bias. The NZICs incognisance of the global security environment and evolving threatscape was in part due to their focus on the "values, systems, and viewpoints" of the dominant culture.

99. As part of its deliberations we request the Royal Commission to consider any institutionalised racism and anti-Muslim bias in the NZIC. The process needs to include scrutinising training materials, hiring and promotion policies and practices, internal communications, etc., to make determinate findings and specific recommendations in this area. The existence of patterns and practices of racism and anti-Muslim bias in the NZIC does not imply that individual members of the NZIC hold explicit racial and anti-Muslim biases. FIANZ believes that NZIC members are highly motivated by the spirit of service to New Zealand, and the mission of keeping New Zealand and New Zealanders

safe and secure.¹⁸⁶ We appeal to the NZIC to thus be open to constructive criticism, and to “own it, fix it, learn from it, and move forward”.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.



The securitisation of Islam and Muslims

100. The relevant State sector agencies were unable to anticipate or plan for the attack due to an inappropriate concentration of, or priority setting for, counter-terrorism resources on other perceived threats. This may be partly because of the securitisation of Islam and Muslims. Islam and Muslims have been discursively constructed over decades as a security threat, and counter-terrorism has come to mean the governance of the “threat” of Islam and Muslims in the way society and Government talk, think, and act. The securitisation of Islam and Muslims is not necessarily intentional, and cannot be fully explained by the intentional actions of individual agents. It is a structural issue that involves both official and unofficial security actors, including politicians, academics, and the media. Further, Islamist extremist terrorists have themselves contributed to the securitisation of Islam and Muslims through their nihilistic actions and narrative, while RWE narratives have been mainstreamed by social media, tabloids, provocateurs, and personalities. Our concern is not with apportioning blame, but with solving complex problems.

101. FIANZ recommends that we simultaneously desecuritize Islam and Muslims, and resecuritize all forms of terrorism, including but not limited to RWE and Islamist extremist terrorism, and proposes concrete measures to achieve a paradigm shift. This will enable the Government to appropriately set the NIP, and the NZIC to perform their functions. We anticipate that securitising RWE will encounter deep resistance, and not solve the underlying issue of the securitisation of Islam and Muslims. Both complex problems must be solved at the same time. Resecuritising terrorism must involve communicating that the security threat of terrorism is not existential, but governable. This paradigm shift must also involve reiterating our “all hazards – all risks” approach to national security, and keeping the threat of terrorism in perspective.

The political theory of securitisation

102. According to the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, an issue is securitised when the public legitimate official speech acts that construct the issue as a security threat and call for exceptional security measures to counter it. Past paradigms in security studies, international relations, and international political theory talk about threats as objectively existing, and try to measure their seriousness and develop strategies for governing threats. Securitisation theory is a second-order theory observing the behaviour of the main actors – academic, official, political, and social - in the field. It studies how problems are constructed by security actors as threats to the existence of something which justifies the use of extraordinary measures and elevates the problem to the level of high politics. Security takes a specific rhetorical form:

Some referent object is posited as having a demand on survival and as being existentially threatened; the threat has a swiftness and drama high enough to make a point of no return credible — if not dealt with in time, it will be too late — and therefore this issue can not be left to ordinary practices. The actor that tries to define the situation like this—the securitizing actor—thereby claims a right to use extraordinary measures, and the success of the securitizing move is ultimately decided by the relevant audience in its decision to accept or not accept this operation. Thus, security is neither objective (threats in themselves) nor subjective (a matter of perceptions), but intersubjective and political: Who can securitize what and with what effects?¹⁸⁷

103. It is not that securitisations refer to a real threat that exists prior to and independently of the utterance, that can be objectively perceived and measured. Rather, the utterance is itself the speech act that constructs, successfully or not, something as a threat to something that justifies exceptional counter-measures. Speech acts have or lack illocutionary and perlocutionary force.

104. The original elements of Copenhagen School's securitisation theory are thus:

¹⁸⁷ Carsten Bagge Lausten and Ole Wæver (2009) "In Defense of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization", in Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile. Edited by Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, Palgrave. 150.



- who securitises (securitising actor);
- through what language (securitising speech acts);
- on what issues (threats);
- for whom (referent object);
- who is being persuaded or whose legitimation is being sought (audience);
- why;
- with what results;
- under what conditions.

A securitisation may be successful or not, in terms of achieving practical effects, depending on whether it satisfies the intersubjective and political conditions of the securitising speech act, and produces the effect of the audience legitimating the exceptional measures proposed as necessary to counter the threat.

105. The construction of a threat always already involves societal dimensions of identity, values, norms, socialisation, narratives, and relationships. New Zealand's securitisation of the threat of nuclear weapons is based on our strong internalisation and entrepreneurship of anti-nuclear norms. It is integral to our national identity and values, and the story that we tell ourselves about who we are as a people and our place in the world. Aotearoa's construction of the threat of climate change is based, in part, on our socialisation into the rules-based international order and belief in multilateral approaches to global problem solving. Our relationships with Pacific peoples also shape how we talk and think about the threat of climate change and our responses to it.

106. As an official securitising actor, the NZIC plays a critical role in the construction of Islam and Muslims as security threats through its official security narrative. There has been a laudable intentional effort made by the NZIC to prevent the direct securitisation of Islam and Muslims, but the securitisation of Islam and Muslims occurs despite explicit disavowals that terrorism is a Muslim problem. Through its actions and official narrative over decades, the NZIC has contributed to the direct and indirect securitisation of Islam and Muslims.

107. We make the assumption that the NZIC acts as a rational budget-maximising and power-maximising bureaucracy.¹⁸⁸ The direct and indirect securitisation of Islam and Muslims provides pretext for the NZIC to make increasing budget bids. The 2016 budget gave the intelligence community a \$178.7m dollar boost over four years.¹⁸⁹ Spending on the NZIC has more than doubled from \$67m in 2013 to \$138.6m in 2017. This year the agencies have \$153m.¹⁹⁰ NZSIS staff increased from 240 in 2014/2015 to 335 in 2017/2018.¹⁹¹ In 2015, former Prime Minister John Key explicitly linked the expansion of national security resources and powers to the Islamic State, while making no mention of the resurgent threat of RWE during the same time period to the “changing security environment”.¹⁹² For comparison, in the Review of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Machinery 2015, the Australian security and intelligence bureaucracy explicitly make the case for removing the budget constraints of the Efficiency Dividend from all ASIO, ASIS, and Federal Police operations by directly and indirectly securitising Islam and Muslims.¹⁹³

108. After the Christchurch terrorist attack, Western security and intelligence agencies will predictably make increased budget bids, and appeals will be made to legitimate greater powers to govern the threat of RWE. We predict that it will be more challenging to securitise RWE compared to Islamist extremist terrorism, however. The securitisation of Islam and Muslims has

¹⁸⁸ William Niskanen (1968) “Nonmarket Decision Making: The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy”, *The American Economic Review*, 58:2. 293-305.

¹⁸⁹ NZSIS & GCSB (2017) “Briefing to the Incoming Minister”, 13. <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-12/GCSB%20and%20NZSIS.PDF>

¹⁹⁰ Gyles Beckford and Phil Pennington (April 2, 2019) “New Zealand enmeshed in web of security agencies”, RNZ. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/386111/new-zealand-enmeshed-in-web-of-security-agencies>

¹⁹¹ David Fisher (March 17, 2019) “Spies warned of gaps in our security and came up with a plan to keep New Zealand safe - but it would take years and millions of dollars”, *New Zealand Herald*. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12213585

¹⁹² John Key (January/February 2015) “Facing a changing security environment”, *Informit*. <https://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=917553219807747;res=IELHSS> for earlier comments see <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/protecting-national-security-and-responding-isil>

¹⁹³ Home Affairs (January, 2015) “Review of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Machinery”, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/nat-security/files/review-australia-ct-machinery.pdf>



manufactured the public opinion that Muslims are a legitimate target of HUMINT and SIGNIT operations, while citizens and residents who are accustomed to being the population whose lives and “way of life” are secured, and the primary audience of securitisations who legitimate exceptional security measures, are not.

“Islam is the problem”¹⁹⁴

109. To prevent any confusion and misunderstanding, securitisation theory does not imply that threats are not in a critical sense, “real”. Christchurch shows that the threat of RWE to New Zealanders was all-too-real. While New Zealand has fortunately not been the target of Islamist extremist terrorism, internationally there have been Muslims who commit terrorist acts. There are real extremist ideologies, individuals, organisations, movements, and networks who really threaten the security of different countries, institutions, communities, and people. The real threat of RWE was not constructed as a national security threat to New Zealand.

110. There are six parts to the claim that Islam and Muslims have been securitised:

- Counter-terrorism has been focused exclusively on Islamist extremist terrorism while ignoring or downplaying other real terrorist threats in security discourse, with the effect of indirectly making terrorism a “Muslim problem”.
- RWE is registered at the level of low politics, as a law and order or community safety issue, not as a security issue proper, or as a lower magnitude threat. This indirectly securitises Islam as a problem or threat of a different order.
- Securitisations have been vague and unstable. Dominant security discourse shifts from neutrally framing Islamist extremist terrorism as a threat to people, property, territory, and institutions in Western countries and in Muslim-majority countries and regions, to framing Islam or Muslims as “the

¹⁹⁴ Boris Johnson (2005) “Just don’t call it war”, The Spectator. <https://www.spectator.co.uk/2005/07/just-dont-call-it-war/>

problem”, and as a demographic, normative, or ontological threat to Western “identity”, “values”, and “our way of life”.

- Islam and Muslims are directly and indirectly securitised through the discourse of social cohesion.
- In the Muslim experience, the direct and indirect securitisation of Islam and Muslims is a process and a structure. It is produced and reproduced through the uncoordinated activity of different securitising actors, not only officials. Directly and indirectly, politicians, officials, academics, media, and extremists, both Islamist and right wing, have all contributed to the securitisation of Islam.
- Security discourse is global. Even if New Zealand is neutral and professional, the social forces constructing Islam and Muslims as a threat will influence perceptions and behaviours here.

Exclusive focus

111. Officials made laudable attempts to not directly securitise Islam and Muslims. The Director-General has stated publicly: “I’ve been careful not to be trying to target a particular community or to say there’s a particular community that’s a problem. If you start saying that, then you’re creating a problem. I’ve been really, really careful not to do that, which is why I talk about behaviours, extremist behaviours.”¹⁹⁵ Tellingly, the same Listener article states that the focus is on “Islamic terrorism”. The failure to analyse and assess other forms of terrorism and speak about these publicly, particularly the resurgent threat of RWE during the past decade, indirectly contributes to the securitisation of Islam and Muslims through an exclusive focus on Islamist terrorism, in effect making terrorism a Muslim issue.

112. The 2016 Report of the First Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand, “Intelligence and Security in a Free Society” by Hon. Sir Michael Cullen, KNZM, and Dame Patsy Reddy, DNZM, which lead to the Intelligence and Security Act 2017, assessed the “modern threat landscape”.

¹⁹⁵ Rod Vaughan (6 August 2015) “Secrets & Spies”, New Zealand Listener. <https://www.noted.co.nz/archive/archive-listener-nz-2015/secrets-spies>



Their assessment frames the terrorist threat exclusively as a Muslim problem, referring to “turmoil in the Middle East”, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and the risk that New Zealanders radicalised by ISIL here or returning from Syria or Iraq will be inspired to carry out attacks on home soil, as has occurred in other Western countries”.¹⁹⁶ No mention is made of RWE attacks that had occurred in other Western countries since Oslo, prior to the review. This created a justification narrative for the expansion of the powers of the security and intelligence agencies that was based exclusively on the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism.

113. In Australia, our closest security partner, the dominant security narrative exclusively constructs Islamist extremism as a threat to national security, and securitises Islam, migration, and Muslim-majority countries and regions. The 2006 Counter-Terrorism White Paper claims that “Jihadist terrorism is the predominant focus of Australia’s current counter-terrorism efforts due to its spread, impact and explicit targeting of Australians”, and does not refer to RWE or other forms of terrorism.¹⁹⁷ The recent 2015 Review of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Machinery, assessed the “threat environment” exclusively in terms of Islamist extremist terrorism and explicitly links violent extremism to Muslims. The exclusive focus on Islamist extremist terrorism contributes indirectly to the securitisation of Islam, while the direct securitisation of Islam occurs through repeated references to the Australian Muslim community, “potential terrorists”, and “at-risk” “individuals” and “communities”. A timeline of seven “Lone actor and self-initiated attacks in the West” between 2012 and 2015 includes only Islamist terrorism and excludes the RWE terrorist lone wolf attacks perpetrated in the West during the same period.¹⁹⁸ It is unclear whether Australian, Phillip Galea, 31, who was charged in August 2016 with

¹⁹⁶ Hon Sir Michael Cullen, KNZM and Dame Patsy Reddy, DNZM (2016) “Intelligence and Security in a Free Society: Report of the First Independent Review of Intelligence and Security in New Zealand”, 27.

<http://www.igis.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Review-report-Part-1.pdf>

¹⁹⁷ Australian Government (2010) “COUNTER-TERRORISM WHITE PAPER: Securing Australia | Protecting Our Community”, 14. https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/basic_pages/documents/counter-terrorism-white-paper.pdf

¹⁹⁸ Home Affairs (January, 2015) “Review of Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Machinery”, <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/nat-security/files/review-australia-ct-machinery.pdf>

plotting RWE terrorist attacks and was allegedly preparing RWE terrorist training manual, was known to security and intelligence services at the time the 2015 Review was being written. The 2016 Australian Defence White Paper exclusively links terrorism to acts “perpetrated or motivated by terrorist groups such as Daesh, al-Qa’ida and others that claim to act in the name of Islam”.¹⁹⁹

Magnitude of the threat

114. Despite the statistics on terrorism and hate crimes in the West, the problem of Islamist extremist terrorism was discursively constructed as a threat of a fundamentally different order or magnitude to the problem of RWE terrorism, producing the effects of elevating the threat to the level of high politics, expanding the resources and powers of Western security agencies, and mobilising the machinery of Western states and billions of dollars in resources. When RWE is not excluded from focus, it is registered at the level of low politics as a law and order or a community safety issue. In recent years, RWE was increasingly securitised as a threat by the United Kingdom and the United States. However, RWE was not constructed as a global security issue or counter-terrorism priority of the same magnitude as Islamist extremism, which was elevated to the level of high politics through the “Global War on Terror” macrosecuritisation.

115. Australia’s 2015 Counter-Terrorism White Paper claims to “oppose terrorism and violent extremism in all its manifestations, regardless of its ideological or political inspiration”.²⁰⁰ However, it explicitly states that “Terrorism based on other ideological, religious, or political beliefs – such as right wing or left wing extremism – is also of concern, though it does not

¹⁹⁹ Commonwealth of Australia (2016) “Defence White Paper”, 47. <http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf>

²⁰⁰ Commonwealth of Australia (2015) “Australia’s Counter Terrorism Strategy 2015”, iii. <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/Australias-Counter-Terrorism-Strategy-2015.pdf>



represent the same magnitude of threat as that posed by violent extremists claiming to act in the name of Islam".²⁰¹

116. The White Paper mentions the case of Breivik, claiming that it "underscores" the "possibility" of individuals who are not part of a proscribed group committing acts of terrorism in Australia. Under the heading "Other potential threats", the White Paper states that "violent expressions of Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and other racially- and culturally-motivated ideologies" may possibly undermine "social cohesion". The 2015 White Paper goes on to mention that "nationalist and white supremacist movements and individuals" have been "triggered" by the increased threat from Islamist terrorist groups. This trend is framed as reactive, and a problem in terms of "exacerbating local intercommunal tensions" and risking "reinforcing terrorist recruitment propaganda by fueling perceptions of Muslim persecution", rather than to Muslim lives or to national security per se.²⁰² This framing of the "other" potential threat registers RWE at the level of low politics, or in terms of the primary threat of Islamist extremism. The White Paper claims:

Over time, the terrorism threat picture for Australia will change. Groups on the political far right, for instance, have posed a terrorist threat in the past and may resurface. However, there is no significant threat to Australia in the short to medium term.²⁰³

No evidence is provided for this statement. Yet, by this time, the Australian-born terrorist had become radicalised in Australia and travelled internationally from Australia for RWE purposes.

Vague and unstable securitisations

117. Interstate conflict and power politics have now returned to the global agenda. However, the dominant macro-interpretation of post-Cold War global order, security, and politics was framed in culturalist or civilisational terms,

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid, 4.

²⁰³ Ibid.

including the trend toward post-secularism and the popular remobilisation of religion.²⁰⁴

118. The Global War on Terror is theorised by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies as a macrosecuritisation at the system level of analysis.²⁰⁵ Under this macrosecuritisation, vaguely defined security referents²⁰⁶ oscillate variously between "global security", "liberal international order", "the international community", "the West", "modernity", "national security", "liberal democracy", "freedom", "Western values", "the border", and "our way of life". Security threats to these referent objects shift between "terrorism", "extremism", "radicalism", "fundamentalism", "the Middle East", "Jihad", "Muslims", and "Islam".²⁰⁷

119. Muslim-majority countries and regions are constructed as "governance failures", "weak states", "backward", "unstable", or "conflict zones". Exceptional measures justified by this securitisation of Islam include intelligence operations, invasion, drone warfare, and liberal intervention at home ("muscular liberalism", "integration", "social cohesion")²⁰⁸ and abroad ("development", "modernisation", "nation-building", "regime change", "sanctions").

120. The securitisation of Islam occurs in part through the construction of our places of worship and spaces as potential generative contexts of terrorism, or as sites of radicalisation, and thus as legitimate targets of SIGINT and HUMINT operations.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁴ Carsten Bagge Lausten and Ole Wæver (2009) "In Defense of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization", in *Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile*. Edited by Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos, Palgrave. 147.

²⁰⁵ Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan (2009) "Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory", *Review of International Studies*, 35. 255-259.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 266.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 264.

²⁰⁸ Francesco Ragazzi. (2017) "Countering terrorism and radicalisation: Securitising social policy?" *Critical Social Policy*, 37(2), 163–179. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018316683472>

²⁰⁹ Newshub (4 June 2014) "Christchurch mosque linked to al-Qaida suspect", <https://www.newshub.co.nz/nznews/christchurch-mosque-linked-to-alqaida-suspect-2014060417>



121. Primary “audiences” of securitising speech acts are white and Western. Dominant political, official, academic, and media security narratives construct Islam, Muslims, and Sharia, and non-white (particularly Muslim) migration, refugees, and asylum seekers as societal security threats to Western “identity”, “values”, and “our way of life”: to “Judeo-Christian Western civilisation” by conservatives, and to “Enlightenment modernity” or “liberalism” by progressives. For example, former Prime Minister John Key defined national security as “protecting our way of life and the values that shape our society” in a rare public speech on security.²¹⁰ John Key, in that speech, was careful to “stress that none of these people [terrorists] are representative of the New Zealand Muslim community as a whole”. However, he indirectly securitised Islam through his exclusive focus on the global threat of ISIS, and by securitising Muslim-majority regions of the world, including our “close friends and neighbours in Indonesia, Malaysia and others in the region, which have Muslim populations”.
122. Terrorism perpetrated by Muslims is labelled inconsistently, with the practical effect of securitising Islam and Muslims. Terms such as “Sunni extremism”, “Salafi-Wahhabi terrorism”, “Jihadi”, “radical Islam”, “Muslim terrorist”, “Islamic extremism”, “Islamic terrorism”, “political Islam”, and so on, directly securitise Islam and Muslims. These imprecise terms securitise Islam as a religion, and Islamic religiosity and spirituality, not Islamism as a political and social movement with a violent extremist fringe. “Islamist extremist terrorism” is a more accurate securitisation as it refers to an extreme version of a modern political ideology.
123. A central claim of securitisation theory is that the ontology of the referent object and the threat makes a crucial difference to our understanding and practices of national security. Securitisations have different practical effects depending on the constitution of the referent object and the hypostatised

²¹⁰ “John Key (6 November 2014) “Speech to NZ Institution of International Affairs”.

<https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/speech-nz-institute-international-affairs-0>

threat. Securitisations that take the state as referent object are different from securitisations that take the nation or our "identity", "values", and "way of life" as the referent object. This is because, ontologically, the conditions of survival are different for different objects: the intertemporal identity conditions for a "state" are not identical with the identity conditions of the "nation", for a state can be(come) multi-national or multi-cultural, or the nation might revolt against the state and constitute a new one, for example.

124. Securitising our "values", "identity", and "way of life" as a referent object, or Islam and Muslims as a security threat, has different practical consequences to securitising terrorism as one threat among many threats and risks to New Zealand and its territory, people, property, infrastructure, institutions, and information. If the security referent is "modernity", "the West", "Judeo-Christian heritage", or our "identity", "values", and "way of life", and if "the problem is Islam", then there will be an inevitable and irreconcilable "clash of civilisations" and permanent social conflict in pluralistic Western societies. Getting security discourse right is therefore as vital to national and global security, and to the contemporary tasks of governance, as the security response itself. It is not mere "political correctness".

The securitisation of social cohesion

125. The securitisation of Islam and Muslims occurs in part in relation to the question about "social cohesion", Muslims' "loyalty" to the nation-state, and the "compatibility" of (essentialist conceptions of) Islam and the West. It occurs in relation to the "need" for Muslims and Islam to "modernise", "liberalise", "reform", "integrate", "assimilate", or become nationalised as distinctively, e.g., "British".²¹¹

126. For Muslims, particularly after 9/11, security concerns feature prominently in contemporary discourses of social cohesion, which hyperbolise the threat of

²¹¹ Stuart Croft (2012) *Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security*. Cambridge.



a “parallel society”.²¹² Muslim migrants, particularly second generation youth, are problematised and framed as threats to social cohesion and national security in government policy.²¹³ Social cohesion encodes the dominant security narrative that Muslim communities are “segregated”, “suspect”, “alienated”, and thus pose a “potential” terrorist threat, and that our (predominantly male) youth are “at risk” of radicalisation.²¹⁴

127. The 2007 “Connecting Diverse Communities” project, led by the Office of Ethnic Communities and the Ministry of Social Development, was commissioned by Ministers “following a series of international events, including riots in Sydney’s Cronulla area and the debate around the publication of cartoons portraying the Prophet Mohammed”.²¹⁵ The subtext of the Strategic Direction and Intent for the Office of Ethnic Communities 2016-2020 is that superdiversity is a potential threat to the maintenance of social stability and cohesion, despite the OEC’s vision statement: “flourishing ethnic diversity – thriving New Zealand”. The text refers to “many examples from overseas of what can happen when communities do not successfully connect and integrate”.²¹⁶ The redacted briefing to the Incoming Minister provided by the heads of the NZSIS and the GCSB in 2015, obtained by the New Zealand Herald through the Official Information Act after the intervention of the Office of the Ombudsman, directly securitises Islam and Muslims. Troublingly, terrorism was linked not only to Islam and Muslims, but to the analysis that “significant migration... is creating communities with distinct identities and

²¹² Erich Kolig (2016) “The Spectre of Parallel Societies and Social Disintegration” in *Muslim Integration: Pluralism and Multiculturalism in New Zealand and Australia*, edited by Erich Kolig and Malcolm Voyce, Lexington Books. 68.

²¹³ Leonie B. Jackson (2018) *Islamophobia in Britain: The Making of a Muslim Enemy*. Palgrave MacMillan. 31-58.

²¹⁴ Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2013) “Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the ‘Radicalisation’ Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy”, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 15(3), 394–415.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00489.x>

²¹⁵ Appendix 2, Ministry of Social Development (August 2018) “Connecting Diverse Communities: Report on 2007/08 public engagement”, 73. <https://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-resources/research/connecting-diverse-communities/cdc-public-engagement-2007.pdf>

²¹⁶ Office of Ethnic Communities (2016) “Flourishing ethnic diversity; thriving New Zealand”.
<https://www.ethniccommunities.govt.nz/assets/Resources/26250b4a76/StrategicDirectionOct2016.pdf>

links to overseas".²¹⁷ This was assessed by the NZIC as the top national security threat to New Zealand in 2015.

Securitisation is processual and structural

128. The discursive construction of security threats is not as formal and official as the original Copenhagen School describes. Securitisation is an ongoing process, not a single event or a single speech act. It involves a variety of actors and acts, and justifies a range of responses from the exceptional to the everyday, and from the domestic to the global. It involves officials, media, academia, and politicians.

129. Framing theory explains how media employ particular interpretational lenses by emphasising certain aspects of an issue and deemphasising or omitting others in their reporting. Securitisation is the dominant media frame through which Muslim stories or stories involving Muslims or Muslim countries and regions are told to the public. Violent acts perpetrated by Muslim and non-Muslim actors are framed differently: Muslim violence is framed as "terrorism", covered extensively, and linked to the War on Terror macrosecuritisation, while non-Muslim violence is reported using the "mental illness", "mass shooting", or "loner" frames.²¹⁸ Across the country, we heard "the media" named as one of the main contributors to the enabling environment of the Christchurch terrorist attack. While the media is outside the scope of the Royal Commission's terms of reference, it is integral to understanding the securitisation of Islam and Muslims, and the ways in which dominant security discourse can be seen by RWEs to legitimate and support their narrative that Muslims and Islam are a demographic, normative, and ontological threat to Western civilisation.

²¹⁷ David Fisher and Isaac Davison (November 5, 2015) "John Key's response on the six threats facing New Zealand". New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11540188

²¹⁸ Mohamad Hamas Elmasry and Mohammed el-Nawawy (2019) "Can a non-Muslim Mass Shooter be a "Terrorist"? A Comparative Content Analysis of the Las Vegas and Orlando Shootings", *Journalism Practice*, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17512786.2019.1643766>





RADICAL BASE? The mosque in Christchurch.

Figure 2 Image of Masjid An-Nur and caption from a 2014 Press article titled "Drone victims 'radicalised' at mosque".²¹⁹

130. Academic terrorism research and university teaching is concentrated on Islamist extremism and terrorism and on Muslim-majority countries and regions. This contributes to the securitisation of Islam through socialising and educating undergraduate students, the sociology and political economy of "expertise" in international relations, terrorism studies, and security studies (altering who is hired and promoted, invited to give keynote talks, published in leading journals, cited, interviewed by mainstream media, consulted by government and industry, funded by government and private grants, and recognised for research excellence), and by defining the subject matter of international relations, terrorism studies, and security studies. A 2019 article published in *Critical Studies in Terrorism* uses keyword analysis on 3,442 articles published between 2007 and 2016 in nine of the field's leading academic journals. The results were that research on terrorism is concentrated on al-Qa'ida, Islamist extremist terrorism generally, and Muslim-majority countries and regions, and consistently underemphasises or ignores other ideal-typical forms of terrorism, notably state terrorism and RWE terrorism.²²⁰

²¹⁹ The Press (5 June 2019) ""Drone victims 'radicalised' at mosque". <http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/10120347/Drone-victims-radicalised-at-mosque> For a post-March 15 response by the editor of The Press, Kamala Hayman, see David Williams (30 April 2019) "Terror in its patch: a newspaper responds", Newsroom. <https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2019/04/30/559863/a-newspaper-responds-to-terror>

²²⁰ Bart Schuurman (11 October 2018) "Topics in terrorism research: reviewing trends and gaps, 2007-2016", Taylor & Francis Online. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17539153.2019.1579777>

131. The direct securitisation of Islam occurs in part through the actions and speech of political leaders. Statements such as “These are radical Islamic terrorists” and that “To solve a problem, you have to be able to state what the problem is, or at least say the name” are explicit, direct securitisations of Islam.²²¹ Statements like these masquerade as commonsense objections to “political correctness”, but amount to a dangerous mobilisation of the security apparatus and population for the political agendas of increasingly populist and nationalist governments.

132. Globally, the Obama administration understood that the direct securitisation of Islam and Muslims was wrong in principle, and counterproductively threatened US national security and world peace. The Trump administration has resecuritised Islam and Muslims directly to an extent without precedent in the Obama, Bush, or Clinton years, and provided a powerful platform to far-right, conspiratorial pundits and alternative media, whose security narratives now have influence over US foreign policy and national security strategy.²²²


133. Some New Zealand politicians can also contribute to the direct securitisation of Islam. Hansard, the official record of Parliament, has in its searchable record, dating back to 2003, 139 mentions of “Muslim”, 317 mentions of “Islam”, and 238 mentions of the word “Islamic”. These are almost all in the context of security and counter-terrorism.²²³ The Rt. Hon. Winston Peters’ 2005 speech titled “The End of Tolerance”, made after the 7/7 London bombings, stated:

They say - ah-yes - but New Zealand has always been a nation of immigrants. They miss a crucial point. New Zealand has never been a nation of Islamic immigrants...This two-faced

²²¹ Zach Beauchamp (14 August 2017) “Trump loves saying “radical Islamic terrorism.” He has a tough time with “white supremacy”. Vox. <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/8/14/16143634/trump-charlottesville-white-supremacy-terrorism-islamism>

²²² Erdoan A. Shipoli (2018) Islam, Securitization, and US Foreign Policy, Palgrave. 211-257.

²²³ Thomas Coughlan (18 March 2019) “Time to Recall MP’s Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric”, Newsroom. <https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2019/03/18/493288/third-world-riff-raff-what-we-say-about-migrants>



approach is how radical Islam works – present the acceptable face to one audience and the militant face to another... In New Zealand the Muslim community have been quick to show us their more moderate face, but as some media reports have shown, there is a militant underbelly here as well. Underneath it all the agenda is to promote fundamentalist Islam... Indeed these groups are like the mythical Hydra – a serpent underbelly with multiple heads capable of striking at any time and in any direction.

Peters then securitised Islam, as a religion, as a “direct threat” to Christianity.²²⁴

134. The “jihadi bride” saga was a critical event in the discursive construction of the “Muslim threat” in New Zealand. As IWCNZ’s Anjum Rahman said at the time, “We all get tarred with this and people begin to view all of us with suspicion. And in an environment that is already reasonably hostile this doesn’t help matters much at all”.²²⁵ The jihadi bride meme is still being circulated in global and local media after the Christchurch terrorist attack, with a recent article (15 July 2019) in stuff.co.nz, “Operation Jihadi Bride: The truth about sex and Islamic State”, casually slipping between terrible stories of Yazidi slaves and ISIS brutality and factually inaccurate statements about Sharia, reinforcing the negative stereotype of perverse Muslim masculinity and generalised Islamic barbarity.²²⁶

135. The indirect securitisation of Islam occurs despite commendable official statements that distinguish between mainstream Muslims and violent extremists and terrorist organisations.²²⁷ Paradigm examples include: “[ISIS’s] behaviour is barbaric and they’re neither Islamic or a state and actually they

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ 1 News (December 9, 2015) “Shocked Muslim community wants proof of NZ jihadi brides”, TVNZ. <https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/shocked-muslim-community-wants-proof-of-nz-jihadi-brides>

²²⁶ John Carney (July 15, 2015) “Operation Jihadi Bride: The truth about sex and Islamic State”, Stuff. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/world/middle-east/114237645/operation-jihadi-bride-the-truth-about-sex-and-islamic-state>

²²⁷ Clara Eroukhmanoff (December 26, 2017) “‘It’s not a Muslim ban!’ Indirect speech acts and the securitisation of Islam in the United States post-9/11”, Taylor & Francis Online. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23269995.2018.1439873>

do a disservice to the billions of law-abiding, good, honest Muslims around the world".²²⁸

136. From a Muslim perspective, the original securitisation theory also fails to account for the diverse ways in which national security is not only "narrated" but "performed" to construct threats and referent objects of security. For example, the practice of illuminating monuments in solidarity, constructs affective and symbolic hierarchies of publicly mournable deaths and creates public memories and meanings of events.²²⁹ Western countries and white bodies are constructed in this way as security referents. As the organiser of the campaign to have the Sky Tower illuminated to remember the victims of a suicide attack in Bagdad that killed 175 people and injured over 200 said, "I wish that it's not that Iraqis' lives are cheaper, and it kind of does seem like it. Everyone is so immune to Iraqis dying lately, but this was a massive incident and it affected a lot of families in New Zealand".²³⁰

137. Individual acts of solidarity after a terrorist attack, such as adding a symbolic filter or badge to Facebook profile pictures, and dramatised performances of the news of a terrorist attack perpetrated by a Muslim, or events in the War on Terror or in Muslim-majority countries and regions, securitise Islam and Muslims.


138. Security is performed at the border through the "security theatre" of metal detectors, bag checks, random stops, searches, and interrogations of visibly Muslim travellers, people with Muslim names, and Muslims who have travelled to or from Muslim-majority countries.²³¹

²²⁸ Jo Moir (7 December 2015) "Sending Kiwi troops to Iraq didn't increase the chances of terrorism at home - Key", Stuff. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/74836035/>

²²⁹ Anne Barnard (July 5, 2016) "After Attacks on Muslims, Many Ask: Where Is the Outpouring?", The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/world/europe/muslims-baghdad-dhaka-istanbul-terror.html>

²³⁰ Dan Satherley (July 6, 2016) "Sky Tower to honour Iraqi dead", Newshub. <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/new-zealand/2016/07/sky-tower-to-honour-iraqi-dead.html>

²³¹ Nicholas Dynon (2018) "Behaviour detection at the border: dark art or science?", New Zealand Security Magazine. 26. <http://defsecmedia.co.nz/data/documents/NZSM-2018-Oct.pdf>



139. The speed and tone of official statements or tweets by political leaders and the kinds of response they propose to attacks – from “thoughts and prayers” to hyper-securitisation – and their readiness to identify violent acts as terrorism are also securitising performances, rather than simply speech acts.



Figure 3 Tweet from United States President Donald Trump’s personal Twitter page after an attack on London Bridge.²³²

140. Security is “imaginary”, “affective”, and “perceptual”, not only intersubjective. Our imagination of “terrorism” is a knife-wielding and masked young brown man, the Kalashnikov, the kufiyah, the burqa, the beard, Arabic script and phrases, and the names Muhammad and Aisha. Terrorism is stereotypically associated with Arabs and Muslims, as criminality is associated with African-Americans in the United States,²³³ and with Māori in Aotearoa.²³⁴ As the authors of a 2011 social psychology study of Ethnic Group Stereotypes in Aotearoa New Zealand state:

There is a wide body of literature in social cognition that emphasises the self-maintaining nature of stereotypes. According to this general socio-cognitive perspective, existing stereotypes (or schemata about group characteristics) often drive us to automatically see

²³² Phillip Bump (19 March 2019) “How Trump talks about attacks targeting Muslims vs. attacks by Muslims”, Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/18/how-trump-talks-about-attacks-targeting-muslims-vs-attacks-by-muslims/>

²³³ Mary Beth Oliver (2003) “African American Men as ‘Criminal and Dangerous’: Implications of Media Portrayals of Crime on the ‘Criminalization’ of African American Men”, *Journal of African American Studies*, 7:2. 3-18
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41819017?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

²³⁴ Craig Coxhead (2005) “Māori, crime and the media: the association of Māori with crime through media eyes”, *Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence*, 264. <http://www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/NZYbkNZJur/2005/22.html>

what we expect to see. Thus we are more likely to attend to and encode or remember stereotype-consistent information rather than stereotype-inconsistent information. We are more likely to form stable internal attributions about observed behaviours that are consistent with our pre-existing stereotypes and discount observations that are not.²³⁵

141. Group-based misrecognitions and feelings of insecurity and hostility are reinforced by official security narratives. Australia's National Security Campaign, for example, encourages members of the public to report "suspicious activity". From its launch in 2003, Arab and Muslim Australians have raised serious human rights questions about the campaign, arguing that it has made them suspect communities under surveillance by neighbours and colleagues.²³⁶ The current campaign video features ISIS-like imagery,²³⁷ while the radio version mentions ISIS and Syria.²³⁸ A video on chemical security features a white man cast as a small business owner and a stereotypical brown-skinned terrorist.²³⁹ RWE is not named or depicted in the campaign. This directly securitised Islam and Muslims.

142. Official, academic, and political narratives blur into mainstream media and entertainment misrepresentations manufactured by and for a Western, and

²³⁵ Chris G. Sibley, Kate Stewart Carla Houkamau et al (2011) "Ethnic Group Stereotypes in New Zealand", *New Zealand Journal of Psychology* Vol. 40, No. 2, 2011. 35.

<https://www.psychology.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/NZJP-Sibley.pdf>

²³⁶ Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (N.D) "ISMA - National Consultation on Eliminating Prejudice against Arab and Muslim Australians"


https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/racial_discrimination/isma/report/pdf/ISMA_complete.pdf

²³⁷ Australian Department of Home Affairs (August 21, 2018) "National Security Campaign – 30 second television advertisement". <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kK-ChQUSFvI>

²³⁸ Australian Department of Home Affairs "National Security Campaign - radio script"

<https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/National-Security-Campaign/Documents/Campaign-materials-2016/National-Security-Campaign-radio-script.pdf>

²³⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9W075hWjk8E> Compare with the factual and informative Chemical Security for Business Owners and Executive Managers video: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9bKnXMmpkLo>



non-Muslim gaze.²⁴⁰ This complex is referred to in the vernacular and in parts of the academic literature as the “Islamophobia industry”.²⁴¹



Figure 4 “Homeland is racist” – artists hired by the producers of the long running US television series, Homeland, based on the Israeli series, Prisoners of War, use Arabic graffiti to subvert the show's racist stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims²⁴²

Conclusion: who/what is being secured from who/what?

143. The securitisation of Islam and Muslims is both direct and indirect, and both official/formal and unofficial/informal. From a Muslim perspective, securitisation is a process, not an event. It is structural, and involves a variety of actors and acts. The discourse of social cohesion encodes the securitisation of Islam and Muslims. Officials and politicians have used rhetorical strategies such as hedging and disclaimers to avoid the direct securitisation of Islam. Meanwhile, officials and politicians have indirectly securitised Islam through an exclusive focus on Islamist extremist terrorism, downplaying the magnitude of the threat of RWE, and by using vague and unstable language to securitise

²⁴⁰ Khairiah Rahman and Azadeh Emadi (2018) “Representations of Islam and Muslims in New Zealand Media”, Pacific Journalism Review, 24:2. 166-188. <https://ojs.aut.ac.nz/pacific-journalism-review/article/view/419/622>

²⁴¹ Centre for Culture Centred Approach to Research and Evaluation (March 17, 2019) “The Islamophobia Industry and the Christchurch Terror Attack: A Call to Dismantle Hate” <http://tur-www1.massey.ac.nz/~wwcare/2019/03/17/the-islamophobia-industry-and-the-christchurch-terror-attack-a-call-to-dismantle-hate/>

²⁴² BBC (15 October 2015) “Artists write ‘Homeland is racist’ graffiti on set”, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34536434>

referent objects and security threats. The construction of Islam and Muslims as a threat is not only the intersubjective validation of securitising official speech acts in public discourse, but something performative, imaginative, affective, and perceptual.




Figure 2 Example of a search result for “terrorism” on Shutterstock²⁴³

144. Critically analysing and countering the securitisation of Islam and Muslims is not to pretend that Islamist extremist terrorism is not a threat. FIANZ condemns terrorism in every form. Thanks be to God, New Zealand has not been targeted by the transnational threat of Islamist extremist terrorism. Nor is it to imply that there is necessarily an organised Western conspiracy against Muslims. The securitisation of Islam and Muslims explains the path dependency of the historical evolution of the NZIC over the time horizon of the post-Cold War era, and interacts with public choice theory to explain the expansion of, inappropriate concentration of, or priority setting for, counter-terrorism resources. Understanding the limits of our thought and practice enables us here and now at this critical juncture to shift the paradigm and alter the evolutionary path of the NZIC going forward. Moreover, it is critical to understand how the securitisation of Islam and Muslims through official, political, and media narratives, images, and memes influences, reinforces, and legitimises the RWE narrative.

145. Rather than securitising RWE under the War on Terror macrosecuritisation, we must desecuritize Islam and Muslims; rationally resecuritize terrorism to

²⁴³ <https://www.shutterstock.com/search/terrorist>



clarify the range of threats and referent objects; and shift to a new all-of-government-and-society approach to Aotearoa New Zealand's security and wellbeing, grounded in our identity and values, and critical of institutional racism and anti-Muslim bias. Because security is always already societal, insofar it involves issues of identity, values, norms, socialisation, narratives, and relationships, we need to have a critical and reflective conversation about our national identity and values, and the implications for Aotearoa New Zealand's security and wellbeing. FIANZ makes this detailed case in our multi-point programme.

Intent, capability, impact, immediacy



146. This was not a low-capability or spontaneous attack. The Christchurch terrorist plotted a sophisticated terrorist attack on New Zealand Muslims, motivated by RWE ideology, that was meticulously planned to have a global impact and inspire others to take violent direct action. The accused used terrorism with the intention to undermine Aotearoa New Zealand's democratic institutions, Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the rule of law, and our national values of multiculturalism, religious tolerance, human rights, diversity, openness, inclusion, and respect for international law, which underpin Aotearoa New Zealand society and Government.

147. When the Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Jacinda Ardern, announced the Royal Commission of Inquiry, she stated clearly that "Questions need to be answered around whether or not this was the activity of an individual we could or should have known about".²⁴⁴ The Christchurch terrorist's online and offline activity prior to the attack, particularly his:

- travel internationally and within New Zealand, before and after his arrival and residence in New Zealand;
- ability to obtain a gun license, weapons, and ammunition;
- training with military-style assault rifles;
- use of social media and other online media; and
- connections with other extremists, whether in New Zealand or internationally,

could and should have been closely monitored for signs of intent and capability of carrying out a terrorist attack or financing one, whether in New Zealand or overseas, and the impact and immediacy of the attack. This knowledge could have enabled the relevant State sector agencies to take additional measures to prevent the attack. There appears to be a systemic dysfunction between the information gathering, sharing, and analysis practices of the NZIC and Police.

²⁴⁴ NZSIS (n.d.) "What are security intelligence investigations?", <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/assets/media/NZSIS-what-are-security-intelligence-investigations.pdf>

148. Because RWE was not an intelligence priority or requirement, in terms of the intelligence cycle, the primary fault lies with the concentration of and priority setting for counter-terrorism resources.²⁴⁵ There was a structural impediment in the authorising framework to the relevant State sector agencies gathering or sharing information relevant to the attack at the operational level.




149. Figure 3 the intelligence cycle, from NZSIS “What are security intelligence investigations?”, p.2.

150. Investigations into a potential threat actor begin with a “lead” – initial information that indicates the existence of a potential threat to New Zealand’s national security. An Investigator commences a security investigation into a potential threat actor by considering the questions of the actor’s intent and capability of carrying out a terrorist attack, and the impact and immediacy of the attack. Further questions about the access to and credibility of information about the target of the investigation must also be answered by intelligence analysts in addition to further intelligence requirements.

151. According to public statements, the fact is that the Christchurch terrorist and his activities were not known to New Zealand or Australian authorities before the terrorist attack.²⁴⁶ The question, per the Terms of Reference, is whether there was any information provided or otherwise available to relevant State sector agencies that could or should have alerted them to the attack

²⁴⁵ Jamie Tarabay (June 18, 2019) “Could the Christchurch Attacks Have Been Prevented?”, The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/18/world/australia/new-zealand-terrorism-christchurch.html>

²⁴⁶ NZSIS (18 March 2019) “NZSIS welcomes inquiry into the Christchurch terrorist attacks”. <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/news/nzsis-welcomes-inquiry-into-the-christchurch-terrorist-attacks>



and, if such information was provided or otherwise available, how the agencies responded to any such information, and whether that response was appropriate. Without a lead, the agencies would have been unable to commence an investigation into the terrorist. However, information was available that should have alerted the agencies to a potential threat, but did not.

152. The terrorist travelled to Turkey, then Serbia, Montenegro and other parts of the former Yugoslavia in late 2016, stopping at the sites of battles between Muslims and Christians during the centuries of Ottoman rule, and in early 2017 travelled to some of the bloodiest sites of the 1990s Balkan wars.²⁴⁷ He then travelled to Western Europe to assess the extent and perceived negative social consequences of Muslim and non-white immigration to the West – an “invasion”.²⁴⁸ After settling in Dunedin, the terrorist continued to travel internationally for extremist purposes, including to Pakistan, North Korea, Bulgaria, where he visited 11 semi-rural sites of major battles during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877 and 1878, and then Austria via Romania.²⁴⁹ This highly unusual travel history could and should have generated a lead from Immigration or Customs.

153. Merely five weeks after moving to Dunedin in August in 2017 to train for the attack after his first RWE dark tour of Europe, the Christchurch terrorist obtained a gun license in September 2017. A Police mail order form reveals that he possessed a AR-15 and Norinco semi-automatic rifles, and purchased approximately 2300 rounds of ammunition from Aoraki Ammunition

²⁴⁷ Wilma McKay and Kate Shuttleworth (March 21, 2019) “‘Hiding in plain sight’: In quiet New Zealand city, alleged gunman plotted carnage”, The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hiding-in-plain-sight-in-quiet-new-zealand-city-alleged-gunman-plotted-carnage/2019/03/21/1846de9e-4a7b-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html

²⁴⁸ Nick O'Malley, Tim Barlass and Patrick Begley (August 10, 2019) “White-bred terrorist: the making of a killer”, The Age. <https://www.theage.com.au/national/white-bred-terrorist-the-making-of-a-killer-20190806-p52ee7.html>

²⁴⁹ Linton Besser (April 1, 2019) “Christchurch shooter Brenton Tarrant’s travels to Bulgaria investigated for far-right links”, ABC. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-04-01/brenton-tarrant-bulgarian-travels-investigated/10957500>

Company.²⁵⁰ The terrorist purchased a firearm from Gun City in December 2017, and bought three more firearms from Gun City up until March 2018, and a hunting rifle from Hunting & Fishing.²⁵¹ Below the radar of the NZSIS or the Police, the terrorist trained and prepared for the 15 March terrorist attack with semiautomatic rifles at the Bruce Rifle Club, in a forest near Milton, about a 45-minute drive south of Dunedin, which offered shooting and target practice with military-style assault rifles. Any of this information could have generated a lead from Police.

154. The terrorist accessed extremist content online during the research and writing of his manifesto and preparation for the attack and communicated across international borders with other extremists.²⁵² Logically, the terrorist either learned how to modify his weapons and produce an improvised explosive device online, or communicated with others with this expertise to acquire these capabilities. Media reports indicate that the now-disabled Twitter page in the name of the terrorist, created three days before the attack, was filled with anti-Muslim and anti-immigration sentiments, extreme ideology, RWE language, and photos of the weaponry and equipment that he would use in the attack.²⁵³ While the NZIC cannot monitor “the internet” in its entirety, any number of possible leads could have opened investigations into the presence of RWE on the internet, including the activity of New Zealand citizens and residents. While the NZIC faces technological challenges and legal restrictions, there appears to have been no systematic effort to monitor RWE on the internet by the NZIC, which may have generated leads relating to

²⁵⁰ Derek Cheng (19 November 2019) “Submitter claims police authorised sale of ammunition to alleged Christchurch gunman”, New Zealand Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=12286323

²⁵¹ Wilma McKay and Kate Shuttleworth (March 21, 2019) “Hiding in plain sight’: In quiet New Zealand city, alleged gunman plotted carnage”, The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/hiding-in-plain-sight-in-quiet-new-zealand-city-alleged-gunman-plotted-carnage/2019/03/21/1846de9e-4a7b-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html

²⁵² Jason Wilson (May 16, 2019) “Christchurch shooter's links to Austrian far right 'more extensive than thought'”, The Guardian. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/16/christchurch-shooters-links-to-austrian-far-right-more-extensive-than-thought>

²⁵³ Tess Owen (March 15, 2019) “Decoding the racist memes the alleged New Zealand shooter used to communicate”, Vice News. https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/vbwn9a/decoding-the-racist-memes-the-new-zealand-shooter-used-to-communicate



individuals. This may have increased the likelihood of detecting the Christchurch terrorist.

155. The NZIC (particularly CTAG) and Police could and should have known about the Christchurch terrorist because of his extremist behaviours online and offline, and monitored him closely for signs of intent and capability of perpetrating or financing a terrorist attack, whether in New Zealand or overseas, and the impact and immediacy of the potential attack. International experience demonstrates that there is no guarantee that any intelligence on the terrorist prior to the attack would have, counterfactually, prevented the attack. The function of the NSS is to manage risks and govern threats. This operating environment of fundamental uncertainty is a given. Yet, the terrorist was not known to the NZSIS or Police or to Australian authorities, even though information was available to the relevant State sector agencies that could have generated a lead. This information did not generate a lead because RWE was not being monitored. This is ultimately because of an inappropriate concentration of and priority setting for counter-terrorism resources over decades.

A “fit and proper” person?


156. The New Zealand Police did not properly assess the Christchurch terrorist as a “fit and proper” person to hold a firearms licence.²⁵⁴ Police released a public statement that correct process was followed, providing the following version of events:

- The accused filed an application for a firearms licence in September 2017 in Dunedin. The vetting process was undertaken by a Police Firearms Vetting Officer in Dunedin, where the accused resided.
- The accused initially listed a family member as one of his referees but that person did not reside in New Zealand. Policy states that a referee must be a resident of New Zealand, therefore new referees were requested.
- The accused provided two further referees who met the requirements of the process and were interviewed face to face by a Police Firearms Vetting Officer.
- One of the steps to gaining a firearms licence is a home visit to meet the applicant in person and inspect the security of their property.
- In October 2017 the accused was interviewed at his home address in Dunedin. A security inspection took place at the same time. Following this, all the available information was reviewed and the licence was approved in November 2017.²⁵⁵

FIANZ argues that this official Police timeline omits crucial details.

²⁵⁴ Jody O’Callaghan (23 October 2019) “Muslim group tells lawmakers: Gun licence checkers ‘must also be checked’”, Stuff. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-shooting/116811761/muslim-group-tells-lawmakers-gun-licence-checkers-must-also-be-checked>

²⁵⁵ New Zealand Police (22 March 2019) “Christchurch terror attack – statement on the accused’s firearms licence application”. <https://www.police.govt.nz/news/release/christchurch-terror-attack-%E2%80%93-statement-accused%E2%80%99s-firearms-licence-application>



Two people who can verify your suitability to possess and use firearms

1. Must be a spouse, partner or next of kin (who normally resides with, or is related to you)

Surname			Gender	<input type="radio"/> Male	<input type="radio"/> Female
First & middle names		Firearms licence number, if held	Date of birth		
Relationship	Mobile phone			Work phone	
Residential address			Email		
Home phone	Occupation			Drivers licence number	

2. Must be a person who is unrelated to you and over 20 years of age and know you well

Surname			Gender	<input type="radio"/> Male	<input type="radio"/> Female
First & middle names		Firearms licence number, if held	Date of birth		
Relationship	Mobile phone			Work phone	
Residential address			Email		
Home phone	Occupation			Drivers licence number	

Figure 7: New Zealand Firearms Application Form ²⁵⁶

157. Police claim that the firearms vetting officer requested that the Christchurch terrorist provide a new referee because the family member initially listed did not reside in New Zealand, and policy states that a referee must be a New Zealand resident. However, it is also policy, stated explicitly on the New Zealand Firearms Licence application form, that the first referee “must be a spouse, partner or next of kin (who normally resides with, or is related to you)”. Further, the second referee “must be a person who is unrelated to you and over 20 years of age and know you well”. The two referees that the Christchurch terrorist supplied were a father and son who the terrorist only knew through an online forum.²⁵⁷ The referees therefore did not meet the requirements of the process, contra Police assertions.

158. Operationally, if there is a contingent policy for approving a firearms license for an individual who is unable to provide a New Zealand resident spouse, partner, or next of kin, then commonsense reasonably expected of a vetting officer is that the applicant must have a considerable footprint in the community and could thus provide alternative referees who can approximate the ability of a spouse, partner, or next of kin to verify the suitability of the applicant to possess and use firearms. However, the terrorist had only been in New Zealand for five weeks prior to applying for the firearms license, had no

²⁵⁶ <https://www.police.govt.nz/sites/default/files/publications/firearms-application-form.pdf>

²⁵⁷ George Block (23 March 2019) “‘Failures’ in issuing gun licence”, Otago Daily Times. <https://www.odt.co.nz/news/dunedin/failures-issuing-gun-licence>

family or personal connections to New Zealand, and no employment. These facts should have been ascertained during the initial background check, and should have been sufficient reasons to, if not rule against the terrorist being a fit and proper person, caution the vetting officer to apply the most stringent requirements of the vetting process. Secondly, the two referees that were provided were only known to the terrorist through an online forum, and thus cannot be said to have known the terrorist "well", except by stretching the language far beyond the core meaning implied by the function of the vetting process and intended by legislators.

159. The initial background check failed to correctly assess the terrorist as a fit and proper person to possess firearms. The background check established that he did not have an Australian or New Zealand criminal record, yet clearly failed to vet his extremist presence online or his international travel for extremist purposes.

160. There are two different sets of questions to be answered after the Christchurch terrorist attack in relation to the firearms vetting process. The first is whether the vetting process followed by the Dunedin vetting officer was adequate under the existing firearms legislation, and whether, operationally, Police had the right policies in place to ensure the vetting process was adequate. We have argued that the correct process was not followed by the vetting officer in the case of the Christchurch terrorist. Police have since issued a new directive informing vetting staff to take precautions regarding RWE, including warning signs such as "tattoos, Celtic or Norse symbolism, books on the Third Reich, confederate flags, and reference to Norway mass-shooter Anders Breivik".²⁵⁸ The existence of this directive demonstrates that there were no impediments under existing legislation to considering these factors when determining whether an applicant is a fit and proper person to hold a licence. This directive could and should have been in

²⁵⁸ Thomas Manch and Sam Sherwood (29 June 2019) "Police check firearm licence applicants for signs of 'extreme right' after March 15 terror attack", Stuff. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/christchurch-shooting/113666061/police-check-firearm-licence-applicants-for-signs-of-extreme-right-after-march-15-terror-attack>



place, and could and should have been standard practice, prior to 15 March. This is because New Zealand Police and the NZIC could and should have identified, assessed, and governed the threat of RWE prior to the attack.

161. The second is whether the existing vetting process is adequate to the task of determining whether an applicant is a "fit and proper" person to hold a New Zealand firearms license. The Government's proposed second tranche of reforms to firearms legislation will refine who is "fit and proper" to hold a firearms licence that will restrict gang members and individuals who show patterns of behaviour that exhibit or promote violence, hatred, or extremism. FIANZ commends the Government for taking this initiative, which is outside of the scope of the Terms of Reference for the Royal Commission. Our recommendations relating to weapons involve the administration of existing firearms legislation, not legislative reform.

RECOMMENDATIONS

to protect and advance the security and wellbeing of Aotearoa New Zealand



A holistic and integrated approach

FIANZ proposes a multi-point programme to prevent future RWE attacks, ensure the safety of the New Zealand Muslim and other minority communities, and protect and advance the security and wellbeing of Aotearoa New Zealand, insha'Allah – God willing. FIANZ sees these recommendations as a critical element in the recovery process to bring about medium and long-term regeneration. New Zealand takes an all-of-government approach to national security. National security is conceptualised in the New Zealand context in a way that extends the "traditional definition of security as solely the preserve of defence, law enforcement and intelligence agencies".²⁵⁹ FIANZ extends the definition of national security further. National security has criminal, security and intelligence, social, economic, cultural, and political dimensions. We thus propose an all-of-government-and-society approach.

The global resurgence of RWE and broader trends of nationalism and populism are epiphenomena of larger global processes of structural transformation that are causing disorder, alienation, confusion, and insecurity. We need holistic, integrated solutions to a variety of governance problems. It is impossible to stop every attack, particularly when the attack is uncoordinated, spontaneous, and low capability. Western security and intelligence agencies and police forces have had mixed successes post-Christchurch preventing copycat attacks of this nature. To reduce the likelihood of major and minor terrorist attacks, we need to intervene at a societal level to govern the threat by changing hearts, minds, and, ultimately, behaviours, and addressing root causes. Furthermore, it is as vital to prevent an actualised attack from having its intended effect on society and Government as it is to prevent a potential attack from being actualised. Therefore, we need to strengthen the structure and cohesiveness of the whole of Government and society to achieve systemic resilience.

²⁵⁹ Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (2017) "National Security Handbook", 9.
<https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-03/dpmc-NZIC-handbook-aug-2016.pdf>

The FIANZ multi-point programme to protect and advance the security and wellbeing of Aotearoa New Zealand is organised into eight interrelated, interdependent areas:

- 1) Security
- 2) Hate
- 3) Terrorism
- 4) Weapons
- 5) Racism
- 6) Nationhood
- 7) Information
- 8) Superdiversity

Some of our recommendations are idealistic, and others represent our modest hopes for our troubled times. Some are aspirational, while most are pragmatic. Some are high-level objectives that will possibly take decades to achieve. Others are mid-level objectives that will take several years. We have tried where possible to make recommendations that are immediately practicable, but have not limited our vision to solving technical problems. Our overarching objective is to protect and advance the security and wellbeing of Aotearoa New Zealand. As young people, we refuse to let the terrorist kill our hopes for making our country the best in the world. The multi-point programme thus articulates what Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern described as the “strongest possible condemnation of the ideology of the people who did this”.

Progress on the Royal Commission’s final recommendations must be monitored, evaluated, and reported on regularly. FIANZ urges the New Zealand Government to establish a steering committee of representatives of those who have made submissions including FIANZ, IWCNZ, Government, iwi, business, civil society, and the HRC. This committee must be ensured the financial, human, and technical resources required to conduct its work.



Security

- 1) **Open and democratise** the process of setting and reviewing New Zealand's National Intelligence Priorities to the greatest possible extent to ensure that these deliver value to Aotearoa New Zealand's security and wellbeing and reflect our core values, identity, and strategic interests.
 - a) The annually refreshed NIP should be subject to general debate and voted on by Parliament after approval by the Cabinet National Security Committee.
 - b) The detailed NIP intelligence requirements should be subject to scrutiny by the Intelligence and Security select committee.
 - c) Produce a declassified version of the NIP for proactive release to the public. This began in 2019/2020 after the Christchurch terrorist attack with the inclusion of the NIP in the DPMC annual report as an appendix.
 - d) The declassified NIP should include an explanation, in plain language, of what they mean for the security and wellbeing of Aotearoa New Zealand.
 - e) The declassified NIP should be on the DPMC, NZSIS, and GCSB websites.
 - f) The annual reports for the DPMC, NZSIS, and GCSB should include details regarding the actions taken to promote each of the NIP. To the greatest extent possible consistent with national security, these should be declassified in the interests of transparency and accountability.


- 2) **Consider** a full inquiry on the structure and role of the NZSIS and GCSB.

- 3) **Coordinate** with our Australian partner agencies through the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) on counter-terrorism policy, capabilities (improvements to information gathering, sharing, and analysis practices), legislation, and the enabling environments of all forms of extremism. This includes populist and nationalist rhetoric and the political

mobilisation of the population through the securitisation of Islam and migration.²⁶⁰

- 4) **Review** training providers, and retrain existing staff on the various faiths in New Zealand. This extends to the NZIC, Police, NZDF, MFAT, Corrections, and Customs. In the case of Islam FIANZ strongly believes that locally contextualised knowledge of Islam and Muslims in New Zealand is more valid than international experience for assessing the threat of Islamist extremism.
- 5) **Hire** analytical staff with expertise in RWE to DPMC, NZSIS (particularly CTAG), GCSB, MFAT, NZDF, Police, Corrections, and Customs as part of the SIB's programme to build a high performing, cohesive and effective security and intelligence sector workforce.
- 6) **Establish** protocols to prevent the infiltration of strategic Government positions, particularly NZDF and Police, by right wing extremists – what the Christchurch terrorist refers to as the “Lightening March through the institutions” – and the accidental radicalisation of NZIC, NZDF, Police staff at work. This may occur through training, exposure, influence, or socialisation. A special counterintelligence unit must be established.
- 7) **Build** Aotearoa New Zealand's locally contextualised knowledge base in security studies, international relations, global political economy, global historical sociology, global history, and global political theory.
 - a) Hold a major conference and commission an interdisciplinary collection of critical essays on New Zealand identity and security post-Christchurch, and continue to convene on topics of identity and security in our changing world.
 - b) Establish scholarships for the postgraduate study of RWE and non-traditional security threats, which, like the GCSB's women in STEM

²⁶⁰ Greg Barton (March 17, 2019) “Christchurch attacks are a stark warning of toxic political environment that allows hate to flourish” The Conversation. <https://theconversation.com/christchurch-attacks-are-a-stark-warning-of-toxic-political-environment-that-allows-hate-to-flourish-113662>



scholarships, will also have the effect of diversifying the recruitment pool and bring new perspectives, insights, and approaches to the NZIC, NZDF, and MFAT.

- c) Create a world-leading interdisciplinary research unit for the study and prevention of RWE involving academia, civil society, and Government.
 - d) Recommend that the NZIC to develop relationships with independent Think Tanks and academia outside the Five Eyes countries in order to broaden their expertise.
 - e) This work of developing our local knowledge base and creating a more diverse and inclusive research environment will feed back into the NZIC, NZDF, and MFAT, and help to prevent future attacks by educating and diversifying the security and intelligence, defence, and foreign policy workforces, and producing the knowledge and theory to inform the practice of the NZIC, NZDF, and MFAT.
- 8) **Desecuritize** migration in official and political discourse.
- a) Tendencies toward the securitisation of migration, regular and irregular, and the militarisation of borders in Europe, North America, and Australia, are more deadly on a global scale than RWE terrorism.
 - b) Securitising rhetoric around border security and migration provides support to RWE narratives that frame Muslim and non-white migration as demographic, normative, and ontological threats to Western identity and values, and creates an enabling environment for audiences to be receptive to RWE narratives.
 - c) Official and political security discourse in New Zealand has contributed to the securitisation of migration. The extent to which migration has been securitised is not yet as extreme as other Western countries. The NZIC's threat assessment of migration as the number one security threat to New Zealand in the 2015 briefing to the incoming Minister is a prime example of the danger that the securitisation of migration can support and legitimate notions of the "great replacement" and of non-white "invasion".
 - d) Politicians promoting conspiratorial RWE talking points on migrants and refugees, and spreading misinformation and disinformation about migrants

and refugees for political marketing purposes, is extremely dangerous to Aotearoa New Zealand's national security.

- e) There is a need for officials and politicians to normalise the politics of migration by focusing on the costs and benefits of economic openness, and pragmatic solutions to the dynamic disequilibria within societies created by openness to global markets for labour, capital, goods, services, and ideas.



Hate

9) Criminalise hate speech.

- a) The Terms of Reference specify that the recommendations sought must be consistent with maintaining New Zealand as a free and democratic society. There is an understandable worry about infringing on free speech and other important rights and freedoms. FIANZ shares that worry especially in relation to religious freedoms.
- b) The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 states that rights and freedoms may be subject to "such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".²⁶¹
- c) It is possible to identify and justify the lower limit of permissible speech in a free and democratic society. The line is drawn at speech that is intended to be harmful or to incite harm (physical or psychological), or to propagate hatred.
- d) As the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination's concluding observations on the combined twenty-first and twenty-second periodic reports of New Zealand notes with concern, the most recent successful prosecution for hate speech was in the 1970s. While the lower limit for permissible speech in a free and democratic society should be set high, the lack of prosecutions suggests that the lower limit is currently too high.
- e) The Human Rights Act 1993 s61(1), makes unlawful "speech which is threatening, abusive, or insulting, or to broadcast by means of radio or television or other electronic communication words which are threatening, abusive, or insulting". However, the Human Rights Act s61(1) relates to racial disharmony, but not religious intolerance and hatred. This must be amended.
- f) FIANZ welcomes the governments review into updating the Human Rights Act to provide protections for religion and other diverse groups. FIANZ

²⁶¹ New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5.

<http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0109/latest/whole.html#DLM225501>

believes that the Harmful Digital Communications Act also needs to be reviewed to tackle online hate and bullying effectively.

- g) There should be a coordinated process established across agencies and crown entities dealing with hate speech so that communities have a singular reporting and complaints process. Currently hate speech is dealt with by various government entities including DIA, Police, Human Rights Commission and Netsafe. There is no coordination of response or a singular triaging process to deal with complaints or getting content removed off online platforms.
 - h) FIANZ believes that it is critical for the wellbeing of society for different religious teachings to be discussed openly and publicly and for dialogue between different religious, ethnic, and cultural communities to be open and inclusive, rational and civilised.
 - i) FIANZ believes that positions on moral and social issues and theological matters that are unpopular or contradict majority public opinion or positive law should be protected by freedom of speech and religion.
 - j) However, there is a clear line between the freedom to openly and publicly discuss, defend, and teach different positions on moral and social issues and theological matters, and professing hatred and inciting violence. While the former are necessary for the maintenance and progress of a free and democratic society, the latter are destructive for a free and democratic society.
- 10) **Enact and enforce** hate crimes legislation. The New Zealand Law Commission must review the adequacy of existing legislation and consider the proposal that hate crimes should be established as a separate category of offence rather than an "aggravating factor" in sentencing.
- a) This should include acts of hatred that target people (individuals and groups), property (including places of worship and minority-owned businesses), and religious symbols (including Halal and Kosher).
 - b) FIANZ believes that it is important for Halal and Kosher to be legally protected in New Zealand as symbols of religious identity that are often the targets of verbal and physical hate attacks. This may require legislation



in addition to hate crimes legislation to protect Halal and Kosher dietary requirements, to ensure food security for New Zealand Muslims and Jews.²⁶²

- 11) **Criminalise** groups and organisations that promote, incite, or perform acts of racial or religious discrimination, hatred, or violence, and participation in such groups or organisations.
- 12) **Register** hate crimes and **record** statistics on the perpetrators and victims of crime to build an accurate record of racial- religious- and gender-based violence, including where these intersect (for example, white male physical assault against black Muslim female).
 - a) Police must be trained in accurately and sensitively identifying and reporting crimes which are perceived by the victim, the officer, or any other person to be motivated by a hostility based on a personal characteristic. This must involve human rights, cultural competency, and unconscious bias training.
 - b) Statistics should be collected on complaints, prosecutions, convictions, and sentences to provide an accurate picture of the state of hate in New Zealand.
- 13) **Formulate and implement** a National Hate Crime Action Plan.
 - a) Establish a dedicated Hate Crime unit within Police to monitor, analyse, work with other agencies and communities, train police staff and advise on investigations and prosecutions of Hate Crime. This is in line with other best practice models for police groups internationally.
 - b) There is currently no designated support services for people affected by hate speech and hate crime. It is left largely to communities themselves to support one another. Victim support is provided as a general reference during court cases, but what is required is additional services for persons


²⁶² Mustafa Farouk et. al. (2015) "Spiritual aspects of meat and nutritional security: Perspectives and responsibilities of the Abrahamic faiths", Food Research International, 76:4.

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S096399691530017X>

affected on a regular basis. This will require specialists who understand the various forms of hate and who have the cultural, religious, linguistic, knowledge and specific skills to address the harm caused to victims. It will also require a multilingual telephone service for persons to contact and linkages to any online reporting process so that persons can be adequately supported. Engage with New Zealand minority communities and look to countries such as the United Kingdom for models and best practices.²⁶³

- c) Include in this support for the Human Rights Commission, Police, universities, and civil society organisations such as FIANZ and the national bodies of other ethnic and religious minorities, particularly the New Zealand Jewish Council, to build a national project on the model of Tell MAMA and the Community Security Trust.
 - d) This project would ensure that racial and religious hate incidents and attacks in Aotearoa are monitored, mapped, measured, recorded, and reported to police when requested, victims are adequately supported, and statistics and analysis are regularly provided to Government, academia, and media.
- 14) **Develop** capacity of visible and vulnerable minorities to provide for their own basic security.
- a) The UK government committed £5m over 3 years to put in place a new security training fund for places of worship of all faiths. During Ramadan, the Home Office supported Faith Associates to provide security training and advice to mosques, community centres and madrassahs. This should be replicated.
 - b) Waikato Police have been working with male youth from Waikato Akhi Initiative, who voluntarily provided basic security during Ramadan. So far, there have been two basic training sessions. FIANZ calls for this model to be developed and expanded nationally to places of worship of all faiths who express an interest, with a formal certified training programme, uniforms, and equipment provided by Police. Volunteers must be

²⁶³ UK Government (July 26, 2016) "Hate crime action plan 2016 to 2020".
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hate-crime-action-plan-2016>



adequately trained and equipped to deter or manage a serious threat, including training with emergency services to ensure effective communication and rapid response times.

- c) Provide free and accessible tailored self-defence classes for women and girls across Aotearoa New Zealand to combat gendered and racialised violence and harassment. This has been done in the past with great success.

Terrorism

- 15) **Desecuritize** Islam and Muslims, and **resecuritize** terrorism rationally.
- a) Shift from an identity-based to a behaviour-based paradigm. The NZIC has already made moves in this direction, but this needs to be more thorough.
 - b) Clarify referent objects in official speech in line with legislation. Official speech must be clear that it is not just white bodies and Pākehā identity and values that are being secured, and that Muslims and Islam are not demographic, normative, or ontological threats.
 - c) Places of worship and religious holidays must be made referent objects.
 - d) Avoid the explicit securitisation of Islam in speech, particularly inaccurate phrases such as "radical Islam", "Muslim extremism", or "Islamic terrorist". Accurate terms include "Islamist extremism", "Islamist extremist terrorism", and "Islamist extremist terrorist", "right wing extremism", "right wing extremist terrorism", and "right wing extremist terrorism" and so on following the pattern – "environmentalist extremism", "anti-1080 extremist terrorism", and "left wing extremist terrorist", etc.
 - i) These standardised terms also permit standardised abbreviations, e.g. "IE", "RWE", "LWE", "EE", "A1080E", etc.
 - ii) Where possible, the names of specific organisations or networks should be used to identify the variety of extremism or the nature of the terrorist attack., e.g. "The Daesh terrorist", "The terrorist with suspected links to the Atomwaffen Division", or "The Nordkreuz terrorist attack".
 - iii) This resecuritisation of terrorism involves the collective effort of politicians, officials, media, and academics.
 - e) Avoid framing of Muslims as a "suspect community" and our youth as "at risk", or exclusively framing Muslims as the likely perpetrators and not the possible victims of terrorism, which directly and indirectly securitise Muslims and Islam.
 - f) Normalise Islam and Muslims in official and popular discourse. This will also involve media in New Zealand making a conscious effort to normalise Muslim representations on screen, and to take a critical, rational, and



ethical approach to priming and framing stories involving Islam, Muslims, and Muslim-majority countries and regions.

- g) Allocate counter-terrorism resources rationally based on empirical evidence. This will involve thoroughly reviewing the NIP cycle.
 - h) Restructure the SRRP to ensure that it is representative of the superdiversity of Aotearoa New Zealand and our values and identity, and increase its powers. Bringing together different perspectives to act as a “critical friend” to the NZIC is a safeguard against business-as-usual and the reproduction of institutional racism and Islamophobia.
- 16) **Produce** an annual terrorism situation and trend report for the New Zealand public modelled on EUROPOL TE-STAT.
- a) The basic structure of the TE-STAT report includes trends, general overview, and sections on the terrorism threat of Islamist extremists, ethno-nationalists and separatists, left wing extremists, right wing extremists, anarchists, and single-issues, and seven annexes for transparency and accountability.²⁶⁴
 - b) This basic structure lends itself to the rational securitisation of terrorism and away from the securitisation of Islam or the politicisation of security.
- 17) **Deny** extremists the freedom to travel, network, communicate, mobilise, and finance terrorism, and limit their ability to create, distribute, and consume extremist content and radicalise, motivate, inspire, and recruit online.
- 18) **Stop** the abuse of social media by extremists.
- a) FIANZ strongly supports the Government’s championing of the global governance of the internet and the “Christchurch Call” to provide a regulatory framework to stop the spread of terrorist and extremist content online.

²⁶⁴ EUROPOL “EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (TE_SAT): Reviewing the terrorism phenomenon” EUROPOL. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report>

- b) FIANZ supports Spark's view that Government should establish a "robust policy framework to address the important issues surrounding such material being distributed online and freely available".²⁶⁵
- c) FIANZ supports the Helen Clark Foundation's recommendation to establish an independent regulatory body in New Zealand for social media companies, and to subject social media companies to a statutory duty of care to ensure the reasonable safety of their users, and that they take reasonable measures, including technological means, to prevent, or reduce the risk of, users harming themselves or others.²⁶⁶

19) **Fund** increased security for mosques, Islamic centres, and other places of worship vulnerable to RWE, particularly synagogues. This work programme should be coordinated with the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations action plan to safeguard the sanctity of religious sites.²⁶⁷

20) **Fund** increased security for religious places such as Mosques / Islamic Centres, Synagogues, Temples, Gurdwaras, Churches and other places of worship vulnerable to RWE.

Provide visible deterrence security of major events of various faiths, for instance for Muslims during Eid ul Fitr and Eid ul Adha, for Jews during Hanukkah, etc.

FIANZ asks that the Police presence be as peaceful and demilitarised as possible (consistent with threat assessments) to ensure that participants feel safe.

²⁶⁵ 1 NEWS (August 9, 2019) "In wake of latest mass shootings, Spark promises to block 8Chan in NZ if it comes back online" 1 NEWS. <https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/in-wake-latest-mass-shootings-spark-promises-block-8chan-nz-if-comes-back-online>

²⁶⁶ Claire Mason and Katherine Errington (2019) Anti-social media: reducing the spread of harmful content on social media networks" The Helen Clark Foundation. 6. <https://www.helenclark.foundation/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/thcf-social-media-report-min.pdf>


²⁶⁷ United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (March 22, 2019) "UN Secretary-General Tasks High Representative for UNAOC With Drawing an Action Plan for Safeguarding Religious Sites" United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Press Release <https://www.unaoc.org/2019/03/un-secretary-general-tasks-high-representative-for-unaoc-with-drawing-an-action-plan-for-safeguarding-religious-sites/>



- 21) **Counter** the radicalisation of RWEs and **design** deradicalisation programmes for our local social, historical, and geographical context.
- a) Reintegrate RWEs into mainstream society through educational and vocational opportunities and social activities that help RWEs to learn about what it is to be a New Zealander in the 21st century, and to learn the history and foundations of contemporary New Zealand society and government.
 - b) Counter RWE narratives.
 - i) This will involve targeted interventions to enable RWEs to think critically about whiteness, masculinity, nationalism, global history, world religions and civilisations, and the meaning of “the West”.
 - ii) Conspiracy theories are integral to extremist narratives, so targeted interventions must be based on the psychology and epistemology of conspiracy theories, paranoid thinking, and belief revision.
 - iii) Provide better interpretations of, and explanations for, the complex regional and global transformations and events that are causing disorientation, destabilisation, alienation, and polarisation. Start with these experiences and the motive of searching for truth and justice, problematise simplistic or implausible interpretations or explanations, and present more enlightening perspectives and accounts.
 - iv) Use mainstream conservative, liberal, and socialist political philosophy and mainstream religion to suggest alternative ways of understanding the world and developing their personal beliefs, ethics, and aesthetics.
 - c) Discredit RWE leaders, movements, beliefs, ethics, and aesthetics.
- 22) **Launch** a comprehensive national “exit programme” for members of terrorist groups, extremist movements, and gangs.
- a) Establish a multidisciplinary and multiagency taskforce capable of assessing and meeting the individual psychological, social, health, security, economic, financial, and legal needs of people wanting to transform their lives.

- b) Partner with faith, cultural, iwi, and community stakeholders to design and implement the programme and strengthen protective factors (identity, place, belonging, aspiration, social connections, etc.).
- 23) **Facilitate** an inclusive and enabling environment in which youth from different ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious backgrounds are recognised and provided with support to design and implement programmes to promote peace, social cohesion, justice, and development, in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015) on Youth, Peace and Security.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁸ Security Council (December 9, 2015) "Resolution 2250 (2015)" United Nations. <http://unoy.org/wp-content/uploads/SCR-2250.pdf>



Weapons

Recommendations involve the administration of firearms legislation, and are thus within the scope of the Royal Commission's terms of reference.

- 24) **Strengthen** the firearms licensing vetting process.
- a) Set a higher threshold for assessing whether an applicant is a "fit and proper" person in operational policy.
 - b) Formally include psychometric assessment of extremist and racist beliefs and signs of RWE (tattoos etc.), and social media, forums, and message boards, in assessing whether an applicant is a "fit and proper" person.
 - c) Replace 280 casual vetting staff with sworn Police officers with specialist training in psychological assessments of applicants as "fit and proper".²⁶⁹
 - d) Centralise and standardise processes across districts.
 - e) Subject districts to periodic review and practice assessment.
 - f) Ensure that the logic of restructuring is improved safety, not efficiency.
- 25) **Review** current licenses issued in last 5 years to ensure that correct process has been followed. Reassess the applications of licensees who were approved without following the correct process, and revoke if necessary the licenses of individuals who are not "fit and proper" persons.
- 26) **Revoke** the licenses of individuals who have come to the attention of Police for extremist and racist beliefs and signs of RWE, including on social media, forums, message boards.
- 27) **Automatically** investigate large, unusual, or frequent purchase orders, and the scrutinise with extreme caution any large, unusual, or frequent purchase orders of a licensee who has held their firearms licence for less than one year.

²⁶⁹ Amber Leigh-Woolf (31 January 2019) "Police firearms staff proposed restructure could affect more than 350 jobs", Stuff. <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/110266758/police-firearms-staff-proposed-restructure-could-affect-more-than-350-jobs>

- 28) **Review** previous large, unusual, or frequent purchase orders in of last 5 years.
- 29) **Strengthen** the regulatory regime for gun clubs and ranges, including obligations on operators to report suspicious behaviour to Police.



Racism

- 30) **Establish** an inquiry into effective anti-racism legislation including consultation with all stakeholders including minority groups.
- a) As Paul Hunt, Chief Human Rights Commissioner, stated after the Christchurch terrorist attack, our country must “become a global champion of anti-racism, anti-Islamophobia and human rights”.²⁷⁰
 - b) Commit government and society to eliminating personal, cultural, institutional, and structural racism and advancing racial equality in Aotearoa New Zealand in line with Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
 - c) Frame the legislation in the global historical context of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide, and the national historical context of settler colonialism.
 - d) Recognise the different experiences of racism by differently racialised groups by explaining and defining anti-Māori, anti-Pasifika, anti-Black, anti-Chinese, anti-Indian, and anti-Arab racism; gendered racism; colourism; Islamophobia; anti-Semitism; and xenophobia.
 - i) Consult with iwi and community leaders and stakeholders.
 - ii) Consult with legal and academic experts and civil society.
 - iii) Learn from international experience in countries such as South Africa.
 - iv) Draw on United Nations human rights instruments and declarations.
 - v) Specify obligations on classes of public and private sector organisations in relation to eliminating personal, cultural, institutional, and structural racism and advancing racial equality.
 - vi) Include the obligation to develop a multicultural and multifaith strategy focused on eliminating all forms of racism, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, and related discrimination, building on the work of the HRC’s Diversity Action Programme, Te Ngira.


²⁷⁰ Paul Hunt (April 2, 2019) “Tackling racism, islamophobia and hate in New Zealand” Human Rights Commission.
<https://www.hrc.co.nz/news/tackling-racism-islamophobia-and-hate-new-zealand/>

- 31) **Develop** programmes with community input to reduce all forms of bullying and discrimination in schools, including racial and religious bullying and discrimination.
- a) The Education Review Office notes that our school roll is more ethnically diverse than Aotearoa New Zealand's general population.²⁷¹
 - b) The Children's Commissioner report, *Education Matters to Me: Key Insights* (2018) offered six key insights from their analysis of what tamariki and rangatīhi are saying.
 - i) The first is that children and young people "want to be seen for who they are, and to be understood within the context of their home life and experiences".
 - ii) The second is that many children and young people "experience racism at school and are treated unequally because of their culture".²⁷²
 - c) Many children and young people responded to an open-ended question on what they would change about their school that they would end bullying and racism and ensure the emotional safety of students.²⁷³ This resonates with what Muslim children, young people, and their parents and elder siblings have been saying across the country.
 - d) The Ministry of Education must develop a comprehensive plan and monitoring and reporting processes in consultation with tamariki, rangatahi, and whānau, iwi leaders, the Children's Commissioner, Human Rights Foundation, FIANZ, IWCNZ, and other stakeholders representing Aotearoa's superdiversity.
 - e) A focus must also be placed on identifying, re-socialising, and re-educating children and youth who exhibit racist behaviours and warning signs of radicalisation.

²⁷¹ Education Review Office (2018) "Ethnic diversity in New Zealand state schools" <https://www.ero.govt.nz/footer-upper/news/ero-insights-term-1/ethnic-diversity-in-new-zealand-state-schools/>

²⁷² Office of the Children's Commissioner (January, 2018) "Education matters to me: Key insights. A starting point for the Statement of National Education and Learning Priorities" <https://www.occ.org.nz/assets/Uploads/OCC-STA-Education-Matters-to-Me-Key-Insights-24Jan2018.pdf>

²⁷³ Office of the Children's Commissioner (March, 2018) "Education matters to me: Emotional wellbeing" <https://www.occ.org.nz/assets/Uploads/Emotional-Wellbeing2.pdf>



- 32) **Run** effective programmes to eliminate institutionalised discrimination and ethno-centric bias in the NZIC and the Police.
- a) The Royal Commission must inquire into patterns and practices of racism and anti-Muslim bias to determine their findings and recommendations.
 - b) The Royal Commission may recommend that separate inquiries be launched into the matter of institutional racism and anti-Muslim bias by the Independent Police Conduct Authority and Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. Indigenous and racialised minority communities should be given legal and financial assistance to submit evidence to these inquiries. The scope of these inquiries should include the period after the Christchurch terrorist attack, including the Armed Response Team trial.
 - c) Specific policies to hire, develop, and promote diverse staff to positions of senior leadership and policy analysis must be set, enacted, and reported on.
 - d) Develop policies to hire, develop, and promote diverse staff to positions of senior leadership and policy analysis must be set, enacted, and reported on. Currently senior leaders are appointed in an ad hoc with no visible support and mentoring in a dedicated and transparent manner.
 - e) Make it a requirement for police to publish annual statistics of the leadership development and appointment of Maori Pacific and Ethnic persons in Police.
 - f) Provide additional personnel resources and a larger budget for Maori Pacific and Ethnic Services at Police National Headquarters to oversee ethnic communities nationally. The ethnic area of policing must keep pace with the changing demographics and so must leadership, resourcing and budget for this area.
 - g) Establish dedicated trainers for Ethnic communities at the Police College at a senior manager level. Review why the Police College did not have dedicated trainers for Ethnic communities in the lead up to and post 15 March 2019.
 - h) Establish Police Ethnic Liaison officers in every police District in New Zealand with a consistency in rank. Larger cities and regions with large

former refugee and migrant populations should have additional ethnic liaison roles.

- i) Establish Police Ethnic Advisory boards in every police district with representatives from the community.
- j) Conduct an Inquiry as to why the 20 Ethnic liaison officers that was provided to the New Zealand Police by the last government did not have the positions filled. Where did these roles go and why were they changed to fill other liaison and police roles? The inquiry must investigate why the Christchurch Police specifically did not have their two ethnic liaison roles filled for a considerable period of time in the lead up to and post 15 March and why their Ethnic advisory board had not met during the lead up to and post 15 March 2019.
- k) Ensure the Police National Security and Counter Terrorism Group (NSCTG) and National Security and Intelligence Threats (NSIT) group has sufficient independent oversight and not overstep its mandate in targeting minority communities unfairly. Ensure it sticks to its role of national security and not blur and overstep its role by conducting community engagement and securitising engagement to gather intelligence and target minority communities. Engagement and partnerships should be left to other specialised police groups not NSCTG and NSIT.
- l) Advise the police to develop all training regarding Muslim and other minority communities in partnership with those communities and not by Intelligence analysts who have no relationship with those communities.
- m) Remove the Police Distance Learning Course cost (\$715) and include a pro rata bursary for students from migrant and refugee backgrounds or with financial hardship during the 12-week course to achieve existing recruitment diversity goals. A barrier to entry for potential recruits from migrant and refugee backgrounds is that it may be significantly more difficult to work full time and study part time, and that these potential recruits may take longer than the estimated 12-15 hours per week to complete the coursework.




- 33) **Empower staff with resources, and capacitate** the NZIC and Police to deliver effective initial and regular ongoing training to uphold the highest standards of ethical integrity and professional conduct, and to unlearn implicit and explicit biases.
- 34) **Include** "racial equality implications" and "superdiversity perspective" in the key requirements of a general Cabinet paper under other implications sections in addition to existing human rights implications, gender implications, and disability perspective. Create a tool to assist Cabinet decision-making to examine how superdiversity and racial equality are affected by Government action modelled on Bringing Gender In.
- 35) **Declare** the United Nations Committee on Racial Discrimination competent to receive and consider individual communications under Article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
- 36) **Accelerate** the Alliance of Civilizations New Zealand Implementation Plan at the local, national, regional, and global levels.
- a) Commit resources to funding measures towards our stated objectives in the areas of education, youth, media, and migration.
 - b) Direct MFAT to elevate the UNAOC and interfaith and intercultural dialogue at the regional and global levels as a priority area for Peace, Rights, and Security.

Nationhood

- 37) **Analyse** and develop capacity programmes to eliminate root structural causes of alienation and polarisation. These could include anomie, alienation, un(der)employment, inequality, poverty, isolation, anxiety, depression, drug and alcohol addiction, violence, the disintegration of communities and families, and the devaluation of cultural and faith traditions. These are the main drivers of polarisation and radicalisation in the hypermodern world.
- 38) **Engage** in a national programme to enhance the inclusive, global, postcolonial, multicultural, multifaith national identity for Aotearoa New Zealand – a common sense of “who we are” as a nation that makes true the Prime Minister’s powerful statement that “this is not us”.²⁷⁴
- a) Funding to the Ministry for Culture and Heritage (including sport and recreation) for nation-building should increase. We need to tell our stories and share our unique perspectives on events. Our creative people from our diverse artistic and cultural traditions, and our ethnically and religiously diverse sportspeople, will define our nation in the twenty-first century.
 - b) Post-Christchurch and in the wider social, historical, and geographical context of the post-settlement period of Crown-Māori relations, the Pacific reset, and the Asian century, nation-building should be the top priority for the Minister of Arts and Culture and Ministers holding other relevant portfolios such as Trade, Foreign Affairs, Sport and Recreation, Ethnic Communities, and Te Arawhiti.
 - c) Government should work with iwi leaders, business leaders, and civil society to reconstruct our national identity and reject societal and economic closure, xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, and Islamophobia.
- 39) **Memorialise** 15 March.
- a) Officially commemorate 15 March as a National Day of Prayer and Reflection.

²⁷⁴ The Listener (March 20, 2019) “If ‘This is not New Zealand’, let us show it then” The Listener.

<https://www.noted.co.nz/currently/social-issues/christchurch-shooting-this-is-not-new-zealand-let-us-show-it/>



- b) Allocate funding to the Ministry for Culture and Heritage to finance the production of public art and cultural events to commemorate the martyrs and learn from the attack.
- 40) **Set and enforce** minimum standards of ethical integrity, professional conduct, and democratic discourse across all agencies and levels of government.
- a) Demagoguery degenerates democracy, creating polarisation and instability. FIANZ believes that setting and enforcing minimum standards for public officials and candidates for public office is demonstrably justified for the maintenance of a free and democratic society against forces of polarisation and instability.
- b) Public officials (elected or appointed) and candidates for public office in an established democracy should be expected to model the highest standards of ethical integrity, professional conduct, and democratic public reason, so setting and enforcing minimum standards is reasonable.
- c) Therefore, FIANZ proposes amendments to:
- i) The Cabinet Manual to prohibit racial and religious discrimination in relation to the Conduct of Ministers.
 - ii) The Standing Orders of the House of Representatives to create a mechanism for censuring Members whose speech constitutes racial or religious discrimination below the lower limit of democratic discourse on matters such as immigration, international relations, trade, foreign investment, and security and intelligence.
 - iii) The State Services Commission's Code of Conduct for the State Services to prohibit racial and religious discrimination in relation to Standards of Integrity and Conduct.
 - iv) The Local Government Act 2002 to mandate that local authorities prohibit racial and religious discrimination in their Code of Conduct.
 - v) The Electoral Act 1993 to make campaigning on a platform of racial or religious discrimination, intolerance, or hatred, including calls for deportation ("remigration", "repatriation", "go home"); internment; violence; genocide; social exclusion; revoking New Zealand citizenship or revoking the full and equal rights of citizenship; a disqualifying

offence (in addition to any other criminal offence). Complaints would be referred by interested parties to the Electoral Commission, who would determine whether the disqualifying offence had been committed, and this decision could be appealed in court.

- 41) **Call on** religious leaders to continually denounce and delegitimise all forms of extremism, racism, xenophobia, and related intolerance in line with the United Nations Durban Declaration s.211. Leaders should feel compelled as morally upright people, defenders of faith, and as New Zealanders to spread the universal message of "peace, human dignity, and the sanctity of life".
- 42) **Review** Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and other forms of racial and religious discrimination, intolerance, and hatred in all New Zealand's political movements and parties.




Information

- 43) **Intervene** in the information ecosystem, to inform domestic, regional, and global publics, and counter disinformation and misinformation during our age of uncertainty and change.
- a) Turn Aotearoa New Zealand into a regional and global information hub for the Asian century by establishing a global non-commercial news and current affairs channel as part of the proposed RNZ-TVNZ merger.
 - b) Leverage our dynamic comparative advantage in indigenous and Pacific newsgathering, storytelling, and reporting, and our nation's credibility, to build the organisation into the Aljazeera, CNN, or BBC of the Asia-Pacific.
 - c) This capability will broaden and deepen our soft power in the region and globally as the centre of geopolitical gravity pivots to the Indo/Asia-Pacific, and will enable Aotearoa to project our national identity and values.
 - d) This investment in our soft power capabilities would balance our multibillion dollar defence investments in hard power upgrades.²⁷⁵
 - e) Producing high quantities of high quality information is necessary to help populations, business leaders, and political leaders understand, prepare for, and take advantage of the complex regional and global transformations that are causing disorientation, destabilisation, alienation, and polarisation.
- 44) **Increase** public funding for the production of content for television, radio, print, and social media that challenges common stereotypes and exposes audiences to more balanced, positive representations of minority cultures. This includes minority cultures within Aotearoa New Zealand and of the diversity of cultures and religions in the Indo/Asia-Pacific region to which our security and wellbeing are inextricably linked.
- 45) **Campaign** for media literacy and critical thinking to combat the rise of fake news and the viral spread of misinformation and disinformation, including information warfare by hostile state and non-state actors.

²⁷⁵ Ministry of Defence (June, 2019) "Defence Capability Plan" <https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/Defence-Capability-Plan-2019.pdf>

- 46) **Mobilise** civil society, the media, government, and academia to inform public debate and opinion. The careful deliberation of an informed public on the future of our country can preserve the political centre, consensus-based politics, the rule of law, social cohesion, and support for rules-based international order, multilateralism, and open market economics, and prevent the rise of populism, polarisation, authoritarianism, and violent extremism.



Superdiversity

- 47) **Diversify** the public service. Establish set goals and realistic targets to have diversity at all levels of the public service, including senior leadership.
- a) Despite progress toward diversity and inclusion in the public sector, Pākehā are still over-represented as Managers and Policy Analysts.²⁷⁶
 - b) In 2018-2019, during the last round of senior appointments, we witnessed a recycling Chief Executives from one government agency to another, and all new appointments being largely Pākehā for both men and women. Agencies must recruit, develop, and promote ethnically and religiously diverse staff to senior management and policy positions.
 - c) Monitoring and reporting on progress toward diversity and inclusion objectives must identify actions taken to recruit, develop, and promote diverse staff, and disaggregate statistics to show changes over time in the demographics of senior management and policy positions.
 - d) Establish Maori, Pacific and Ethnic Liaison officers (similar to the Police) in all Government agencies.
 - e) Establish benchmarks and targets for building diversity in the Public Service at all levels including senior leadership.
 - f) Conduct a review into the appointments process of Chief Executives and senior leadership teams in the public sector. It is a serious concern that while the State Services Commissioner openly talks about diversity and inclusion and has a diversity and inclusion strategies, that the senior leadership of the public sector is monocultural and male dominated.
 - g) Make targets for diversity and inclusion key performance standards for the State Services Commissioner.
 - h) Conduct a Royal Commission of Inquiry into institutional racism and structural discrimination within the public sector.
 - i) Conduct a review into the Career Boards and the Talent Exchange programme managed by the State Services Commission. The process and


²⁷⁶ <http://ssc.govt.nz/public-service-workforce-data/hrc-diversity>

functionality of the Career Boards and Talent Exchange are opaque. Its boards are predominantly Pākehā, and the career development and progression of minority communities is not keeping pace with the experience and expertise required for working with Aotearoa New Zealand's changing demographics.

- j) Develop nationwide education and professional development programmes to celebrate Aotearoa NZ's diversity.

48) **Develop** mental health and wellbeing capabilities adapted to the changing needs of our superdiverse society.

- a) FIANZ commends the Government's commitment to additional funding for Canterbury mental health services to help respond to the ongoing impacts of the 15 March terrorist attack. This was an attack on New Zealand. It is critical that the mental health and wellbeing needs of not only survivors, the Muslim community in Christchurch, and Cantabrians (including first responders), but all New Zealanders are met. This includes particularly New Zealand Muslims in other regions that are experiencing trauma, depression, and anxiety ranging in levels of severity. It is also vital that appropriate and accessible mental health and wellbeing services are specifically funded for survivors.
- b) The experience of Muslim mental health experts with our community has shown that, due to social stigmas around mental health, Muslims often refuse to engage in psychotherapeutic interventions. There is a need to investigate culturally and religiously appropriate approaches to mainstream interventions, and effective alternative clinical interventions, such as micronutrients.
- c) Design and implement initiatives through the Ministry of Health to train mental and allied health professionals to become more culturally competent and sensitive to cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences. It is important to understand that one solution that might help one minority group might not be appropriate to another minority group. Mental and allied health practitioners and policy makers must adopt a superdiversity perspective.



- d) Fund social scientific and psychological research on spiritual wellbeing and the protective factors of religion and community, including in the context of counter-terrorism and resilience after a terrorist attack.
 - e) Fund social scientific and psychological research on racism, Islamophobia, right wing extremism, white supremacy, security perceptions and narratives, national identity, and inter-communal hatred, conflict, and dialogue.
 - f) Fund social scientific and psychological research on the determinants of minority mental health and wellbeing.
 - g) Create undergraduate and postgraduate scholarships for Māori, Muslim, and other superdiverse students to enter the mental and allied health professions.
 - h) Encourage professional societies for psychiatry, psychology, counselling, and related therapeutic practices to increase their mentoring and support for Māori, Muslim, and other superdiverse practitioners, and combat any racial and gender discrimination, bullying, and harassment in the sector.
 - i) Actively recruit superdiverse families as foster caregivers for Oranga Tamariki – Ministry of Children to ensure that religious, linguistic, and ethnic minority children in State care are placed with families that can support their mental health and wellbeing.
 - j) Deliver effective initial and regular ongoing training to frontline Government staff across sectors to uphold the highest standards of ethical integrity and professional conduct, and to unlearn implicit and explicit biases. Experiences of discrimination are detrimental to the mental health and wellbeing of clients.
 - k) Provide psychological support for individuals radicalised by RWE ideology to develop stable identities, unlearn biases and group-based misrecognitions, manage violent tendencies, and reintegrate into mainstream society.
- 49) **Elevate** the Office of Ethnic Communities to the Ministry level.
- a) New Zealand's demographic transition is one of the most significant and visible social transformations to result from the 1980s neoliberal restructuring. Yet, we do not have the governance capabilities to manage

the process and ensure social cohesion, justice, and development. It was not until 2000 that the Office of Ethnic Affairs was established, which in 2015 became The Office of Ethnic Communities. The Office is constituted as a third tier business unit within the Department of Internal Affairs, and does not report directly to the Minister for Ethnic Communities. It lacks human and financial resources and credibility with Aotearoa's superdiverse communities. The situation is an omnishambles.

- b) FIANZ recommends that we disestablish the OEC and establish a Ministry for Superdiversity that recognises the intersecting ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identities of people living in Aotearoa New Zealand, including their visa type, refugee status, residency, or citizenship.
- c) With immediate effect, elevate the OEC within the DIA from the Policy, Regulation and Communities branch to the second tier within the organisation. This move would raise the profile of the OEC and make it directly accountable to the Minister for Ethnic Communities.
- d) Conduct an independent review into the Office of Ethnic Communities and its appointments processes for the Director position since 2012, allegations of bullying and harassment by former staff, its failure to act on concerns raised by the Muslim community and their leadership role in the social inclusion work they were designated to lead in 2017 by the State Services Commission.
- e) Ensure that the future Ministry for Superdiversity hires qualified, able, and representative staff with relations, accountability, and mana within Aotearoa's superdiverse communities, and is adequately resourced.
- f) Publish high quality and updated guides and resources for the public and private sectors focussed on multicultural and multifaith equity and inclusion.
- g) Produce a reference guide to New Zealand's superdiverse communities by working closely with faith-based organisations and key stakeholders in our superdiverse communities. This should be updated every five years.
- h) Provide far more comprehensive services to superdiverse communities to inform individuals (in their language, if required) about Aotearoa's legal,



political, and economic system, and socialise individuals into our legal, political, and economic culture and institutions.

- i) Advocate across Government agencies for the collective rights and interests of superdiverse communities.
- j) Be transparent and accountable to superdiverse communities, provide accurate notes of meetings, commit to taking specified actions on issues raised by community leaders and stakeholders, manage expectations, and report progress on issues.
- k) Provide thought leadership and set the standard of best practice on multicultural and multifaith equity and inclusion in the public sector.

50) **Hosting** by the Ministry for Superdiversity of interfaith and multicultural events and create opportunities for dialogue, particularly through culture and sport. Develop nationwide education and professional development programmes to celebrate Aotearoa NZ's diversity.

51) **Establish** Maori, Pacific and Ethnic Liaison officers (similar to the Police) in all Government agencies.

FIANZ Royal Commission Consultations: Dunedin

Held at 6:00 pm on Monday, 2nd December 2019; Castle 1 University of Otago

Agenda:

1. Introduction
2. Presentation of Report
3. Question and Answer Session

Attendees: 25 Attendees		
Question and Answer Session		
Topic	Question/Comments	Answer/Response
Semi-Automatic Guns	<p>What does the process look like once submitted?</p> <p>Only action by the government other than ban semi-automatic police are to ban police – only people to suffer from this are minorities. Does the report touch on this?</p>	<p>Not included in the report. Must consider within the terms of reference – what we are claiming and recommending has to be within the terms of reference</p>
Justice and Capital Punishment	<p>Likes the silver fern design</p> <p>Said start at 6 pm but started at 6:30 pm – please stick to time</p> <p>51 Recommendations – is this coincidence?</p> <p>The second category – social cohesion, justice and development Regarding Justice – I don't see justice in the current law If we want justice, we need capital punishment. Law in NZ is not just</p> <p>Says Muslims need an active role. Capital Punishment is important for deterrence and FIANZ needs to be a leading organization in this</p>	<p>No, not a coincidence</p> <p>Have told them we have taken note of this</p>




	Want capital punishment to be instated – important because of what the Quran says.	
Firearms Process	<p>Referees are not enough; referees are not always honest anyway</p> <p>Says strengthening process in our recommendations is a very general process</p> <p>Need to move on to a new system</p>	<p>Note the terms of reference – look at the current legislation and the enforcement of it</p> <p>Cannot ask for a different system as that would not be within the terms of reference but can talk about enforcement</p> <p>Direct to recommendation 7 in the report</p> <p>Have specifically included though a recommendation for a psychometric assessment and signs of RWE, including on social media</p>
Hate Speech and Freedom of Speech	<p>Some of the wording may be open to misunderstanding –</p> <p>E.g. Criminalizing hate speech; where does freedom of speech sit in this, when are we able to get freedom of expression; how would this apply to us, what about differing opinions</p> <p>Hold our identity – integrate and assimilate; should hold onto our identity</p>	<p>Direct to report (page 86 at the time) – draw line at professing hatred and inciting violence</p> <p>It is possible to identify a limit – but want it to be as low as possible to protect freedom of speech as well</p>
Accessibility to document	<p>Going to change the landscape; will affect our children – should be able to read it</p> <p>Do not feel comfortable basing it on Executive Summary</p>	Worried about leaking premature
	<p>Unkind and unfair to ask a group of young people to take on such a task</p> <p>Aware that the Intelligence Service was meeting with Muslim Community/leaders regularly</p> <p>Were you aware of the context of</p>	

	<p>those conversation? Wanted to know where the threats were</p> <p>If we are looking at RWE, also need to look violent left web Which Muslim came up with the statement “they are us” Where are the Muslim people in the conversation?</p> <p>Need to be very careful so that we do not appear as the group that comes to tell them how to live – only been here for 200 years</p> <p>For future reference – FIANZ could have at the beginning of the process included neighbors in the conversation</p> <p>Appears we are blaming the NZ government</p>	<p>Global search but part of our claim</p> <p>IWCNZ’s submission includes a lot of reference</p> <p>Take to page 56 – gendered; women were not considered reliable in their testimony about what they were feeling about their change in environment and hostility Muslim women have been threatened multiple times Directed to Sister Aliya’s difficulties with Police – has been belittled and ridiculed by Police</p> <p>May come across as a bit fiery in presentation, but there is a spirit of wanting to make this place better</p> <p>Explicitly express our gratitude to the government and emergency In future presentations – may need to make it clearer</p>
	<p>Acknowledging the government is good but need to have some accountability</p> <p>Jacinda was here for an hour but it was people outside of leadership, and the wider community</p>	<p>Acknowledge missing in NZ</p>
<p>NZIC</p>	<p>How much input does the DPMC get from the experts in intelligence services?</p>	<p>We make that recommendation – existing mechanism, SSRP (critical friend) We criticize them – say they fail to do their job, say that their necessary response so that the changes in</p>



		<p>culture and in security intelligences happen, need right people sitting on that table, and make sure some of the abuses that we have seen in the years have been looked into</p> <p>Need to have better people sitting at that table – need people from Muslim community too</p> <p>Say it has a power, but we argue it needs a bit more people and we need a diversity of perspective</p>
<p>Recommendation 46: Memorialize March 15</p>	<p>Asking because got an email from FIANZ with regards to this</p> <p>Is it just for 15 march? This is not the first tragedy that has happened in NZ</p> <p>What is your intention regarding recommendation 46?</p> <p>Another person raises issues about whether this recommendation is Islamic – said we need to ask whether it is in accordance with</p>	<p>This memorization and memory politics is becoming a focal point in politics – have gained a lot of political traction in recent years</p> <p>Reiterating an independent initiative –recognize March 15 as a National Day of Prayer and reflection; came from Mormon community Say it covers everybody</p> <p>Something happened that matters; lives lost not forgotten</p> <p>Opened floor to ask for any further suggestions?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. One person said that they would not do anything to memorialize March 15 2. Another person raised the concern that even if we would want the day to be inclusive, because it is March 15th, it would become inherently exclusive 3. Putting it on that date, focuses it only on victims of March 15 band takes away any other event in NZ <p>Made a note to ask Scholars that are coming to the focus group meeting</p>

	Islam. From his understanding, it is not	
Islamic Scholars	Asking for clarification about whether we have asked scholars	No, but have them attending Focus Group Meeting and can ask then
Islam and Report	<p>Importance of integration – although not expecting anyone to sell ourselves out regarding our values, and although respect it must pass test of Islam disagree with some things</p> <p>But some things might not be considered 100% Islam and should be included and some things are some things find basis in Islam but should not be included</p> <p>Provides example of Capital Punishment – says it might be a bridge too far that might not be achievable as an outcome</p>	
Capital Punishment	<p>This person has been directly affected and asks for justice to prevail</p> <p>Says we need best law to deter future attacks</p> <p>Gives example of repeated killing, says it is common in NZ</p> <p>Gives example of a criminal being let out of jail and then committing same crime – says here the law is responsible for the second killing</p> <p>Says NZ law is not just</p> <p>Saying if this report is for better future, then we need to look at whether NZ law is just</p> <p>NZ law will not be perfect unless it is in regard with God’s law</p> <p>Says not enough effort from community – no response from FIANZ regarding capital punishment</p>	



Process for consultation	Recommendation to provide at least the executive summary beforehand	
Capital Punishment	<p>Says if it goes out it as it is, it will make NZ better – if goes out with recommendations like capital punishment, it will not make it better for Muslims. If it is included it will make the report not represent me</p> <p>More Muslim, more brown men will be affected by this law than any white criminal in NZ – brown men always receive harsher sentences than white man – statistics show this</p> <p>Always regarding the context of the crime – says in the context of NZ</p>	Report has a limited purpose – need to look at it and see what we can do with the opportunity we have, the scope we have and how we can use this most effectively
Purpose of Document	Suggests the document is healing document	
Politics	<p>Should not be used by party to win election over politics</p> <p>Good thing about RCI is that its not about the political parties</p>	
Recommendation No 31	<p>Recommendation No. 31 – wants to see how we will argue it</p> <p>Need to see it from a lay person's point of view – what does this mean for me?</p>	<p>Take them to report</p> <p>Also include specific recommendations about hate crime.</p> <p>Talk about giving more powers to the HRC</p>


FIANZ ROYAL COMMISSION CONSULTATIONS: CHRISTCHURCH

**Held at 6:00 pm on Tuesday 3rd December 2019; Bishopdale Community Centre
(started late- 6:35 pm)**

Agenda:


1. Introduction
2. Presentation of Report
3. Question and Answer Session

Attendees: 23 Attendees		
Question and Answer Session		
Topic	Question/Comments	Answer/Response
Frustration to do with the autopsy/handling of the body after the attack	Why was there such poor handling of the bodies after the attack?	Another Royal Commission to inquire afterwards (the aftermath of the attack) ... Different Terms of References?
Gun License	<p>Did the shooter get the gun license within 5 weeks of coming to NZ or 5 days?</p> <p>7/12/2017 he got his license... 2018 was in Pakistan FOR TRAINING... police approval was 11/12/2017</p>	<p>We will investigate this (check if 5 days or 5 weeks) and make changes if needed.</p> <p>Clarified... application for firearms license took 4 days. – NEED TO FIND OUT ABOUT THE PROCESS AND AVERAGE TIME THAT THE PROCESS TAKES OF THE STANDARD AMMUNITION LICENSE</p> <p>NEED TO LOOK AT THE COUNTRIES PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TO, NOT JUST THEIR OVERT IDENTITIES. – We need to look at behaviours, rather than the identities.</p>




Recommendations	51 points that are being proposed. Are they short like in the executive summary? Or are they in detail?	Some are short and snappy, and others provide the actual steps when we think that it is important to spell out. E.g. de-securitizing Muslims. We provide some context and reasoning and then steps that government can take to achieve that.
Criteria/priority of recommendations	What criteria are the 51 points based on? Are they based on research? Or from the community? Could it be less than 51 points that were more in detail	The research was robust, and the level of detail was what we thought was the level of think tanks. That's the level of reasoning, detail etc.
Follow up question on Recommendations.	Is there any overlap between the 51 recommendations?	The 51 points are interrelated and interdependent
Mental Health	Is there anything related to the mental health of the people affected?	We haven't included anything about this in the report. Part of that is due to the response from the government.
Ammunition and Gun License	07/12/2017 got a license and ammunition, and in 2018 was in Pakistan for training. Had a visa to go to Pakistan and entered back to NZ. Had this approved in 4 days?	Find out the process and the average time taken to approve the standard ammunition, firearms etc... Raises questions with customs. Asked "Do you look at the countries that they go to? Or their overt identity?" Important to look at the behaviours and not the identities.
Ammunition	Should be looking at data sets of ammunition purchased, and when visiting countries.	
Vetting Process for Gun License	Are they using non-sworn members for police? As they are using non-	Terms of reference limit what we can recommend. We commend the

	sworn... they don't have the means to identify risk factors	new vetting process in firearms reform. What we can do is talk to members of the administration
Behaviours of Travel	They should have questioned him based on his history of travel.	
Polices Operational limitations	An article recently published highlights that the police couldn't focus on operational matters because they have been focusing on the Muslims. Operationally they have had to sacrifice a few things because of focusing more on other things.	Would be interested to see the article- get the link
Leaked Letters from Prison	The letter that has gone to the media is more threat to Muslims. Because instead of going to one person it has gone out to many.	
NIP	Clarification on NIP (National Intelligence setting process) sought	DPMC is a core part of the government. Governs our wellbeing and security. The executives that fill the top positions of DPMC are apolitical appointees that come from the governing class. The people will often stay in place after a change of government -> provides continuity. Analysts are bureaucratic employees
Colonisation	Institutionally racist. Challenge the mindsets. Looking at 600 years old. Based on white supremacy or white rights. The assumptions that the organisations make haven't been examined in 600 years. With 5 eyes, the US is at the top. When will NZ realise that this intelligence is not in our favour?	Few things we can do to mitigate this. Diversity in the institutions. Particularly at senior positions. Still, there is a culture of diversity. Inquire into institutional racism, DO with evidence, to drive real change. Young black man murdered by a gang of white supremacist; Police botched case. Inquiry into police failure. The finding of the report was that the police were institutionally racist. This kind of inquiry has more



		<p>power to investigate. Put people into SRRC. Should have increased powers.</p> <p>Further points Ways to mitigate:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Question of diversity within these institutions... particularly at the senior levels... solve the question of diversity 2. Inquire into institutional racism into NZIC (by royal commission or inspector general)... do with evidence... but not enough evidence to drive a real change... e.g murder of Stephen Lawrence (e.g police were institutionally racist... explained their behaviour to handle the case correctly) 3. Risks that business, as usual, will continue as normal... by putting people on SRRP... who made up of people whose job it is to be friends to OEDSCG- this board should have increased powers and be more inclusive
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Christchurch Community	In Christchurch, we are often not listened to e.g. with the earthquakes. Due to refusal to look at EQC, how did we perform? The same thing should apply to this	We hope to do the best job at this. This is why we are inquiring with all of you.
A repeat of 15th March	Do you reckon what happened on 15 march will happen again?	Timeline of 40 attacks has already happened... we need to do something in order to stop this chain from continuing.
Prisoner Rights	With the mail, he has rights to have visitors, phone calls once the court case is finished.	We can't do much in our capacity but can talk to Mustafa Farouk.
RWE vs Islamic Extremism	There is a lot of talk about RWE, but there are also risk groups e.g. nutters that could comprise of a lot of different people including RWE. Are we going to miss all the nutters in between RWE and Islamic extremism	What we talk about is de-securitisation of Islam and re-securitisation of terrorism. There are extremes on each of the spectrums. We are not here to say the extreme right, or extreme lefts, 1080 extremists, single extremists etc. we just want to name the threats for what they are. Annual terrorism report is so much better than what is in NZ. It analyses and names different threats.
RWE	Issues with skinheads. I would assume that as a Nzer that RWE was being looked at due to that error.	RWE is a persistently evolving threat. There was never a drop off in the actuality of the threat, but there was a drop off on the focus due to the securitisation of Islam.
Aspirations vs Realistic Goals	From talking 1 on 1 with the community. I understand that we are looking for a utopia here, is it really realistic. I'm not racist to you, we all have something that we group people of different races. Is the utopia something that is possible?	We had a look into this, and whether we were steering in the right direction.



FIANZ Royal Commission Consultations: Wellington

Held at 6:00 pm on Wednesday 4 December 2019; Victoria University

Agenda:

1. Introduction
2. Presentation of Report
3. Question and Answer Session

Attendees: 60 Attendees		
Question and Answer Session		
Topic	Question/Comments	Answer/Response
Media	<p>Haven't seen the 51 points.</p> <p>Because the royal commissions' role is quite big, they should get a hold of the media and not only the government, due to the role that they have played.</p> <p>E.g. not saying an attack perpetrated by a white person is not extremism.</p> <p>Rebecca can't be blamed because due to the effects of the media, and that the minute you talk about extremism, you immediately think of Islam.</p>	<p>51st recommendation relates to what you have said but could be more specific. Can list these specific points under it.</p>
Islamophobic Culture	<p>Not just the media – but the culture in NZ that is categorizing Muslim this way,</p> <p>Seen it in through school when did not want to be seen as a stereotype, but then also saw it later years in work and career where examples of hate comments and racist remarks were made as jokes and it was considered okay – Muslims have almost become immune of not</p>	<p>Good response. Have looked into more than media. Politicians are also contributing. Following 2017 London attacks, Winston Peters comment that we need to hand these monsters in, it starts with their own families.</p>

	<p>reacting back to this</p> <p>Victoria St bomb scare – everyone was taken outside of the offices and it was a simple joke someone said “call your people to make sure we are okay – you will protect us”</p> <p>When you hear simple jokes like this, you become immune to it, do not know how to react to it, it is not just the media, but it shows that the youth are taught</p> <p>It is a big issue that we need to look further into</p> <p>Need to educate everyone who we are and what we bring to the table, and its more than the media and what we teach to kids. It’s not an overnight process.</p> <p>Says it is not okay for her daughter to grow up in a society where this is the norm</p> <p>It is not just the media, but it is a big culture that needs to shift</p>	
Politicians	<p>Says there has been an enormous amount of information (a bit overloaded, but not a criticism) in terms of the presentation</p> <p>Looking at Pakistani and India politicians – jokes about them having the best media</p> <p>We are all allowed to make mistakes and they stuffed it up (e.g. police, intelligence). We cannot measure the tragedy that has happened. We do not want to create a phobia of RWE in our own community. Do not want to give the impression that islamophobia is coming for them, like that has been seen in other countries.</p>	<p>Have anticipated your concern but do try to frame this positively in the report</p> <p>Refer to the 51-point program of our report</p>



	<p>The reaction of the public in Porirua (where I am from) has been great. Don't want to give them the impression that we are this and they are that.</p>	
Perception of Islam	<p>Islam is still looked at the way the crusades are looked at, but we do continue to work</p>	
Language and tone of the report	<p>Commend a comprehensive report and trying to take everyone's views</p> <p>One thing would like point out – the document when you first start reading it is does come across as quite accusatory</p> <p>As psychiatrist, think about perception – need to think about this when it comes to RC; will cause them to put up defences and barriers</p> <p>What we do not want to have automatic barriers to come up, we want to create dialogue</p> <p>Just the initial statement point is a little provocative and confronting.</p> <p>But when look at 51-point program it is good but just the first bit is confronting and a little provocative</p>	<p>Our document needs to be positive</p> <p>But we will do this the Muslim way – as we have an issue and should talk to them first, so they have the opportunity to explain things. We will go talk to the people directly, including Rebecca Kitteridge who has agreed to this. Will also do this with NZP</p> <p>Will be seeing the agencies one to one</p> <p>We ask them “what changes should we make?”</p> <p>Not make it as confronting – language is a very powerful tool and can bring people together but can also divide people. It is something to consider.</p>
Monitoring RWE	<p>Not comfortable saying that if they were looking at RWE, they would have picked this up</p> <p>Platforms RWE is on is very fast moving and filled primarily with nonsense, satire and memes – it's just a very difficult to look at</p> <p>There is one thing to look in the right direction, but also about looking in the right way</p>	<p>Refer to recommendations</p> <p>What these agencies are supposed to do is keep up to date with these sorts of developments.</p> <p>It isn't like they haven't tried in regards to Muslims and Islamic terrorism.</p> <p>Cannot say they would have but can look at the probabilities</p> <p>They were looking at the Muslim equivalents</p>

		<p>Note that the only 2 convictions in NZ were for distributing objectionable content. There is a whole section that is supposed to be looking at online content.</p> <p>The online community is real, and the role of the security services is there.</p> <p>The only person he got for his verification were two people (this is an online community that is real) which is what we are trying to point out</p>
Securitization of Islam following March 15	<p>Wanted to express about the securitization that we noticed after 15 March – cannot be specific but more about how I felt</p> <p>Was down in Christchurch after the attack for a week, and it felt immediately that there was an authority response about the possibility of a Muslim backlash – it came up that they had to make sure this did not happen</p> <p>If it had not been for the public and their overwhelming warmth or people in the media that had positive messages, then an alternative narrative would've taken over</p>	<p>Did feel it too</p> <p>Looked at white reverts as people they looked at as being a potential “revenger attacker”</p> <p>Had 51 people die and still had to worry about Muslim backlash and revenge attacks</p> <p>We do want to work with police etc to solve these problems. But don't want to be spoken to right after there has been an attack on us, about us being the attackers again.</p>
School/Young Children	<p>What about school children and how they feel about this?</p> <p>e.g. My friend was playing with some kiwi children, and said she wanted to adopt her. And the 4-year-old girl said no you can't because we are not of the same culture.</p> <p>We need to teach children in school about different cultures, not just Islam., so that people know about different cultures and religions</p>	<p>It is perfectly possible for white people to be anti-racist.</p> <p>Small bit, whereas large part is on policies etc.</p>



	<p>Bad people are everywhere. Terrorists are not from Islam. Islam doesn't teach that at all. Important to teach young children and take care of young minds.</p>	
Wording in Summary	<p>Said "lack of diversity in NZIC, especially in senior levels"</p> <p>This line it is making it sound like the issue is on people rather than policy</p> <p>Are we focusing on the people and not the policy?</p> <p>Are we looking at action behaviour rather than racial profiling?</p>	Yes we are looking at the people
NZIC is racist and Islamophobic	Mentioned NZIC is Islamophobic and racist – very strong claim. Is it evidence based?	Making sure it is evidence based but are also being inclusive and going through a lot of editorial processes
Level of evidence	<p>NZ is exemplary in the way it has reacted including this process</p> <p>Have an issue with saying the NZIC is institutionally racist and Islamophobic – as a scientist, need evidence as scientist</p>	<p>Refer them to page 7 of the NZSIS annual report. In that report para 6, line 4 says several Muslims have been arrested and convicted for crimes related to terrorism.</p> <p>Note the definition for several means more than 2 but there were only 2 people, not several</p> <p>Head of security (Cheryl Gwenn) herself criticized NZSIS for all the mistakes they made, and jihadi bride saga. Jihadi point they had to apologise as it was incorrect. We are going by public documents and official documents. We are not blaming anybody, we are saying let's have a look at it.</p> <p>In terms of kind of evidence, it wouldn't be the same as scientific evidence. We have agreed that we have not met the evidential</p>

		<p>requirement (we are not accusing because that is another level, that is a legal framework)</p> <p>This is a hypothesis we want the Royal Commission to investigate with the power they have – suggesting the RC looks at it or the IGIS looks into</p>
Diversity and inclusion strategies	<p>Husband is Muslim but I am not – brought my friend. I am impressed by comprehensiveness of the report</p> <p>When have evidence can say that institutions can be racist and Islamophobic</p> <p>Everyone has family who have experience of Islamophobic and racism. It does not have to be this way</p> <p>Aware of thorough work that Wellington Council does not have a multicultural or diversity strategy and do not have a Muslim on their board, but have not tried to get one because worried about tokenism</p> <p>Australia has better policy about multiculturalism and inclusion – we need to do better</p>	
Meaning of Surah	<p>What is in report is important (based on experiences) – not a personal attack, cannot have an anti-racist and inclusive board or organization without any diversity. People want to do it, but it cannot be done</p> <p>As someone who is not religious and does not know much about religion – have surah here but does not make sense to me. Could have a beautiful effect, something that is spiritual and would be good for non-Muslims too and could resonate with them</p>	<p>We do not want the Eurocentric view of martyrs that they are dead. Rather in Islam the Quran says that they are alive and with God.</p> <p>Note: This is not the one she is referring to, as she is pointing to the one in the Executive Summary (regarding everything happens because it is in the Qadar of Allah) and that surah explained above is in the full report.</p>



Differences in Muslim Experiences – Recommendations	<p>Great presentation and it is great that the securitization theory is included too as I study political science.</p> <p>Skimmed through 51 people – Just wondering whether you have found differences in Muslim experience (such a diverse background, refugees, migrants, languages, socio-economic class)</p> <p>Do recommendations include a higher level of support for those who have less of a social support (E.g. Muslims in rural areas etc) or is it the same level of support for everyone</p>	You are correct and we have to include this, and have to bring the whole community together
Recommendation for youth	<p>The idea that we need to busy youth up as they can easily be recruited</p> <p>An important point that should be looked at</p>	<p>Refer to recommendation</p> <p>Important 51 point about school children – PM has been wonderful The way forward, we need to revamp the whole history curriculum. PM has taken this up and has been revamped.</p> <p>Who is going to write our history from our community?</p>
Inclusion	<p>After Sept 11, met with staff to say must have inclusion in investigation group[s]</p> <p>Going to make it open for others to come in</p> <p>Make sure they have noticed</p> <p>Police woman in Auckland did not tell she was Muslim because was worried they would not accept her</p> <p>Primary curriculum – about teacher whether they</p>	Mustafa – victim, wants to be Police Officer
Hate Crime	Do not have hate crime statistics	One of the only countries that don't record hate crime data, and therefore

<p>Hate Crime</p>	<p>Psychology and Sociology study – hate speech and hate crime Looked at it in context</p> <p>Share a personal incident – was on bus, with hijabi refugee. Was discriminated against heavily. Someone told them to get off the bus. There were about 20 people in the bus. Said don't use Arabic. Basically, first time experiencing this.</p> <p>She was upset we were speaking Arabic</p> <p>Someone else said “don't worry, she's mentally ill”</p>	<p>Not alone in incident – has happened far too often. It is about time we started looking into hate crimes.</p> <p>Looked into Royal Commission report – number 19...hate crime data should be noted and recorded easily.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Do this through the law - Do this through the media - FAIR – reporting islamophobia ... we want to be able to give detailed reports about hate crime to the public <p>Sometimes people do not want to talk to police... usually have an advocate</p>
<p>Racism and Unconscious Bias</p>	<p>Fine line between racism and unconscious bias – that something that cannot change because that is human nature</p> <p>Goes both ways from us towards them</p> <p>Muslim community needs to come out of victim mentality</p>	
<p>Legal System is soft</p>	<p>Supportive of the point that the legal system and enforcement in NZ is very soft – even if taken to police, not taken seriously</p> <p>Had an incident where every article about March 15 had been placed in her mother's letterbox</p> <p>Whether you take it to the police or an official (someone higher than you) – I don't think anything would have happened from it.</p> <p>These comments/actions cannot be taken lightly.</p> <p>Police said go ask the neighbors. Have to deal with it as ourselves</p>	

Tone of Report	Think the first line does need to be aggressive and confronting about it – has gone on for too long and NZ is too soft. Needs to be told like this.	
Islamophobia as a global narrative	<p>This Islamophobic narrative is a global narrative – NZ was in a false sense of security and have been exploited because of that. We now have to confront it.</p> <p>If say NZIC agencies are Islamophobic., we are looking at a global picture as we are part of the 5 eyes</p> <p>Need to tell them to make our country secure, we need to act in slightly distinct ways from the 5 eyes approach</p>	



FIANZ ROYAL COMMISSION CONSULTATIONS: PALMERSTON NORTH


Held at 6:00 pm on Thursday 5th December 2019; Manawatu Islamic Centre

Agenda:

1. Introduction
2. Presentation of Report
3. Question and Answer Session

Attendees: 27 Attendees		
Question and Answer Session:		
Topic	Questions/ Comments	Answer/Response
Customs and Border Control	We should look at customs and border control as a source of intelligence as well. If the terrorist was going overseas	We have mentioned these as part of the broader intelligence community in the report.
Medias portrayal of RWE	The media is not treating RWE as extremism as they are with Muslims. I can understand that the media should have the freedom to present what they want, but they also have a responsibility to present information accurately and without bias.	We have mentioned the role of media in the recommendations.
Gun License	Referees - Relative or friend as referees regarding the gun license. If the friend has the same thoughts as the person who is applying for the license, then it is easy to manipulate the license. The person should be able to prove why they need a gun better. E.g. prove hunting is a hobby etc.	We want to strengthen the firearms vetting process. There needs to be a much higher threshold to see if they are fit and proper. Include psychometric assessment etc. See recommendation 7

Follow up on Gun License	If someone has a gun because they used to be a farmer, or hunter etc. If the person sells his farm and is no longer a farm etc. If there is a change in the situation, they should also recheck the need for the firearm.	We will take this into account. Relates to recommendation 8.
Mental Health	Mental health checks for people applying for firearms	Can add to recommendation 7
Gun License notification	If a person is holding a gun and has a license, they should notify neighbours etc. This is so that if they notice any unusual/suspicious activities, they can call the police.	This can be a good thing and a bad thing, as this may make the people living nearby uncomfortable.
Gun License Referee	A person such as from a church, mosque, employer etc. (someone of standing in their community)	Good idea to include as possibly the second referee. Will look into.



FIANZ ROYAL COMMISSION CONSULTATIONS: HAMILTON

Held at 6:00 pm on Friday 6th December 2019; Hamilton Jamia Masjid; Claudelands, Hamilton 3214

Agenda:

1. Introduction
2. Presentation of Report
3. Question and Answer Session

Attendees: 53 Attendees		
Question and Answer Session:		
Topic	Questions/ Comments	Answer/Response
Recommendations	Recommendations in exec summary Need to be more specific	That is just the summary – recommendations themselves have parts to them which have reasoning and changes
Gun License and Ammunition	Why was the person allowed to buy so many weapons and ammunition? Why was the person selling not investigated?	This was done legally. One of our recommendations is for large quantities or unusual sales to be reviewed.
Hate Crime	About criminalising hate crime, it is already a criminal act. Are you recommending higher sentencing?	Hate crime legislation should be reviewed by the law commission. Should look at aggravator factors in sentencing etc..
Hate Crime recommendations implication on Muslim Community	Point 43: put our imams in jail by using this Especially when we have the rainbow community	Under hate speech category, it is vital that our religious speech is protected. We differentiate between hate speech and discussion. It is important to discuss minority

		views etc. but seek to do so without harm to individuals.
Follow up on Hate Crime and definition	However, you define it, allows Brian Tamaki to say what he does about Muslims	Don't want to see Uncle Mustafa's face on the next letter they send out. Particular context is important.
Follow up	Comment: When you tighten the hate speech laws, they are used against Muslims	
Deadline / Time Frame	Time frame. Quite hard to make recommendations, as it may already be in the report. What is the deadline	Not fixed. The editorial process will happen this Sunday. If you can get it in this Sunday that's good. However final part will be for FIANZ
Monitoring Recommendation Progress	The first part for police etc. is easy. The second part is important, e.g. social cohesion, media etc. The social cohesion is the hardest part. A lot of the parts I hadn't even thought about etc.	Before we state 51 recommendations, we say these signs of progress which would initially be made by the RC needs to be monitored and assessed by a committee FIANZ, HRC and IWCNZ and others need to be sitting at that committee Recommendation zero – monitored and accessed.
Definition of terrorism	How are we defining terrorism? How do we expand the definition of terrorism? - Practical measures by NZ govt so that across the board that the common NZ citizens understand that terrorism is a	- In the terrorism repression act 2002, we have an official definition of terrorism – violence motivated by any political, religious, or ideological cause.



	<p>wider term. What steps can the government take to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We are part of 5 eyes. In terms of global intelligence, is there any recommendations to deal with global intelligence such as training? - The effect of the terrorist on certain individuals e.g. the manifesto. Is there any way to restrict access or make them less attracted to seeking out this information. - Prioritise the 51 points instead of just a list. - Online preventive surveillance should be there. 	<p>There is no sense the Islam is the ideal type or the statistical norm.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Talk about de-securitisation of Islam. Talk about better representation. - We know about institutionalised racism in schools etc. and we have to work to sort this out. - In our school the biggest issue that children identify is racism. - Have had a look at international examples, based on the McPherson inquiry in the UK. This was pivotal on race relations. We don't agree that there are too many, but we do agree that some need to be championed.
<p>Follow up a comment on Terrorism</p>	<p>Although global, we are asking for govt to seek some measures – talk more conclusively about what steps can be used to</p> <p>NZ is part of the big 5 global intelligence exchange, what</p>	<p>-</p>

	recommendations have been made in regard to this (As we cannot remain isolated)	
Comment on radicalisation	Concrete measures are taken by govt for people who are attracted to content such as manifesto to reduce this attraction e.g. an awareness campaign by govt about what Islam	
Policy and Prioritising recommendations	Provide more of a road map on high priority recommendations, and not leave it for them to set it up. If we detail it then they can lift it, rather than leaving it for their own interpretations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We agree. Will talk about it in the future. - Looked at international examples - McPherson inquiry into the murder of Steven Lawrence - Not an analogy but similarities - The outcome of inquiry came up with 72 recommendations - Well within the normal range when it comes to RC. Other examples with similar numbers - But do agree some need to be flag shipped and prioritised - But all 51 are necessary
Measuring progress on Recommendations	Having roadmap/milestones on how we want to see NZ in 2020, 2025 etc. This will make the government more	More suited for the steering committee



	accountable etc.	Could include a timeline of milestones in that recommendation
Monitoring threat levels	IWCNZ statement on levels of a threat going back up. Is there anything about continuously monitored so that immediate action can take place.	<p>An obligation on police. Police are trained in identifying hate crime, even if the victim doesn't identify it. Need to continuously monitor to access level.</p> <p>Further notes Yes. E.g. create a hate crime register that will make it an obligation on Police to categorise crimes, even if the victim does not report as a hate crime</p> <p>If it factors in as hate crime, then they should record it as a hate crime</p> <p>Hence they need to record information on the perpetrators of hate crime</p>
Recommendations	The 51 recommendations. Are they add to what the government is already proposing to change? OR are they outside of this, as 51 new recommendations.	<p>The terms of reference prevent recommendations on gun laws, and therefore we cannot change this.</p> <p>There are other things that the government are doing in regard to hate speech etc.</p> <p>What we are doing is making sure the government hears our angle on the changes they want to make.</p>

<p>Police and Government response to 15th March</p>	<p>Analysis of governments response to the attacks, especially since the manifesto was emailed to everyone. Police arrived 17 mins later in the city centre. Two police from Dunedin picks up the murderer and arrests him. Our emergency report time is 7 mins. The murderer has 2 mothers, and if you review this. Where are we going to lead this, and how will they lead this?</p> <p>I'm sure they understand what has happened.</p> <p>No matter how hard we try, this tyranny has extended till this day and will continue to.</p> <p>We need to put resources towards our own community etc..</p>	<p>We have frustrations with the terms of reference. This doesn't allow us to investigate the response.</p> <p>Why the police hadn't trained for this attack? This was because they weren't looking for terrorist/ RWE. But we can't inquire into their response per se.</p>
<p>Media</p>	<p>What about the media?</p>	<p>Terms of reference do not include the media at all. sir William mentioned media etc. said it is not in the terms of reference, but we are studying it to see any implications.</p> <p>Senior members of the Muslim Community made submissions about the media regardless of Terms of reference</p>
<p>Auckland Incidents</p>	<p>Some incident happened in Auckland about public transport, and not being</p>	<p>He was fired</p>



	accepted on the bus.	
Unity	How come we only (become one community) after the event. Prevention is better than cure. We need to turn hostility into hospitality.	
Government response to 15 th March	What exactly has the government done in the last 9 months to ensure that we are safe here? Is it possible through the media to bring some sort of awareness about Muslims, Islam and other religions also?	The government shouldn't be sitting on their hands. They should be able to already make changes based on their own shortcomings. We are still in an elevated risk environment. We need to know if they would be able to respond better in the case of a copycat attack. About the media. Already in NZ, with Maori and Pacifica, there has already been a representation. This needs to be extended to the rest of the community.
Christchurch call	The Christchurch call to action by Jacinda. I have often thought to myself and investigated the statistics, we are not behind in the IT sector. When single handily, if the Muslims in the IT sector came together. They could make difficult for people to consume and distribute extreme materials.	


FIANZ ROYAL COMMISSION CONSULTATIONS: AUCKLAND

Held at 6:00 pm on Friday 7th December 2019; Auckland University

Agenda:

1. Introduction
2. Presentation of Report
3. Question and Answer Session

Attendees: 67 Attendees		
Question and Answer Session:		
Topic	Questions/ Comments	Answer/Response
Media's role in the securitisation of Islam.	RC PERIMETERS- other state sector agencies apart from police – the NZ media authorities – the reason security forces didn't care about RWE is that the media focuses on Muslims and not RWE. What should the media broadcasting authorities have in stopping this negative categorising of Islam – govt to stop racial qualifications of hate speech – the media negative portrayal of Muslims and the role they play.	<p>the report covered two parts</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Find fault in the relevant state sector agencies – media is off-limits and is out of scope for the terms of reference 2. to make recommendations - however, the recommendations follow the whole of society and govt approach – the scope of the recommendations is wider than the scope of the findings – the recommendations cover the 3 scopes of the finding – the media's part to play in this. <p>The recommendations provide a recommendation on hate speech in an attempt to combat the negative portrayal of Islam.</p> <p>Media is off-limits in terms of</p>



		<p>reference</p> <p>Social cohesion and social development cover the concerns of media etc.</p> <p>A lot of the media caused what happened.</p> <p>The commissioners are taking a wider interpretation of the terms of reference and looking at media – it might not be explicit but they will be attempting to include it.</p>
<p>Recommendations to apply to other communities – not just Muslims</p>	<p>-increasing fairness and equitability for Muslims – putting Muslims in the spotlight and in turn putting ourselves under threat – focus on Muslims on the recommendations</p> <p>Change that is fair but some NZ'ers feel that this focus on Muslims is unfair – how do we go about it in a way that doesn't seem like it's a focus</p>	<p>A lot of the recommendations don't just apply to Muslims. We want to engage with other groups that are affected by marginalisation, racism, discrimination etc.</p> <p>Our approach isn't only to work with central govt but with organisations such as HRC and to enable our Muslim communities to have a space to do that. FAIR is being supported so they can grow as a Muslim program and look out for ourselves – enabling our Muslim communities.</p>

		<p>Holding Muslim communities accountable but also holding Muslims using people as political point-scoring to account too. – holding the politicians to account.</p>
<p>Securitisation of Islam</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Countries that he visited are seen as a threat – are we not generalising what we go through as Muslims due to the securitisation of Islam? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - in response to what Kitteridge said – we have to base these things on behaviours rather than identities – we are not implying it – we are arguing that the securitisation of Islam is what causes this hyper-focus on Muslims. - We are not saying that identity is the issue – we are saying that his actions leading up to travelling to these countries should have triggered alarm bells. Muslim’s travel to these countries recreationally and still get stopped at customs – the terrorist, who is not a New Zealand citizen has all these alarming behaviours (buying 2320 rounds and then



		<p>immediately travelling to these countries) and does not get stopped or questioned. There is a bias in the process in which people are stopped at customs – people are not stopped based on behaviours but rather as a result of their identity. (first part of question missed)</p> <p>- The vast majority of extremism in the US – are perpetrated by RWE – not through Islamic extremism.</p>
51 points	Are the 51 points elaborated on in the report?	Yes.
	<p>One of the parts of the slideshow was that mentions that the terrorist visited Pakistan and Turkey. Why do you think someone is linked to terrorism if someone visits Pakistan and turkey? why do you include that in the submission that they visited these countries? why should this raise red flags?</p>	<p>we need to base these things on behaviour rather than identities...</p> <p>We need to stop securitising Islam and Islamic Countries. Not specific to countries that they travel too</p> <p>- Gets stopped because of their identities rather than their behaviours</p> <p>The fact that he bought 2310 rounds of ammunition and then</p>

	We shouldn't generalise about specific countries ... when we are trying to fight this myth that Muslim majority countries are potential threats for terrorism?	travelled to these countries show behaviours that should raise alarm bells, nothing to do with identity. But because they didn't, do customs only look at Identities?
Subconscious/unconscious bias	Reiterate – the root cause of Muslims is the subconscious hatred of Islam – if the root cause of this hatred is still there – nothing will change. The media is the root cause of this hatred.	the subconscious and conscious bias of Islam – post 9/11, if you look at airport screening, it targets Muslims – a lot of the securitisation of Islam happened post 9/11. In the recommendations, we state that there needs to be an institutional change that is recurring through educational training that is consistent and constant (not just one-off), policy change, workshops, cultural competency training. Media as an implication but not part of the terms of the reference. Media in NZ is privately owned and is out of the scope of the media. Putting it in the appendix means we bring light to it and the govt.
Collaboration and engagement with other non-Muslim communities	How are we working to get together with other religious and minority groups – as at the moment it is mostly Muslims engaging with Muslims?	- we need to come together as Muslims first and break down those barriers before we branch out externally. Work out our issues



		<p>internally before we go out externally</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recommendations; teaching, racial inequalities in cabinet members, forming an open and inclusive, global, post-colonial national identity. - Muslims in New Zealand to Muslims of New Zealand – we are part of this country and see ourselves as kiwis.
Timeline of the attack.	Is the timeline part of the submission.	Yes.
Hate speech recommendations	Why are we recommending for hate speech to be criminalised when it is already recognised in the HRA. The report should focus on points that haven't already been done.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The issue isn't that the crimes aren't in the legislation – they are in the HRA – but they aren't applied appropriately and equally upon people – recommendations on criminalisation. – we do recommend for the proper enforcement of laws but we do want to be clear with our wants - the Human Rights Act does include hate speech (s61(1) – makes illegal speech that is hateful etc

		<p>----- however this provision relates to racial disharmony but not religious intolerance – so the Muslim community is not included in this – our recommendation does state we want to include racial intolerance.</p>
<p>Recommendations regarding the enforcement of the recommendations.</p>	<p>Have we got any recommendations in relation to enforcement?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - We've made specific recommendations here and are based on international best practices. - point 22 in the recommendations. - We also need advocacy. We need to constantly advocate. Local politicians need to speak, and we need constantly engage with other communities - OEC is a talkfest... in 2017 they wanted to create a Muslim youth group... ALL TALK NO WORK - A lot of the change in the Muslim community needs to come from within. – engagement with political parties - We argue that change is



		<p>not occurring due to a structural issue...</p> <p>intersecting intercultural realistic</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Directly under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. - We are not media tokens or political tokens. - We agree about how it will organise that initiative. Already have that through FIANZ. Collaboration with all political parties.
Inclusivity (not just Muslim issues)	<p>Question – inclusivity – how this was advertised and exclusive to all the Muslims not open to non-Muslims too – wouldn't be more valuable to have all communities present for this.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Yes we did post posters, make announcements, approach associations, WhatsApp groups, approached people – whether they show up we can't control – we made a Facebook post – Muslim only because as Muslim youth we can only speak on behalf of Muslim youth but we can make recommendations for all communities, media leakage, safety issues.
Monitoring program of the recommendations and	<p>Question – is there any way to see how much of our</p>	<p>Answer: we have recommended a follow-up committee.</p>

their implementation	<p>recommendations have been reached or implemented – monitoring the recommendations we have put through</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Can we collaborate together to meet, have one voice etc? 	<p>Office of ethnic communities – all talk no action ---</p> <p>If there is no substantial change, the meetings don't do anything. A lot of the change has to come from the Muslim community first.</p> <p>A collaborate response to support each other on the recommendations we make. We recommend a ministry of super-diversity rather than OEC – to properly implement the actions we want. – having the ministry of super-diversity to be straight under the ministry of internal affairs.</p> <p>We do not wish to be media tokens – we want actual change.</p>
Security issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Question: - How can we as a Muslim community trust the police and the SIS to protect and implement security measures for us? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Answer: we are not saying we want them to implement them for us. – want the funding to be able to implement these surveillance programs ourselves – the autonomy to do so. - There has been international – an



		<p>increase in security for religious places. We don't want them to use it as a counter-surveillance tactic. This work to be coordinated with the UN reliance on civilisation fund.</p>
Point 49 of the recommendations	Point 49 – elaborate more on this	
Influence of SIS and politicians on Islamophobia.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Media can't address it – Kitteridge – the SIS has spoken to the media and has perpetuated it – why can't we include it as a talking point 	<p>there will be a report given to the RC formerly, a public report where the media will be included (ChCh press article about a mosque linked to terrorism 4 years ago that has now been edited out.)</p> <p>Hansard – there is evidence in Hansard where all the biases come out about Islam in parliament. – Winston Peters makes remarks about Islam – right-wing activity and press releases around Islam – we have looked at it but is unfortunate we can't include it directly in the report as it does not fit the terms of reference.</p>
Police dealing with the Muslim Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Police have focussed on 'deradicalizing' people rather than taking our concerns seriously. 	<p>Tell Mama - - we want something similar in NZ – if you do not feel comfortable to go to the police, there should be a platform you can go to for support in making a claim to the police to lay a formal complaint. You should also have the option to leave it there if you don't want to file a formal complaint and just want someone to talk to.</p>

		This idea essentially advocates for police report claims to be made. The data from these platforms would also support report writing and statistical analysis on what the level of anti-Islamic hate crimes are in NZ.
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Findings Focus Group 2

- Ethics committee – confidentiality and consent forms – a reminder for next time we initiate a thing tank – suggested by attendee who offered to send us the UC template for these forms. Came about due to the implications of filming the participants

What do you think went wrong that enabled March 15th to happen?


Due to a lack of a hate registry, there was no trend keeping on hate crimes and therefore, no way to combat it. We could have been better prepared to deal with such an attack had we have known the data on hate crimes in NZ.

Question: does the report contain any record of attacks that have occurred in the past in NZ? The report itself does include evidence that highlights that there was a threat of a right-wing extremist/white supremacist attack happening in NZ –

Recommendation: We potentially need to consider adding in examples of hate crimes/right-wing extremist attacks which have occurred in NZ – not just the high-profile international RWE attacks.

Highlighted the Lauren Southern debacle, making statements of “enjoy your shariah law”.

1. Dealt with the issue as to why Muslims or any minority group are considered a threat in western countries – what causes people to be threatened by us?
 - social psychology answers this. Right-wing extremists look at Muslims negatively – “they come to NZ with their culture and don’t want to assimilate. Having our own mosques and schools, in their eyes is a direct attack against their culture and our lack of interest in assimilating,



Note: solutions that help one minority, won't necessarily help another minority – need to consider recommendations that broadly support all groups in NZ – not just Muslims (also indigenous peoples (Maori), Pacifica groups, Chinese, etc.

Also mentioned the RWE rally in Christchurch from 2012. Their slogan was that all these minorities are bringing their culture and rejecting the mainstream culture. This is what is used to drive the view.

Following 15th March, the empathy of people was unbelievable, but it was only for about 4 weeks and it goes back to normal. There is a lack of office of ethnic communities or any power or facilities to build bridges.

The rhetoric used against us is “if you don't like it, go back to your country.” – this was a recurring theme and narrative that was spoken about throughout the day and just one of many examples of the hateful language used against minorities in New Zealand.

2. There is a lack of people who have power and facilities to help build bridges between these communities and groups. People are afraid of things they don't know. Besides security issues, we don't have anything that shows NZ what we (Muslims) are about.

Solution: Building social bridges – we don't have a presence in the media and when we do it is negative. People are threatened by the idea of Muslims because we are always portrayed in a negative light. Build a positive media presence for Muslims in NZ, get involved with other communities, embrace our religion and culture. Develop a social brand for our Muslim community.

3. Social, political education, environmental and historical – a deeply imbedding intergenerational issue that starts from biculturalism right down to Colonization. We haven't addressed bi-cultural issues let alone multi-cultural issues. Our highest at risk are Maori and Pacifica, then Muslims, followed by Indians and then Chinese. The reason March 15th happened, is because of white supremacy and white privilege. Everyone in the room (within focus group) can give an example of something they have experienced, environmentally, educationally, historically etc. This highlights the deeply embedded nature of white supremacy and privilege within NZ culture and it's often overlooked or brushed under the rug.

Solution: As a country, we need to investigate bicultural issues that relate to Colonisation – we need to study and analyse it and there we will find an answer as to why March 15th happened. Start from the root of the problem and then build upwards.

Questions: “What are we going to do in our schools, in the education system – we need to consider how little our schools know about our Muslim communities. Our education system needs to be built around educating our youth on all religions, and ethnic minorities to ensure ignorance does not breed into hatred.

Widespread intolerance of Muslims and a lack of education regarding Muslim values and principles. Issues around social cohesion also contributed to the attacks of March 15th. We need to formalize these issues in all areas – not just education (state sector agencies, workplaces, hospitals etc.).

Historically, we are on land where biculturalism isn't accepted so how can we expect multiculturalism to be accepted? Need to address issues of bi-culturalism and the rights and struggles of Maori and Pacifica groups.

4. Misconceived ideas of who is a true New Zealander. Some right-wing NZ'ers believe people who can speak English (fluently or better) and are from a Maori or white background are NZ'ers – anyone else does not fit the criteria of a NZ'er. People of this belief have a low ranking for Chinese, Indians and then Muslims who fall at the bottom of the rank.

There is a level of acceptance for minorities and Muslims come at the bottom of this acceptance – how the overall public sees us.

“It is about more than just social cohesion and security.”


5. How do we identify – the dominant discourse believes they (Muslims) are here and they matter – it is often that NZ displaces us and makes us justify our right to be in this country. This need to justify ourselves and our right to be New Zealander's contributes to the narrative that lead to the March 15th attacks.

White privilege. – but also need to acknowledge that we all have privilege depending on our identity (example: someone with tertiary education has more privilege than someone with only a high school diploma).

Unconscious biases and pre-conceived ideas that take over our own narrative as Muslims. What non-Muslims perceive us is the driving narrative. If these things are not challenged and critiqued – nothing will change. Muslims need to control their own narrative.

New Zealand has a superficial lens on biculturalism.

New Zealand is more scared of being called racist than addressing racism itself.



Exposing children to more diversity, more academic and cultural competency training.
Addressing where does this unconscious bias comes from.

6. Institutionalization of Islamic racism – we don't talk about terrorism – we talk about “Islamic terrorism.” We need to stop referring to terrorism as an Islamic issue when in reality, it is a global issue that does not fit under the scope of one group or religion. Anyone can be a terrorist as proven by the March 15th attack. “Islam has nothing to do with terrorism” Solution: “circular surveillance of all groups and communities- not just Muslim communities.”

- Islamic terrorism needs to be removed from the dictionary.

Post 9/11, Muslim communities came under significant surveillance.

The underlying issue which lead to the attacks of March 15th is fear – fear of the unknown.

Suggestion: there may be white supremacy issues, but there are also brown supremacy issues. We should be clear in our recommendations, we need to talk about more than just white supremacists, but also brown supremacists that hate Muslims and other minority groups. E.g the RSS and Indian Right-Wing

7. We don't push our people enough to have a seat at the table. There is a certain bias related to what kind of person can be at the table. If Muslims are not sitting at the table, they will design a policy that doesn't include Muslim narrative- even if they think they are being inclusive. We need to help create the narrative at these tables for our communities, to ensure these policies are made in recognition of our existence and contribution to New Zealand society.

8. Why are Muslims not at the table? 3 reasons.
 - a. Our communities are not willing to be at the table.
 - b. Tall poppy syndrome – agenda – “this person is doing it for themselves”
 - c. People that have capabilities in our community are time-poor, and people who have time, don't have the capabilities.
 - d. fear of speaking about Islam in front of non-Muslims.

In addition to this, Muslims in leadership become the “black-box” for hatred. Hatred is sent their way just because they are leaders in the Muslim community. A multitude of Hate mail received, and articles are written

9. The narrative of a lone wolf – The Christchurch attack was not a lone wolf scenario. There are significant similarities between the Christchurch shooter and other right-wing extremists which adhere to the same ideology. To imply that the Christchurch shooter is a lone wolf is to say that there are not others who have the same belief system and are willing to commit similar attacks.

GCSB was set up to digitally spy on foreign threats – not New Zealand threats. Now they say New Zealander's can be surveilled by the GCSB.

Police complaints – always related back to psychological problems – no actual action – our issues are often invalidated through the argument of mental illness or lone-wolf theory.

We need a strategy in New Zealand to include minority communities and to be unapologetic and proud of our cultural and religious backgrounds and differences.

10. Racism is everywhere, each country has a different percentage of it. He came from Australia where racism is prevalent.

A lot of people in NZ are not religious – so when we speak to them they don't understand where we are coming from. (issue regarding lack of education)

Hate speech being enabled and allowed in New Zealand under the gaze of freedom of speech.


Muslims in New Zealand have not done enough to present ourselves to the New Zealand public. We need to focus on a strategy to present the Muslim identity in a positive light.

The media – we as a Muslim community need to work on framing our narrative in the media (proper media training and ensuring that journalists tell our stories – not their perception of our stories).

Solution: A Muslim channel on the television in New Zealand - an example given was the UK's Islamic channel – Peace TV.

11. Issue of guns was brought up:

– why was the guy able to buy 5 guns legally? Why were there no red flags throughout the process?



12. abuse of New Zealand Muslims – we are never equal to anyone – we will always have to prove ourselves and our points more than anyone else – especially after 9/11.

13. Refugees – people questioning why we are accepting refugees, why they are being moved to safer countries, and what happened to them in their countries. The refugee crisis presented a general fear of unfamiliar cultures and people.

14. There were gaps in the narrative regarding how he acquired the gun legally.

15. Example of death threats

26 July Pakeha lady made a death threat made on her life. Smash her head and the other that he would run her over.

Even non-muslims who try to come and support us receive death threats.

Police culture around receiving death threats.

- The police stated he was a keyboard warrior. The police officer refused to give details of the person and was told to file a Privacy Act request.

Gives examples of the securitization of Islam as a security concern – write it down and share with focus group

drone attack in Yemen – Christopher Havard and Daryl Jones – he was from Australia but was alleged to have been radicalised in Masjid Al-Nur (this was not the case). Following this, Masjid Al-Nur became one of the top targets of the NZSIS– and the masjid was often used in photos in the media. This caused scrutiny upon the entire Muslim community. We suffered the repercussions due to the actions of two individuals. Muslims are always expected to be apologetic for the actions of few that do not represent the true peace and beauty of Islam.

<http://i.stuff.co.nz/the-press/10125382/Yemeni-drone-victim-had-escaped-to-Chch>

1. Non-Muslims are also victims of islamophobia (Sikh people are often confused as Muslims). Young kids are not taught how to deal with racism or given the right tools, resources and support to deal with it.
2. “what are you doing here” “why are you here, go back to your country.”
3. Passports being ceased – asked by the government to help facilitate discussions with the group. SIS and internal affairs stayed away from this issue. There were men within this group that were radicalised but there were also people in there who were victims of circumstance. One of the men in the group had his passport ceased because he did not wish to spy on his own Muslim community.
4. Securitization of Islam – an action done by an individual with no reference to you, your community etc. However, the actions are related back to you and your community and you are asked to explain it and justify the actions of an individual. The burden is upon the entire Muslim community to apologise.
 - a. Summary: We have to be apologetic for the actions of one individual when other groups are not expected to apologise for the actions of a few.
5. Direct islamophobia, private Islamophobia and institutional islamophobia. – Islamophobia is entrenched in New Zealand. If things have to change, there has to be an appetite for change from the top (the institutional level). It has to be looked at in its entirety- it has to change in its entirety; through legislation, in the school systems, education systems- peoples mentality have to change, the state sector agencies’ perceptions have to change.
6. We have to be unapologetic and open Muslim and let people ask us questions and be willing to engage in these conversations. Majority of people are ignorant about Islam and therefore, we need to educate them. We don’t need to fit in, we have to open up and be ourselves within our religious identity.
7. University bans Muslim scholars. Sheikh Ebrahim Bahm, white supremacy is not even recognized. The more you educate about racism, the more sophisticated you get. Vice-chancellor in Auckland – bans Islamic speakers but does not acknowledge right-wing extremism. Action Zealanda – in the flesh, it’s right there.



8. Women taking off their hijab after March 15th out of fear of being recognised as Muslims.
9. Trying to frame Muslims in New Zealand is the norm now because there's more impact.
10. Racial and ethnic profiling and tokenism-
11. Media; the invasive reporting of the Christchurch shootings and its victims. One of the families of the victims had reporters standing outside her family's shop. The reporter had managed her in a tokenistic way and sent a Muslim journalist to speak to her after a white journalist messed up and said: "We haven't had our chance to get a story out of you." There's a documentary coming out next year that also highlights the mistreatment of the Christchurch victims.

Reporter pushing issues that push Muslim limits – a story about a non-Muslim victim who lost her revert mother in the attack. The reporter wanted to talk about the conflicting issue of alcohol and consumption of alcohol with a Muslim in a non-Muslim family. – a direct example of how the media are taking advantage of traumatised brains that can't make logical decisions.

12. Police in our Muslim community events – are they there to protect us or are they there surveilling us too?
 - a. "Are we being monitored for the fear of retaliation?"

The securitization issue is continuing because of March 15th and makes victims very vulnerable.

Whatever you hear in the media, unless it is directly from the victims' families, is not a direct reflection of the victim's views.

Journalists attempting to find a widow who was heavily dependent on her husband and trying to lure a story out of her. – journalist using vulnerability and manipulation to get victims to speak about the attack and the aftermath of it.

13. KiwiFarms – An online American online forum – global forum but there are people using this forum that are from New Zealand. The shooter clearly stated his objective and plan before the attack – discussions were happening about the attack on the online forum. There was no intelligence picked up on these discussions- even though they are easily and publicly accessible by anyone.

- the role of our intelligence agencies – we need to emphasise the expansion of intelligence gathering to also include right-wing extremism and white supremacy within the intelligence monitoring processes. People who are known to be associated with these right-wing extremist organisations MUST be monitored.

14. Queenstown and Auckland

We tried to bring a few motivational speakers to New Zealand – with the objective of giving motivational talks to youth – their names were Ahmad and Mohammad (popular Muslim names) – they were stopped and interrogated and then they were sent back. The reason given for being deported was dishonest reasoning for wanting to enter the country. Government has the right to follow processes that mitigate any threat to the safety of the country but they should have done further research to find out more about these individuals rather than just deporting them when they were not linked to any threat.

Attempting to understand the problem – Surah Baqara (Aya 120). “They will never be happy with you until you follow them.”


- [And never will the Jews or the Christians approve of you until you follow their religion. Say, "Indeed, the guidance of Allah is the \[only\] guidance." If you were to follow their desires after what has come to you of knowledge, you would have against Allah no protector or helper.](#)

Recognising that these groups, the media, SIS, and state sector agencies have their own agendas and objectives.

Unconscious bias – our unconscious biases happen because of our experiences, opinions presented to us, our environments but they can be eradicated through proper education and engagement with other communities.

Muslims have a significant part to play in engaging with other communities in New Zealand and in spreading the blessings and mercy of Allah SWT. We all have different expertise and abilities to help each other and the wider New Zealand community.

Recommendations Focus Group 1




What is the follow up to this process:

- a. We will undertake an editorial process after collating all the feedback from all the presentations and focus group workshops.
- b. We will submit a final amended copy to FIANZ.
- c. FIANZ may choose to share it with Associations – if they do, associations responsible for updating their constituents.


Based on your experience, how can we prevent another massacre from happening	
Topic	Response
	<p>The underlying thing we need to get done is get a representation of all NZers within our authorities</p> <p>If we have representation, then things like education will have better changes</p> <p>Two way – need to be supporting our youth so that they can get into these positions; also need to challenge the agencies when we think they're not doing enough to get equal representation</p>
	<p>Very strong monitoring of hate – data analytics etc. Need it to predict hate speech/crime around NZ. Need to develop a body of knowledge and then know what would be appropriate – need to develop a framework that would be appropriate</p> <p>Three layers of prejudice/hate</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ignorance – need to be proactive about this; need to identify everyone's role as individuals, as a community, as a country to know what we have to contribute <p>Need to investigate national mosque safety and training</p>

	<p>In terms of recommendation, let's not have a narrow Muslim Focus. People who hate Muslims might hate other minorities.</p> <p>These attacks have happened on other minorities.</p> <p>Example – Pakistani men involved in sexual grooming in the UK. Community knew.</p> <p>Disagree with the document in general – a very narrow focus; need to consider other groups like the Jews etc</p> <p>Everyone needs to take on that responsibility, regardless of whether they were Muslim or not</p> <p>Need to focus on everybody's life, not just Muslims</p> <p>Security of Masjids – not ideal but what we need. Should not be like that but that's the way it is</p> <p>Facilitators: we need to take a holistic and wider approach. Need to be more holistic – live in a diverse society (need to work collaboratively)</p> <p>Us is just not Muslims, us is all</p>
	<p>Local Security – we have a very specialised person (Major Latif)</p> <p>If you think local masjid has not been contacted (but according to his knowledge has been contacted) then we can get you in contact</p> <p>He is also working with other communities</p> <p>Saying, stick with security plants directed by experts</p>



	<p>Approach the people who stand behind the microphones and do speeches to ensure there is a clear and unified message that we need to share with the non-Muslim community as well</p> <p>Unify the message of Muslims and try to tidy up controversial issues that we have in this community – be it religious speakers or personal; we do have internal racism and extremists</p> <p>People cannot get along with each other – need to fix the racism and suspicion in our communities</p> <p>An initiative in Wellington is an interfaith community (Wellington interfaith committee. Program is called Acceptance for Peace. Members/participations are referred to people as faith) – approach schools and have an education session with children; opportunity for kids to ask questions. Questions regarding religion in general and Islam specifically</p> <p>Our own kids do not know how to</p> <p>Self-Defence – Martial arts. Kids from schools learning self-defence. Also available to women and men. People need to defend themselves when waiting for Police.</p>
	<p>IWCNZ have organised self-defence classes for Muslim women across NZ before March 15</p> <p>Education background and Employer</p> <p>Anti-Discrimination policy and training – for employers and employees</p> <p>Need to ensure that they are being enforced/applied</p> <p>Inclusion and diversity at the workplace and in the school system</p> <p>Intergroup contact – older students; staff so they know each other more so they know what they are doing. Avoid ignorance</p> <p>If assaulted, no one does anything</p> <p>Changing the social norms – through education and enforcing policies</p> <p>Implementing a see something say something policy (have one in the US)</p>
	<p>Sometimes taking these things into your own hand can make it worse – can be assaulted etc so requires a lot of courage</p>
	<p>How did he get his gun license?</p>

Suggest 5-key recommendations that we will write policy papers for (Write an ordered list then share with focus group)	
Topic	Response
	<p>Cut them down to 5 altogether or prioritize. Differentiate between tangible and aspirational. Make them smart recommendations; specific, time orientated.</p> <p>Some of them have no way to be achieved.</p> <p>Do not make it a wish list.</p> <p>How much have we thought this out? Muslims aren't on the same page. People are on different pages when it comes to policy.</p>
	<p>Split them up further into aspirations and policy - some of them more aspirations rather than policy</p> <p>Make this very clear – what we actually want</p> <p>Be aware of what has already been done – e.g. security for mosques</p> <p>They will choose the ones that are done and say it has been implemented by them – when referring to government/policymakers</p> <p>Should acknowledge this in your report – highlight explicitly some recommendations we had that government has taken action on – there is progress</p> <p>Some of them can be easily put down</p>
	<p>Question on the number of recommendations. When the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry was brought up – “but that was the final report”</p>



	<p>Memorialise March 15 – re-traumatising for victims and making it only about Muslims</p> <p>“But if it were the other community, there would be”</p> <p>If the NZ government wishes to memorialise March 15th then let them do so, however it should not come from Muslims. We should not put ourselves in the spotlight. Other tragedies in NZ have not been acknowledged through a day of reflection.</p>
	<p>Feedback on focus group: Start on time and end on time – need to be professional things – Brother left at 4 pm</p>
	<p>Definition of Hate Speech blurred</p> <p>These recommendations are a bit complex 1; 3; 5; 6; 24; 30; 31; 32</p>
	<p>Institutional Racism – premise that it is there and exists.</p> <p>Things are not very clear e.g. securitisation of Islam which is a bit complicated to understand – Economical term which relates to the security of assets</p> <p>How does it link to securitisation –</p> <p>Solution: Use plain English. The language used in Parliamentary documents is aimed at achieving the reading age of 13</p>
	<p>Have a chapter in the report to highlight Muslim contributions to NZ society. Consensus and agreed.</p>

	<p>Conferences are coming up. We should make papers/background work and present it at conferences.</p> <p>Some recommendations we do not have. Once we have it, it's done and is down to maintenance. So, we should look into gathering feedback on the progress.</p> <p>In the next 10 years, we can equal representation. Based on that we can expect and help people accountable.</p> <p>Avoid finger-pointing – highlight the problems and present solutions for a better New Zealand – should say what the failings have been but not who they are</p>
	<p>For 5 recommendations – could have equal representation; could have real numbers that we expect to see and then follow up on it with them and</p> <p>Set numbers as guidelines – a measurable outcome but do not want tokenism</p>
	<p>E.g. scholarships</p> <p>E.g. Malaysian scholarships - After they have graduated, they are given graduate roles</p>
	<p>Verses of Quran – do not know if it is appropriate because Perception of Non-Muslim</p>

Milestones Questions	
Topic	Response
	<p>Conferences on Diversity (Ummah Day – Wellington) – papers can be drawn from this work and see how much traction that gets when you present this</p>
	<p>Keep things boiling not just let them drop away</p>



	<p>Some of these recommendations are one and done – once done you have them there (need to ensure they are there and being used)</p> <p>Clear how you can measure that</p> <p>When it comes to things like education, it is important to record metrics</p> <p>Feedback to see the results</p>
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Recommendations Focus Group 2

1. Create an Islamophobic Register – having data beforehand on Islamophobic behaviour could have led to the creation of a precautionary approach strategy. (Gave the example of three different individuals (two from Christchurch and one from Wellington) that had three different complaints. – None of these cases were taken to the police as they thought that the police wouldn't take it seriously or that there would be a threat for more attacks). – Look at Recommendation 22
 - Having data would mean we would be in a better situation to respond to the event
 - The data gives you the ability to come up with strategies
 - Hate Crimes is a tricky concept and the police themselves must be trained to empathetically understand the situation for themselves. There needs to be statistics on conviction, sentencing, prosecution and complaints (there are huge number of complaints, but no prosecutions- this points to a flaw in the system)
 - The information that police are getting are dependent on self-reporting... we know the reasons why people do not self-report (thus we formulate a National Strategy)- model of Tell MAMA in UK
 - Hate crimes in Aotearoa should be monitored, mapped, reported and recorded.
 - Organisation would have an advocate who already has a relationship with police to help you lay that complaint so that you can take it seriously. – Victims are also provided with counselling and wellbeing services etc

- Need a national and global register of anti-Muslim hate crime events and details and send this to all decision makers
2. Is there a register to identify RWE groups in NZ? – We need to create a register for all these organisations and deem them as terror organisations. If it is identified officially, then we can get easy surveillance.
 - Linking back to those individuals as the individuals would be common to the organisation
 - To ensure what's going on in the public domain (what we can know without jeopardising security) e.g create a trend report monitoring- (look at Recommendation 14)
 3. Strategy to follow up on Recommendations (when, how it will be implemented)
 - Progress on the Royal Commission recommendations should be monitored and reported on regularly
 - Prioritise the recommendations so that it is easier for the Royal Commission to understand. – use five flagship priorities
 4. Include the voice of victims that were specifically affected in the recommendations
 - Need to have victims voice heard in the report. We need to use our initiative to talk to these people.
 - Not just 51 deaths, there are families and individuals who were injured and affected – they need to be considered in the report
 - Go visit victims face to face, rather than have a meeting... make it authentic by visiting the families
 - Recommendations should include perspective analysis
 - Organise the engagement from within the victim community (as victims are likely to understand each other better). This can help with participation rates
 - Effective consultation – **have victim representation in the steering committee**
 - Empower victims to create their own group
 - Have a supplement that we give to the Royal Commission and let them know what is coming.
 5. We need Muslim-specific recommendations about what our specific community needs – rather than focussing on minority groups as a whole
 - Refer to Recommendations 30-46
 6. Portrayal of Muslims on media
 - How we can control this
 7. We need a professional directory for the Muslim community – so that everyone knows where to look for help from within the Muslim community.



8. Ensure that there is a recommendation for Mental Health and Wellbeing amongst the Muslim community – how they can support their own mental health, as well as help others within their own community.

Top 5 recommendations

- 1. Criminalise Hate Crimes - submit examples of hate crimes**
- 2. Recommendation 3 – deny RWE (based on overt behaviours)**
- 3. Ministry of Super-Diversity**
- 4. Media representation**
- 5. Police and NZIC training**